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Abstract 
 
 
A growing literature indicates that the representation of women in legislatures is 
positively associated with the passage of female-friendly social policy. However, there is little 
corresponding research concerning the effect of women in cabinet on female-friendly social 
policy. Yet, almost all advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary democracies, where 
policies typically originate within the cabinet and governments typically enjoy substantial 
control over the legislative process. Thus, to the extent that women promote female-friendly 
policy, women in cabinet positions should be ideally placed to do so, and indeed, possibly be 
more influential than women in legislatures. The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of 
female cabinet ministers in the adoption of a wide range of female-friendly policies, thus 
addressing this gap in the gender and politics literature.  However, the role of female 
officeholders on female friendly policy may differ by policy.   
To address this issue, I look at three different policy areas: family leave, working time, 
and child care.  I create an index measure for each policy area so that I am able to analyze 
women‘s impact on both individual policies (e.g. maternity leave) and a wider range of related 
female-friendly policies (e.g. family leave policies in general).  In order to assess female 
officeholders‘ effect on female friendly policy in general, I sum the three policy indices to form a 
single measure of female-friendly policy; this is the Support for Women‘s Employment Index.    
Using OLS regression, I find that female ministers have a significant effect on the adoption of 
female-friendly policy generally and in each of the three policy areas.   
iv 
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Chapter 1: Gendered Representation and Female-Friendly Policy 
Introduction 
The past decade and a half has witnessed tremendous growth in research on gender 
representation and policy outcomes.  Much of the work to date has focused on the role of female 
legislators in the adoption of policy that addresses gender inequality in the labor market 
(Kittilson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Wangnerud, 2000).  These scholars argue 
that female politicians tend to represent the interests of women; therefore, female legislators are 
the key to the passage of these types of policies.  What has gone largely unnoticed in this 
research, however, is the issue of executive dominance over the legislature.  In particular, 
researchers have failed to acknowledge that the majority of advanced industrial democracies are 
parliamentary systems in which the cabinet typically exerts considerable control over the 
legislature.  Thus, the current research has not taken into account the role of the cabinet in the 
adoption of public policy.  It is of practical importance that this omission be addressed because 
the issue of gender equality is now attracting serious attention in many advanced industrial 
democracies. 
The increased importance of gender equality in the labor market stems from one basic 
issue: population aging.  This is a demographic phenomenon in which low mortality rates 
combine with low birth rates to produce a society in which the elderly and middle-aged make up 
a disproportionate share of the population.  Welfare systems in these societies are likely to 
become unsupportable as an aging population decreases the number of workers in the economy 
and increases the strain on already over-burdened systems (Castles, 2004; Myles, 2002).  A 
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proposed solution  to the welfare problem is to encourage women to join the workforce, thus 
increasing the number of workers contributing to funding the welfare state  (EU, 2006; OECD, 
2004).   
Yet, in most societies, women are at a disadvantage in the workforce because of their 
potential to become mothers.  As Esping-Andersen (2002b) points out, because women are likely 
to interrupt their careers to care for their families, a rational employer is more likely to invest in 
male workers.  Consequently, working women often choose to postpone motherhood, or even 
rule it out completely (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).  In addition, it is difficult to harmonize 
motherhood and employment; therefore many mothers choose to work outside the home only 
part-time, if at all.   These choices reduce female labor force participation and lower birthrates, 
thus exacerbating the population aging problem.  However, research indicates that where women 
do not lose economically as a result of childbearing they are more likely to have children and 
remain attached to the labor market (Chesnais, 1996; McDonald, 2002; Rindfuss, Guzzo, & 
Morgan, 2003).  Consequently, governments have become interested in implementing social 
policy aimed at reducing the economic inequalities associated with motherhood; these policies 
are often referred to as ‗female-friendly‘ policies (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; EU, 2007b; 
Gauthier, 2005).
1
 
A large body of literature posits that increased numbers of female legislators will lead to 
passage of female-friendly policies, and researchers have found evidence that supports this 
hypothesis (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Tremblay, 1998).  I argue that, given our 
understanding of the policy process in advanced industrial democracies, it is necessary to 
                                                 
1 The female-friendliness of such policies is debatable; this will be discussed at length below. 
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determine the extent to which female cabinet ministers influence female-friendly policy.  Most of 
these countries have parliamentary systems in which the level of executive dominance over the 
legislature is relatively high.  Executive dominance is evident in three main areas of the policy 
process: initiation, design, and adoption.  First, cabinets are the primary source of policy 
initiatives in parliamentary democracies; in most countries, a member of parliament is restricted 
from initiating legislation.  Second, an individual minister has considerable discretion over the 
crafting of policies within her purview.  As a result, the design of policies is often a reflection of 
the minister‘s own policy agenda.  Third, cabinets typically exert substantial control over the 
legislative agenda, meaning that they have significant discretion over which policies can even be 
considered by legislatures.  In sum, the cabinet is the dominant institution in policy making; 
therefore, we should expect the presence of women in cabinets to be of greater importance to the 
adoption of female-friendly policy than the presence of women in legislatures.    
It is this issue, the influence of female cabinet ministers versus that of their legislative 
counterparts in respect to the adoption of female-friendly policy, which I address in my 
dissertation.  In order to do so I develop an index measure of female-friendly policies.  I do this 
because most studies focus on a single policy area (e.g. childcare), despite evidence that 
women‘s influence varies depending on the policy being considered (Weldon, 2010).  There are 
many types of female-friendly policy and there is considerable cross national variation with 
regard to which of these policies is actually adopted.  A more appropriate approach is to 
determine how female officeholders influence both individual policy areas and a range of 
female-friendly policies.  To that end, my index will be comprised of a total of nineteen 
variables, divided into three sub-indices: family leave, childcare policy, and labor regulations.  
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Each sub-index will be used to test the influence of female officeholders on individual policy 
areas; the full index will be used to determine these women‘s influence on a larger package of 
female-friendly policies. 
In the following, I first discuss the social and political issues that have made female-
friendly policies a pressing concern in many advanced industrial democracies.  I then outline the 
ideological debate over the definition of female-friendly policy and define female-friendly policy 
for the purposes of my research.  In the third section I explain the theories of descriptive and 
substantive representation, focusing on the expectation that female officeholders will represent 
women‘s interests.  In the fourth section, I explain the concept of executive dominance as it 
applies to parliamentary democracies.  When considered together, the theories of female 
representation and executive dominance suggest that it is not general female representation that 
matters to the passage of female-friendly policy; it is female representation in the executive.  In 
the fifth section, I explain the methodology and data that are used to test my hypotheses.  This 
section also includes an explanation of the index measures of female-friendliness that I am 
developing to test my hypotheses.  I conclude with a chapter-by-chapter overview of the 
dissertation structure.  
The Practical Politics of Female-Friendly Social Policy 
 
Over the past two decades, gender inequality in the labor market has become a matter of 
vital interest to policy makers in many advanced industrial societies.  The pressing need to create 
―Men were the indisputable protagonists of high industrialization; women may occupy centre-
stage in post-industrial society.‖ 
~Gosta Esping-Andersen (2002b, p. 68) 
 
 5 
 
gender equity in the labor market stems from policy makers‘ belief that women are the key to 
maintaining appropriate levels of funding to the welfare state.  As a result of generous benefits 
and low contributor-to-recipient ratios, many wealthy nations are experiencing a profusion of 
funding problems in many areas of the welfare state.  A good example is ―the looming pension 
crisis‖ (OECD, 2007a).  Wealthy societies have built pension systems that are predicated on 
having a high ratio of contributors to recipients. Unfortunately, contributor-to-recipient ratios 
have fallen to historical lows in many countries; this has resulted in the high likelihood of 
pension system insolvency in many countries (Eberstadt, 2004).  Analysts predict that the 
pension systems in wealthy nations will become increasingly unsupportable as population aging 
further decreases contributor-to-recipient ratios (Castles, 2004; Myles, 2002).   
As mentioned, the population aging problem stems from two main sources:  low 
mortality rates and low birth rates.  First, people are living longer, therefore mortality rates are 
falling.  While this is typically viewed as a boon, it is a pressing concern for welfare systems, 
particularly those in which solvency requires high contributor-to-recipient ratios.  Second, since 
the 1960s, a number of factors have combined to cause birthrates to plummet in most of the 
wealthy nations;
 2
 this has decreased the number of people entering the workforce and 
contributing to pension schemes.  Given the magnitude of the problem, and the low likely of 
rapid large-scale reform,
3
 countries must find ways to increase the number of people contributing 
to welfare systems.   
                                                 
2
 For a full explanation, please see Coleman, 2005.  The United States is the primary exception. 
3
 As Myles (2002) points out, wholesale reform is unlikely to take place unless social consensus regarding change 
can be achieved.  Unfortunately, welfare systems are so well entrenched that citizens typically vehemently oppose 
reforms. Therefore, it is assumed that massive restructuring is unlikely to occur in the immediate future. 
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While migration has been touted as a solution to increasing the number of contributors, it 
is not a tenable solution.   As McDonald (2002) notes, unless a country‘s fertility rate is at least 
1.6, the level of migration needed to even sustain the current workforce is too large to be 
feasible.
4
   Harris (2006, p. 97) provides the following examples: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, it seems that immigration is at best a stopgap measure.  Consequently, policy 
experts recommend that countries increase the female labor force participation rate in order to 
increase overall participation in paid employment and, as a result, increase contributions to ailing 
welfare systems (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Longman, 2004; Myles, 2002).  The European Union 
concurs, stating in a 1999 (p. 11) report that ―Women's increasing participation will be the main 
source of future labor force growth in many Member States.‖  In order for that to happen, 
governments must remove—or at least lessen—barriers to female labor force participation 
(Gauthier, 2005). 
Child bearing and rearing are the primary barriers to women‘s participation in the labor 
market (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  First, women who bear children 
                                                 
4
 Only a few advanced industrial democracies (the Scandinavian countries, France, and the US) are consistently at or 
above a fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman. 
Expressed in terms of migrants per million inhabitants in 2000, 
Italy would require the highest number of immigrants—at 
6,500 annual immigrants per million inhabitants, in order to 
maintain its working-age population, followed by Germany, 
with 6,000 needed annual immigrants per million 
inhabitants…the numbers of immigrants necessary to keep 
constant the ratio of those age 15-64 to those age 65 or older—
that is, the support ratio—are extraordinarily large…for Italy, 
the figure [between 2000 and 2050] would be 113 million (or 
2.3 million per year).  
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are at a major economic disadvantage—for each year a woman is out of the workforce in order to 
care for children, she loses 1.5 to 2 percent of her lifetime earnings potential (Esping-Andersen, 
2002, p. 78).  This ―cumulative wage penalty‖ makes childbearing cost prohibitive for career-
oriented women. Consequently, as female labor force participation rates have increased, fertility 
rates have fallen (McDonald, 2000a).  Second, research shows that employers are reluctant to 
hire and/or promote women; not only might a female employee take time off to have a child, she 
will then have to take additional time off to care for the child (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).  
Therefore, a rational employer will be reluctant to fully invest in female employees; the return on 
investment is likely to be greater for a male employee. Thus, governments cannot expect 
employers to voluntarily increase female labor force participation rates.  Removing the 
childbirth/rearing barrier to female employment has therefore become a public policy issue 
(Gauthier, 2005).  Because research indicates that when women are not penalized financially for 
motherhood they are more likely to have children and remain attached to the labor market, many 
policy analysts recommend a female-friendly policy solution that includes affordable daycare, 
paid maternity and parental leave, and family-care leave (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; McDonald, 
2002, 2006; OECD, 2007a; Rindfuss, et al., 2003). 
Are these Policies Truly Female-friendly? 
Despite the foregoing, it can be challenging to determine which policies are truly female-
friendly. The feminist movement is divided on which policies promote equality and which 
reinforce traditional gender roles.  As Ferguson (1984) notes, the feminist movement is broadly 
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split between liberals and radicals.
5
  Liberals seek gender equality in existing institutions.  
Conversely, radicals seek to transform existing institutions—they reject the liberal approach 
because they believe that the institutions to which the liberals seek access are essentially flawed 
(Ferguson, 1984).   Women‘s voice in policy making is a primary area in which radical and 
liberal feminists split.  
Historically, feminist policy analysis has leaned toward the radical approach.  Analysis 
has hinged on the study of androcentrism in institutions, policies, and laws (Hawkesworth, 
1994).  What these scholars report is that both policies, and policy studies, are gendered—they 
often are based on the experiences and interpretation of men (Hawkesworth, 1994; Sapiro, 1986).  
In particular, feminist scholars argue that throughout much of its history, social welfare policy 
has been based on the experiences and actions of men, rather than on the experiences and needs 
of the women the policies are meant to benefit (e.g. benefits to women are often based on the 
income of their husbands, or on the male-breadwinner model) (McDonald, 2002; Sainsbury, 
1996).  In radical feminist literature, social welfare policy is typically regarded as a patriarchal 
societal mechanism by which men collectively ―separate the sexes and devalue and control 
women‖ (D. C. Miller, 1990).  Radical feminists view policies termed ―female-friendly‖ as 
attempts to erode women‘s power.  They argue that the state has taken on a patriarchal role, via 
the social welfare system, to exert control over women and that the state perpetuates the cycle of 
female dependence (D. C. Miller, 1990; Pascall, 1997).   
In contrast with their radical colleagues, liberal feminists view lobbying for female-
friendly policies as a way to guide welfare policy so that it benefits women (King, 1998).   As 
                                                 
5
 More recent research shows that there are other factions in the feminist movement, however Ferguson‘s will be 
used for simplicity sake, and because this division best mirrors the division over family policy. 
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Heitlinger (1991, pp. 28-29) notes, ―…the main goal of the assimilationist [liberal] model of 
absolute equality of opportunity has been the reduction of the traditional penalties associated 
with motherhood.‖  Starting in the 1930s in Sweden, women began to see equity gains as a direct 
result of welfare policies, gaining ―extensive provision of government services for parents and 
children‖ (Heitlinger, 1991, p. 364; 1993).  King (1998) relates that French women also reaped 
the benefits of these types of policies, gaining increased welfare transfers to women, state-
provided daycare, maternity benefits, and healthcare
6
.  Throughout the Nordic countries, policies 
designed to strengthen the family have allowed women to more fully participate in the labor 
force without loss of pay typically associated with childbearing (Gauthier, 2005).  Liberal 
feminists view these policies as wins.  Radicals would argue that family policies have, at best, 
been a partial gain because the paucity of the benefits does not help women escape the trap of 
poverty and dependence (Pascall, 1997).  Nevertheless, in the mainstream of liberal feminist and 
non-feminist social thought, female-friendly policies have been considered a boon to women‘s 
equality in society (Chesnais, 1996; Gauthier, 2005).  
Even in the liberal feminist tradition, there is not a universal definition of female-friendly 
policies.  Definitions range from any policy that is placed on the agenda by women (e.g. 
Hoskyns, 1996), to any policy that benefits women, families, or children (e.g. Thomas, 1994).  
For the purposes of this research, I follow Bratton‘s (2002, p. 123) definition, in which women‘s 
issues are those addressed by legislation that would ―decrease gender discrimination or alleviate 
the effects of such discrimination and those that are intended to improve the socio-
socioeconomic status of women.‖   I am including policies that specifically address both 
                                                 
6
 The explicit goal of the French government was to stimulate fertility, however these policies are designed to lessen 
the economic penalties women often suffer as a result of leaving the workforce to have a child (King, 2002) 
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discrimination and socio-economic loss by attempting to ensure that a woman‘s career is not 
harmed when she temporarily leaves the workforce for childbearing or when she must take time 
away from work for child care activities (Ahn & Mira, 2002; Chesnais, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 
2002b; McDonald, 2000b).  My focus is on mother-friendly policies because research shows that 
women—regardless of parental status—are often at a disadvantage in the workforce because of 
their potential to be mothers (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).  Accordingly, because the opportunity 
costs of even the potential for motherhood are a deterrent to the financial equality of all working 
women, mother-friendly policies equate to female-friendly policies.  These include the childcare 
and leave policies mentioned above, but also working time policies that regulate vacation, part-
time work, and non-standard working hours.   
Each of these policy areas has the potential to engender equity in the labor market.  First, 
where access to affordable and reliable childcare is limited, women are often forced into an all-
or-nothing situation; they must either work full-time in order to be able to afford childcare, or 
they must stay home in order to care for their children themselves (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
7
  
The public provision of affordable and reliable childcare gives parents the ability to be both 
earners and caregivers.  As such, access to childcare is crucial to creating gender equality in the 
labor market because, as Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 197) note, ―in the absence of acceptable 
alternatives it is mothers not fathers who loosen their ties to the labor market to care for 
children.‖ 
                                                 
7
 Although childcare is often viewed as an issue only when children are under the age of 3, the age at which many 
countries begin to provide pre-primary education,  childcare remains an issue for school-aged children in systems 
where the school day—or , as in France, the school week—is not continuous.  Therefore, school scheduling can also 
be viewed as a childcare-related policy. 
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Second, the provision of properly designed maternity and parental leave programs fosters 
a dual earner-carer relationship between parents, thus fostering gender equality.  I emphasize, 
however, that leave policies must be carefully designed in order to achieve equality.  Extended 
leaves have been shown to weaken women‘s labor market attachment when the leave is 
exclusive to women either because of take-up or design (Deven & Moss, 2002).  However, 
where maternity and parental leaves are designed to encourage fathers to take leave gender 
equity is strengthened and women‘s labor market attachment is less likely to be weakened.  
Finally, working time can also have a large impact on gender equality.  For example, because 
women make up a disproportionate share of the part-time workforce, policies that improve the 
pay and quality of part-time work decrease income inequalities between men and women 
(Gornick, 1999).   
It can be argued, however, that even when a policy has the potential to increase women‘s 
equity in the labor market, the same policy is not necessarily one that increases women‘s equity 
at home.  Gelb and Palley (1996) argue that gender-related policies either reinforce traditional 
gender roles (e.g. maternity leave reinforces a woman‘s role as caretaker) or challenge traditional 
gender roles (e.g. paternity leave challenges the traditional woman-as-caretaker role).  Thus, 
while I define both examples as female-friendly because they help increase women‘s economic 
independence, paternity leave is more female-friendly because it splits the burden of care 
between both parents. 
Since the 1970s, many wealthy nations have implemented at least some of the female-
friendly policies mentioned above.  For example, the Scandinavian countries have offered 
incentives for fathers to take parental leave, some of Continental Europe has moved towards a 
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continuous school day, and most European nations have removed restrictions on when/where 
women can work.  The main explanations scholars provide for the expansion of female-friendly 
policy are: power mobilization in the form of left parties, labor unions and women‘s movements 
(e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Sainsbury, 1999; Weldon, 2010) and 
female political participation (e.g. Dahlerup, 2006b; Kittilson, 2008; Tremblay, 1998).  Although 
power mobilization is addressed briefly below, my main focus is female political participation: 
specifically, the representation of women by female politicians. 
Left Parties, Labor, and Women’s Movements 
 Power resources theory is frequently used to explain welfare state expansion; it is argued 
that benefits and spending will be greater in countries in which women‘s movements, labor 
unions, and left parties are strong (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Lambert, 2008; Stephens, 1979).  It 
is expected that women‘s movements, as advocates for women‘s rights, will be more important 
determinants of policies that challenge traditional gender relations, such as anti-discrimination or 
violence against women policies (Gelb & Palley, 1996; Weldon, 2002).  For example, Weldon 
(2002, 2010) finds that cross-national variation in the adoption of violence against women 
policies is best explained by the relative strength of women‘s movements and, to a lesser extent, 
the proportion of women in the legislature. Also, in direct contradiction to earlier analysis 
(Mazur, 2002), Weldon (2010) finds that where there are strong and autonomous (e.g. not 
affiliated with parties or the government) women‘s movements, there is a greater likelihood that 
policies which challenge traditional gender roles will be adopted.     
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In contrast, it is expected that labor unions and left parties (as champions of the working 
class) will be key determinants of policies that address class interests, such as welfare state 
generosity and/or public provision of services (Weldon, 2010).  For example, Lambert (2008) 
finds that union density is a significant determinant of policies that support mothers‘ 
employment.  Similarly, Weldon (2010) finds that labor protest is a significant predictor of the 
adoption of family leave policies.   Both Lambert (2008) and Weldon (2010) also find gendered 
representation to be a determinant of female-friendly policy. 
Gender and Political Representation 
A key debate in studies of female representation concerns the conditions under which 
female officeholders are able to promote female-friendly legislation (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 
2005; Tremblay, 2006). This debate primarily focuses on the interplay between descriptive and 
substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to shared characteristics between 
representatives and their constituencies, i.e., the representative and the represented are part of the 
same group, be it ethnic, racial, gender, etc. Substantive representation refers to the 
responsiveness of the representative to the policy demands of the group (Pitkin, 1967). There is 
an extensive body of literature which argues that descriptive representation leads to increased 
focus on substantive issues of importance to women (Dahlerup, 2006b; Kittilson, 2006; O'Regan, 
2000; Phillips, 1998; Thomas, 1994). In this literature, the contention is typically that descriptive 
representation results in the passage of female-centric policies as the number of women in a 
legislative body increases. The counterargument is that descriptive representation does not 
inherently lead to substantive representation.  First, women come from different backgrounds, 
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therefore they do not speak with one voice (Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007).  Second, 
female politicians are primarily concerned with being politicians and, like their male 
counterparts, must always be concerned with party dictates, serving their constituencies, and re-
election (Norris & Lovenduski, 1989). Additionally, party loyalties may prevent women from 
acting on behalf of women (Grey, 2006). Therefore, even if a female legislator‘s preference is to 
promote women‘s issues, political barriers will limit her ability to pursue her own agenda. 
Despite these hindrances to pursuing a female-friendly agenda, an increasing number of 
studies suggest that women do tend to have more female-centric and care-related policy priorities 
than do men (Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). At the 
voter level, Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) determined that female American voters are 
consistently more supportive of health, welfare, and education spending than male voters. At the 
bureaucratic level, Wilkins and Keiser (2006) found that female bureaucrats are most likely to 
substantively represent their clients in child support cases when the policy benefits women. At 
the candidate level, Norris & Lovenduski (1989) found that in the UK, irrespective of political 
party, female candidates tend to be more liberal than do male candidates; as such, if more women 
were to enter parliament, they could alter direction of public policy. At the legislative level, 
Manon Tremblay (1998, p. 463) found that in Canadian legislative debates on women‗s issues, 
female MPs speak twice as often as do male MPs, and Wangnerud (2000, p. 82) found that more 
Swedish female parliamentarians have personal social welfare policy goals than do their male 
counterparts. 
There is also an extensive body of literature which illustrates that increased numbers of 
women in office leads to increased attention to issues of substantive importance to women 
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(Dahlerup, 2006a, 2006b; Kittilson, 2006; O'Regan, 2000; Thomas, 1994). For example, Bratton 
and Ray (2002) found that at the municipal level in Norway, the proportion of women in local 
elected office is positively related to the percentage of children enrolled in public daycare. Also, 
Thomas (1994) found that in US state legislatures with female membership greater than twenty 
percent women introduce a greater amount of female-friendly legislation than they do in state 
legislatures where female membership is less than ten percent. Similarly, Grey (2006) found that 
the bulk of New Zealand‗s female-friendly policies were passed once women‗s presence in 
parliament passed fifteen percent. The fact that we see cross-national and multi-level support for 
women‗s policy preferences indicates that it is likely that female cabinet ministers will also 
pursue the policy goals shown to be favored by female voters, bureaucrats, and legislators.   
Executive Dominance in Parliamentary Democracies 
As mentioned above, studies of female-friendly policy typically concentrate on the role 
of the legislature in the policy process (e.g. Bratton & Haynie, 1999; C. M. Miller, 1989; 
Oppenheimer, 1983; Tremblay, 1998).
8
 This provides an incomplete, and potentially misleading, 
picture. The place of policy origination is critical for determining who is important in the policy 
process.  Most advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary democracies;
9
 therefore policy 
typically originates in the cabinet rather than the legislature (O'Regan, 2000).   I argue that if we 
are to understand how women‗s policy goals are translated into policy successes, analysis must 
begin at the cabinet level.  There are three reasons for this.  First, the place of policy origination 
is critical for determining who is important in the policy process; in most advanced democracies, 
                                                 
8
 There are a limited number of studies that focus on local governments (e.g. Bratton & Ray, 2002) or bureaucracies 
(e.g. Wilkins & Keiser, 2006).  
9
 Of the countries involved in this study, only the United States and Switzerland are non-parliamentary systems.   
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policy typically originates in the cabinet rather than the legislature (O'Regan, 2000).  Second, 
given that government backbenchers are expected to support government bills, it is logical to 
expect that the representation of women in the cabinet is as important as, if not more important 
than, the representation of women in the legislature.  
Finally, cabinets are more influential than legislatures because the legislative agenda is 
typically controlled by the government.  Legislators very often have little influence on which 
proposals are brought to a vote; this severely restricts legislators‘ pursuit of personal agendas 
(Doring, 1995; Laver & Shepsle, 1994; Siaroff, 2003; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003). In 
addition, in the rare case that a legislator is able to pursue a personal agenda, governments are 
exceedingly reluctant to allow backbenchers to pursue legislation that has clear spending 
implications. As a result, female legislators are not likely to have latitude to propose and promote 
female-friendly policy. Therefore, female legislators are likely to have considerably less effect 
on female-friendly policy than female ministers.  
Individual ministers have significant control over policy priorities in their respective 
policy areas (Laver & Shepsle, 1994). Therefore, ministers are able to promote policies that 
address issues about which they have specific concerns; they can also impede legislation that 
interferes with their policy goals (S. James, 1999; Martin, 2004). In most countries, cabinet 
ministers have little ―inclination or ability…to shape the substance of policy emanating from the 
department of a ministerial colleague‖ (Laver & Shepsle, 1994, p. 298). Moreover, cabinets often 
have unwritten rules of non-intervention that make ministers hesitant to interfere in the formation 
of policy in other ministers‘ domains (Nousiainen, 1994). In addition, ministers typically lack in-
depth knowledge of portfolios other than their own; this increases their hesitance to interfere in 
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other policy areas. Accordingly, cabinet ministers are not only well-placed to promote policies 
they favor, but they can also expect their colleagues to give them substantial latitude in doing so. 
 In point of fact, ministers are so influential in determining policy that analysts can 
predict policy based on the preferences of the person holding a portfolio (Laver & Shepsle, 
1994).  Female ministers tend to hold portfolios related to caring professions, such as health, 
education, and welfare (Siaroff, 2000; Towns, 2003).  Since female policymakers often craft 
policy with the interests of women in mind, women who hold care portfolios are more likely to 
promote female-friendly policies than are men holding such portfolios.  It has been argued that 
this concentration of women in the pink ghetto of care portfolios is simply ―a way of excluding 
women from the highest political offices and to reserve to the ‗first sex‘ the most regal offices of 
the state (defense, foreign affairs, finance, etc.)‖ (Janova & Sineau, 1992, p. 119).  However, 
because the minister has a great deal of discretion when crafting policies in her area, this 
concentration of female cabinet ministers in care portfolios may well have beneficial 
consequences for women.  I argue that a strong female presence in social policy portfolios should 
have a positive effect on the passage of female-friendly policy.  
When considered in conjunction, theories of gendered representation and executive 
dominance suggest that it is the presence of women in the executive that should be a significant 
determinant in the adoption of female-friendly policy.  In short, because the cabinet is the 
dominant institution in the development of policy I argue that female cabinet ministers are likely 
to be more influential in the policy process than are female parliamentarians.  In addition, this 
discussion of executive dominance suggests that while greater numbers of women in cabinet 
should have a positive effect on female-friendly policy, it may be crucial that the women be 
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placed in social welfare portfolios in order to have the greatest impact.  Thus, in this dissertation 
I will be testing two hypotheses:  
H1:  The greater the proportion of women in cabinet positions, the more female-friendly 
policy is adopted 
 
H2:  The greater the proportion of women holding care portfolios the more female-
friendly policy is adopted 
   
I should note that although the premise of this dissertation hinges on the contention that 
the cabinet controls the policy agenda, this is not true for all democracies.  In presidential 
democracies, the system is designed to provide multiple avenues for the introduction of 
legislation.  The checks and balances in the system preclude the executive from dominating the 
legislative agenda; the president and his cabinet have little or no control over legislative 
business.  However, inclusion of non-parliamentary systems in the analysis is necessary; it 
allows me to determine whether or not the inclusion of women in the cabinet is important even 
when the cabinet does not control the policy process.  If women in cabinet are important in non-
parliamentary systems, it could indicate that gendered representation in the executive affects 
policy implementation. 
Increased Female Representation at the Cabinet Level 
 In most countries, the most common pattern of recruitment into the cabinet is 
from the legislature (Blondel & Thiébault, 1991); legislators who have successfully navigated 
through the party ranks are tapped for cabinet posts.  Thus, party seniority is a key factor when 
legislators are considered for ministerial positions.   As greater proportions of women have been 
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elected to legislatures, the number of female cabinet ministers has also risen.  The cross-national 
increase in female cabinet ministers is shown in figure 1.1, below.   
[Figure 1.1, here] 
Women have historically been given social welfare portfolios such as health or education 
(Davis, 1997).  This pattern has stayed remarkably consistent.  Figure 1.2 shows that in only two 
of the seven countries in which women were represented in cabinet in 1970 has the proportion of 
women in social welfare ministries dropped by 2005. 
[Figure 1.2, here] 
I expect that the overall increase in female cabinet ministers, and the relatively high 
concentrations of women in social welfare portfolios, will have a significant impact on the 
adoption of female-friendly policy. 
Dissertation Structure 
This project includes analyses of the influence of female officeholders in three main 
policy areas (family leave, childcare, and working time regulations), as well as analysis of their 
influence on female-friendly policy generally. I have structured the dissertation so that each of 
these is addressed separately. This is vital to the project because evidence suggests that women 
may have different levels of influence depending on which type of policy is under consideration 
and whether the policy is being introduced or expanded (Bratton & Ray, 2002). Chapter 2 will 
discuss the support for women‘s employment index; the index measure will then be used to test 
the hypotheses being addressed in the dissertation.  Chapter 3 will address family leave in 
theoretical and historical perspective and will contain cross-national statistical analysis, using the 
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family leave sub-index to test my hypotheses.  Chapters 4 and 5 will follow the same pattern, 
providing theoretical and historical explanations of childcare policy and labor regulations 
respectively, as well as cross-national statistical analyses of the policy determinants.  Chapter 6 
will conclude the dissertation, providing a summary of the findings as well as the wider 
implications of the research.     
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Chapter 2: Data and Methods 
Introduction 
A major obstacle to studying the effects of female officeholders on female friendly policy 
is that there is no single dependent variable that allows researchers to study the issue in a broad 
context.  In most studies, researchers typically make generalizations about the effect of female 
politicians on female-friendly policy based on a single policy issue (e.g. violence against women, 
maternity leave, or equal pay).  However, although single-policy analysis is very effective at 
finding the determinants of individual policies, I argue there are several reasons that using an 
index measure is a better approach to finding generalizable determinants of female-friendly 
policy.  First, there is the issue of group heterogeneity; although we often treat them as a single 
group, women‘s policy priorities are not uniform—leftist women may well have different policy 
priorities than right-wing women, for example.  It is important to see those differences in the 
adoption of individual policies, but also in the overall approach to reconciliation policy.  
This leads to the second reason that an index approach is useful in the study of gender 
and representation; women‘s priorities may lead to differing levels of influence on individual 
policies.  Thus, studies of individual policies may produce contradictory results.  We need to be 
able to see not just the micro trends (e.g. adoption of individual policies), but also the macro 
trends (e.g. the development of female-friendly policy packages).  Finally, the 
interconnectedness of reconciliation policies means that these policies reinforce each other.  For 
example, if a state introduces child care, but does not synch the hours with typical working 
hours, state provided child care will not be less effective at promoting female labor market 
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participation.  Given these connections, the policies must be studied in conjunction in order to 
determine the true influence of female politicians on female-friendly policy.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I first discuss the importance of the index approach to the study of gender and 
representation.  I then briefly describe each of the sub-indices.10 Following this, I detail the 
construction of the full index.  I conclude with an explanation of the independent variables and 
methodology I use to test my hypotheses.   
Why an Index Measure? 
Research on gender and politics has produced broad support for the argument that female 
officeholders do represent the interests of women (e.g. Bratton & Ray, 2002; O'Regan, 2000).  
Many of these studies specifically find that female legislators are more likely to address issues 
the are particularly important to women, such as child care and family leave (e.g. Tremblay, 
1998; Wangnerud, 2000).  These studies of representation typically look at a wide range of 
policies; however, as scholars have begun to look at how (if) that representation has resulted in 
the adoption of policies that address women‘s concerns , researchers have typically focused on 
the adoption of individual policies (e.g. Kittilson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005).  I 
argue that this approach to studying the influence of female officeholders on female-friendly 
policy has several drawbacks and that an index measure of female-friendliness is likely to 
produce more generalizable findings.  
First, women are not a single, homogenous group.  While women do tend to have similar 
concerns, they do not always agree on government‘s role in addressing those concerns.  For 
example, in the 1980s, Norwegian politicians agreed that child care needed to be improved; 
                                                 
10
 Each sub-index is described in detail in subsequent chapters 
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however, Bystydzienski  (1995) found that women and men from left parties were more likely to 
support government subsidized daycare, while women and men from right parties were more 
likely to support cash transfers to families. There is a danger, then, that generalizing based on 
individual analyses may strongly reflect these differences, but may miss larger trends in the 
adoption of female-friendly policy in general.  
Second, recent research finds that women are likely to have varying levels of influence 
depending on the policy under consideration (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Thus, one researcher, using 
maternity leave as her dependent variable, may find that female legislators are a key determinant 
of female-friendly policy (Kittilson, 2008); another, using violence against women policies as 
her dependent variable, may find that women‘s movements are the key determinant in the 
adoption of female-friendly policy (Weldon, 2002).  The differences in these findings may stem  
from differences in what Stetson and Mazur (2000, p. 603) call the policy environment; they note 
that the policy environment concept is ―similar to the political opportunity structure construct in 
that it focuses attention on the possibilities for movement influence in a particular policy area 
during a particular period of time.‖   
Stetson and Mazur (2000) indicate that there are two parts of the policy environment that 
are likely to influence the adoption of female-friendly policy: the policy sub-system and the party 
or coalition in power.  First, policy subsystems, like iron triangles, are clusters of political actors 
concerned with a specific policy area (e.g. a childcare policy subsystem) (J. E. Anderson, 1994); 
the more open the sub-system is to new actors, the more likely that it will address women‘s 
issues.   Second, when left parties are in power, they are more likely to address women‘s issues.  
Thus, the ability of female representatives to affect change in a given policy area is likely to 
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change over time.  At any given point, women may enjoy a favorable policy environment for one 
policy area but not for others.  This indicates that it is unlikely that generalizations based on the 
analysis of a single policy area provide an accurate picture of the overall determinants of female-
friendly policy.  It is therefore very important to analyze women‘s influence on the shift to a 
more female-friendly society more holistically; an index measure of female friendliness will 
allow researchers to do so. 
Third, female-friendly policies such as child care, family leave and working time are not 
stand-alone policies.  As Gornick and Meyers state (2003, p. 255), ―families and workers 
experience policies not singly and distinctly but as combinations or packages of policies.‖  For 
example, the adoption of generous maternity leave does not make the harmonization of paid 
work and motherhood easier unless affordable childcare is available when the mother decides to 
return to work.  Germany, for instance, provides a total of about three years of maternity and 
parental leave; however, the lack of childcare services (either public or private) has traditionally 
prevented most mothers from working full-time (Schweiwe, 2000).  In contrast, Sweden 
combines generous maternity and parental leaves with state-subsidized childcare, resulting in 
some of the highest levels of FLP in the world (Naz, 2004).  Because of this interconnectedness, 
it is important that we see not just the determinants of individual policies but of the broad 
spectrum of policies that contribute to a female-friendly labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  
Finally, there is strong evidence that analysis using index measures is effective when 
studying public policy.  For example, Weldon (2010) uses index measures to test for the 
determinants of paid leave and generosity of family leave (weeks); she finds that union activity is 
a strong determinant of both.  Similarly, Lambert (2008) employs an index measure to test for 
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the determinants of maternal employment policy; she finds that union density and proportion of 
women in parliament are strong predictors of maternal employment policy.  In addition, several 
researchers use index measures to analyze policy outcomes.  For example, Plantegna and Hansen 
(1999) developed a composite indicator of gender equality to test the efficacy of reconciliation 
policies on gender equality outcomes.  They find that gender equality is improved where there 
are policies that help balance paid and unpaid work for both sexes.  The OECD (2001) used an 
index of work/family reconciliation policies to determine the correlation between these types of 
policies and female employment rates; they find that while many of the individual policies have 
low, or even negative, correlation with employment rates, the correlation between the index and 
employment rates is high (OECD, 2001, pp. 152-153).  Given the results of these policy outcome 
studies, it is appropriate to use the composite index approach to assess the determinants of policy 
adoption. 
The Indices 
To address the concerns outlined here, I have constructed an index measure of support for 
women‘s employment; it is modeled on the Support for Mothers‘ Employment index developed 
by Gornick, Ross and Meyers (1997) and Gornick and Meyers (2003).   My index is comprised 
of three sub-indices: family leave, working time, and child care. The family leave index includes 
variables such as weeks of leave, leave benefits, and maternity-related job protections (e.g. legal 
protection from termination because of pregnancy/use of maternity leave).  The working time 
index includes measures of working time, vacation, and gendered work restrictions.  Finally, the 
child care index includes variables related to the availability of publically available childcare, 
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school scheduling, and public expenditure on care.  Each of these is used to test women‘s 
influence in each specific policy area; the three are combined to test overall support for women‘s 
employment.   
The Family Leave Index 
 The first component of the Support for Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI) is family 
leave.  In recent decades, many advanced industrial democracies have adopted parental, 
paternity, and childcare leave policies, thus making more comprehensive packages of family 
leave policies.  Maternity and paternity leaves are commonly associated with the birth or 
adoption of a child, whereas parental leave is intended to allow either parent to care for a 
newborn and is typically taken immediately following maternity leave (EU, 2007d).  Finally, 
childcare leave is normally provided to parents in order to care for small children, and is most 
often available until the child‘s third birthday.  A package of family leave policies is not 
restricted to the provision of leave.  Family leave packages often include pay, job protections for 
pregnant workers, and incentives for fathers to take leave; thus I include these in the Family 
Leave Index, as shown in Table 2.1.
11
  
[Table 2.1, here] 
 Arguably, family leave provides the easiest test of my hypotheses.  First, most family leave 
policy leaves are seen as women‘s concerns.  Because leaves are typically low-paid, men are 
unlikely to use what little leave to which they are entitled.  Thus, leave policies are typically seen 
as ensuring mothers’ time to care; this is then a women‘s issue and female cabinet ministers are 
                                                 
11
 All tables and figures are found in Appendix B. 
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likely to promote policies that address it.  In addition, there have been studies of gendered 
representation and family leave policies that demonstrate positive relationship between female 
officeholders and maternity leave. For example, both Kittilson (2008) and Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler (2005) find that female legislators are key determinants of maternity and parental leave 
policies. In addition, Weldon (2010) and Lambert (2008) find that both legislators and women‘s 
movements are key determinants of expansions of leave policy.  Thus, given the fact that 
ministers tend to come from the legislative ranks, there is quite a bit of support for the likelihood 
that female ministers will promote family leave policies. 
The Working Time Index 
 The second component of the SWEI is the regulation of working time.  Research shows 
that women‘s equity in the labor market increases when work weeks are shorter, vacation is 
longer, part-time work is protected by law, and women are not prohibited from working non-
standard hours (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  In particular, where time for paid and unpaid work is 
balanced between women and men, via a short standard work week (under 40 hours) gender 
equity is strengthened (Rubery, Smith, & Fagan, 1998).  Longer vacation times provide a similar 
benefit in that they provide long blocks of time for both parents to spend with children; long 
vacations also lessen the need for parents to find adequate child care during summers (Gornick & 
Meyers, 2003).  In addition, regulations that prevent employers from discriminating against part-
time workers help to ensure the availability of quality part-time work.  Quality part-time work 
makes it easier for women to remain engaged in the labor market after having children; as a 
result, it can contribute to women‘s economic independence (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Warme, 
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Lundy, & Lundy, 1992).  Finally, many countries have historically limited women‘s access to 
night/nonstandard working hours; even today Austria, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland prohibit 
night work for pregnant women (ILO, 2010a).  While this is positioned as maternity protection, 
in reality it prevents these women from working hours that are often more lucrative than standard 
working hours (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  I have combined measures of each of these policies 
to form the Working Time Index (WTI), shown in Table 2.2. 
[Table 2.2, here] 
Of the three policy areas, working time regulations provide the hardest test of my 
hypotheses.  Regulation of working hours, particularly the adoption of shorter working time and 
protections for part-time work, is necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and 
parenthood.  However, whereas leave policies are typically viewed as gender issues, working 
hours and vacation time are typically viewed as labor or class issues.  Thus, it can be expected 
that pressure for  shorter working hours, longer vacation time and regulation of night and/or part-
time work will come from labor unions rather than from members of government (Figart & 
Mutari, 2000).  Indeed, trade unions have been effective in pressuring government for reduced 
working time in France, while they have been less effective in the UK, which still has among the 
highest average working hours in Europe (Kamerman & Kahn, 1997).  Similarly, German and 
Dutch trade unions have historically been effective at blocking protections for part-time work,
12
 
while in recent years Swedish trade unions have endorsed the right of all workers to a quality 
part-time option (Eklund, 2004; Fuchs, 2004; Visser, Wilthagen, Beltzer, & Koot-Van Der Putte, 
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 In both countries, developments in the mid-2000s indicate that both German and Dutch trade unions have backed 
off of their traditional opposition to part-time protections. 
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2004).  Given the unevenness in cross-national trade union effectiveness vis-à-vis working time 
regulations, and because each of these policies has significant influence on both women‘s labor 
force participation and on gender equity, I do expect that women in cabinet will be influential in 
increasing the female-friendliness of working-time regulations.   
The Child Care Index 
 The final component of the SWEI is child care policy.  It can be argued that childcare is 
the most important of the female-friendly policies, as women are unable to reconcile paid 
employment and motherhood without it.  Esping-Andersen (2002b) provides strong support for 
this argument, finding that childcare availability is the key determinant of the harmonization of 
motherhood and paid employment for both part-time and full-time female workers.   Child care 
policy is not limited to public provision of child care; it also includes child care benefits (e.g. tax 
credits or transfers) and school scheduling.  Thus, I combine five measures of child care policy to 
form the childcare index, as shown in Table 2.3. 
[Table 2.3, here] 
Child care policies also present a challenging test of the hypotheses that women in 
cabinet, particularly women in social welfare ministries, will be strong determinants of female-
friendly policy.  In some countries, such as Sweden and Norway, expansion of childcare services 
or spending has been attributed, in large part, to female officeholders (Bratton & Ray, 2002; 
Byrne, 1997).  Other studies have demonstrated that a combination of female representation and 
women‘s policy machineries (e.g. women‘s movements both autonomous and party-affiliates) is 
the key determinant of expansions in child care policy (Bergqvist & Jungar, 2000; Curtin, 2008).  
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In contrast, however, Bleijenbergh and Roggeband (2007, p. 453) find that ―neither the presence 
of a strong women‘s movement nor the representation of women in parliament is a necessary 
condition for the introduction of public care giving support. The presence of equality 
machineries is the only necessary condition for the improvement of social-care policies.‖ 
Similarly, Ross (2001) argues that the establishment of the EU‘s Equal Opportunities Unit (and 
Childcare Network) were instrumental in getting child care on the European political agenda.  
However, there have been few corresponding studies in countries in which women‘s 
representation in cabinet is historically low (e.g. Greece or Switzerland), or in countries such as 
Spain women‘s policy machineries have traditionally been too weak to press for female friendly 
work-family reconciliation policies (Valiente, 2000).   Given the inconsistent results provided by 
these studies, it is unclear as to whether women‘s policy machines, female officeholders, or a 
combination of the two are effective determinants of child care policy. 
The Support for Women’s Employment Index 
 The Support for Women‘s Employment Index amalgamates each of the preceding sub-
indices into a larger measure of overall support for women‘s employment.  This is a key 
component of this research project, given the lack of consistent results in the current literature.   
Construction of the index was undertaken as follows.  To operationalize the measures, I entered 
the quantitative data numerically (e.g. weeks of maternity leave available to mothers); qualitative 
data were coded into categories (e.g. protection of part-time work was coded yes or no).  All 
qualitative data were then converted to quantitative values (e.g. yes, no, sometimes were 
converted to 1, 0, .5, respectively).  All data were scaled such that all values fall between 0 and 
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1; original values were used for proportions (e.g. spending), all other values were divided by the 
observed maximum (e.g. working hours).  This ensures that no single measure is unduly 
weighted in the construction of the index. 
 I use Chronbach‘s Alpha to determine whether or not there is an underlying structure 
inherent in the variables.  The scale reliability coefficients for each index, reported in Table 2.4, 
demonstrate that the scale formed from the variables measures a single uni-dimensional latent 
construct.  This indicates that additive index measures are appropriate, so I simply sum the 
values of the variables to create each index.  The theoretical and actual minimum and maximum 
values of the indices are also reported in Table 2.4. 
[Table 2.4, here] 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, there has been an across-the-board increase in support for women‘s 
employment.  These overall improvements overshadow the fact that gains have been quite 
modest in countries such as Switzerland, the US, and New Zealand.  Women in these countries 
still face a significant lack of public support for combining paid employment and motherhood.  Is 
there a lack of public demand in these countries?  Do they need stronger women‘s movements, 
labor unions, or female representation?  I, of course, argue that stronger female representation is 
needed.  However, there are also variables, such as GDP and welfare regime type, that influence 
the adoption of female friendly policy and must be considered in the analyses; I detail both the 
key explanatory variables (female officeholders) and the control variables in the following 
section. 
[Figure 2.1, here]  
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Independent Variables 
Key Explanatory Variables 
Women in Cabinet:  As mentioned above, the relative importance of the cabinet in policy making 
implies that women in cabinet are better positioned to influence policy than are women in 
parliament.  Thus, I expect that women in cabinet will be a positive and significant influence on 
the dependent variable. This variable is measured as the proportion of cabinet portfolios held by 
women.
13
 
Women in Social Welfare Portfolios:   It is important to be sensitive to the possibility that while 
the two are correlated, female-friendly policy may not be caused by higher levels of women‘s 
representation in the cabinet. If parties place a higher priority on gender issues, male party 
leaders may simultaneously promote more women to cabinet positions and more female-friendly 
policy. To the extent that this occurs, higher levels of women‘s representation in cabinet may 
correlate with and even precede the development of more female-friendly policy, but that 
representation may not be exerting any direct causal effect on policy.  By testing for the direct 
effect of women in social policy portfolios on the extent of female-friendly policy we effectively 
address this possibility.  This variable is measured as the proportion of social welfare portfolios 
held by women.
 14
   
Women in Parliament: Current literature indicates that women in parliament likely have a 
positive and statistically significant influence on the passage of female-friendly policy, and I 
                                                 
13
 All data for women in cabinet and women in social welfare portfolios were compiled from the annual editions of 
the Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006); cabinet ministers‘ names were cross-
referenced with data from the Guide to Women Leaders files (Christensen, 2007) 
14
 See previous note. 
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expect this positive relationship to be borne out in these analyses.  This variable is measured as 
the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women.
15
   
Control Variables 
Women‘s Movements: I include women‘s movements to control for extra-governmental forces 
that influence the adoption of female-friendly social policy. Research indicates that where 
women‘s movements are strong and autonomous (e.g. independent of parties/state control) they 
are likely determinants of female-friendly policy (Weldon, 2010).  Following Weldon (2002) I 
code women‘s movements as 1 if the movements are rated both strong and autonomous; I code 
them as 0 if either of those two conditions are not met.
16
 
Union Density: Because labor mobilization is often found to be a key determinant of social 
welfare policy, I include net union membership (total membership less self-employed and 
retired) weighted by the total dependent labor force.
17
  
Strikes: In addition to union density, I include the total number of strikes/lockouts per year.  This 
helps to measure labor union militancy and ensures that level of labor protest is accounted for 
(Weldon, 2010).
18
 
Welfare Regime Type:  At a general level, the structure of the different national social policy 
packages is likely to favor or constrain the extension of female-friendly policies. I use Esping-
Andersen‘s (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999) classic welfare state typology: Christian democratic, 
liberal, and social democratic. 
                                                 
15
 These data were gathered from the IPU‘s (1995) Women in National Parliaments 1945-1995: A World Statistical 
Study and the IPU online archives (www.ipu.org). 
16
 I thank Laurel Weldon for sharing these data with me. 
17
 Union density data are drawn from Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (2006). 
18
 Strike/lockout data are drawn from the ILO Laborsta database (ILO, 2009). 
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Left Government:
 
Several studies have demonstrated that left governments are positively 
associated with increased numbers of women in office, as well as increases in female-friendly 
policy.  Therefore, it may be the case that female-friendly policy is driven by left parties, rather 
than by women in office.  I measure left government as the proportion of cabinet seats controlled 
by left parties.
19
 
Federalism: I control for federalism because, as Huber and Stephens (2001) argue, there are more 
veto points in a federal system, thus making the passage of social policies more difficult.  
Following Kittilson (2008), Federalism is measured on a three point scale, ―0‖ (no federalism), 
―1‖ (weak federalism) and ―2‖ (strong federalism). 
European Union Membership (EU): I control for membership in the EU because it has been 
argued that the EU exerts upward pressure on leave entitlements and Kittilson (2008) finds a 
positive association between EU membership and state guaranteed leave entitlement. EU 
membership is measured as a dichotomous variable ―1‖ if a country was a member in a given 
year, ―0‖ if not. 
GDP per capita: I include GDP per capita as a measure of a country‘s wealth because it is 
possible that a certain level of wealth must be reached before a country can ―afford‖ state 
guaranteed leave entitlement.
20
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
                                                 
19
 Left cabinet data for 1980 – 2000 are from Huber and Stephens (2004).  Data for Greece, Spain and Portugal, all 
years, and all other countries for 2001-2003 are from the IPU (2009); left cabinet calculated as per Huber, et al. 
(2004) that is, left party parliamentary seats as a percentage of all governing party(s) parliamentary seats. 
20
 GDP per capita data were gathered from OECD.stat (2008) 
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In any cross-national analysis a researcher faces two main considerations with regard to 
selection of the statistical sample:  the number of cases and their level of similarity.  I have 
selected the advanced industrial democracies in order to ensure a base-level of similarity; each 
country in the study is politically stable, democratic, wealthy, and has a developed welfare state.  
This has provided the limitations on the number of cases in the study.  The countries included in 
the study are:  Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, The United States, and the United Kingdom.  Following Gornick and Meyers 
(2003, p. 22), I have excluded the countries of the former Soviet bloc, as well as most of the 
Pacific Rim. The primary reason for excluding these nations is that their welfare systems are 
very different from those in the advanced industrial democracies and they are not universally 
stable, democratic, and wealthy.  In addition, we lack full data for these countries in the time 
period in question. 
In this dissertation, I use statistical analyses to make generalizations about the 
determinants of female-friendly policy in advanced industrial democracies (Peters, 1998).  Given 
that there are data from 1970 to 2005, a time series option would seem to be preferable in order 
to control for time-serial effects (Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996).  However, despite the theoretical 
desirability of using measures of public policy, they do suffer from the problem that they vary 
relatively little over time.  Thus, I employ OLS regression with standard errors clustered by 
country to address the issue that the data are independent across, but not within, countries.   
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To address the lack of variation in the dependent variables, I measured five year period 
averages of each variable for each country (e.g. 1970-1974, 1975-1979 and, so on). This 
transformation of the data markedly increases the variation on the dependent variable but it also 
reduces the number of observations from 735 to 147.  This data reduction is undesirable, but 
given that many of the independent variables in my analyses also display limited cross-temporal 
variation it does not present significant estimation problems.  In the following chapters, I employ 
this methodology to test for the determinants of the family leave, working time, and child care 
indices.  I then turn to analysis of the determinants of support for women‘s employment. 
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Chapter 3: Family Leave in Comparative Perspective 
Introduction 
Although maternity leave is the oldest type of family leave policy, it is no longer the only 
type of family leave policy.  In recent decades, many advanced industrial democracies have 
adopted parental, paternity, and childcare leave policies, thus making more comprehensive 
packages of family leave policies.  Maternity and paternity leaves are commonly associated with 
the birth or adoption of a child, whereas parental leave is intended to allow either parent to care 
for a newborn and is typically taken immediately following maternity leave (EU, 2007d).  
Finally, childcare leave is normally provided to parents in order to care for small children, and is 
most often available until the child‘s third birthday.21  While the definitions are fairly common 
among advanced industrial democracies, there is considerable variation in how, or if, these 
policies have been adopted (EU, 2007d).   
Family leave is a necessary component in the harmonization of parenthood and 
employment.  Thus, when family leave policies provide a legal right for a parent to take time to 
care for a child, they are typically viewed as female-friendly (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Weldon, 
2010).  In this study, however, I define female-friendly policies as those which strive to increase 
gender equity in the labor market and women‘s economic independence.  There is considerable 
debate over whether or not family leave, in particular maternity leave, meets these criteria.  
There are two basic characteristics of leave policies that must be considered in order to 
determine whether or not leave policies further gender equity (Weldon, 2010).  First, the 
                                                 
21
 Many countries use the terms childcare and parental leave interchangeably, thus making studies of parental leave 
challenging.  In this project, I focus on childcare leave. 
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researcher must consider the structure of the leave policy package.  Is maternity a protected 
category in anti-discrimination law?  Is leave restricted solely to the mother?  Is there any 
provision for paternity leave – and is that leave (a) paid, and (b) reserved for the father?  Second, 
the researcher must consider the compensation provided by the leave package: Is the leave paid?  
If so, by whom (government or employer) is the leave paid and at what rate?    
Because of the many variations in structure and compensation, family leave policies do 
not have a universal impact on gender equality in the labor market—some are more female-
friendly than others, and it is therefore important to look at each individually. In this chapter, I 
trace the evolution of the various types of family leave policies, putting particular emphasis on 
developments that increase the female-friendliness of each policy.  I then use regression analysis 
to investigate the relationship between family leave and female officeholders. 
Female-Friendly Family Leave Policies 
Maternity Leave 
Maternity leave is not a modern policy development; it was first introduced in Germany 
in 1891 (Frank & Lipner, 1988).  The intent of this initial policy, which disallowed women‘s 
paid employment within four weeks of childbirth, was to encourage mothers to (a) breastfeed 
longer in order to reduce infant mortality and (b) to return to their place in the home (Tilly & 
Scott, 1978).  Britain instituted a similar ban on maternal employment in 1895, followed by the 
implementation of an insurance scheme that provided minimal compensation during maternity 
leave (Frank & Lipner, 1988).  This development sparked a wave of demand across Europe for 
remunerated leave; however these demands were shelved due to budget constraints caused by 
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military spending during World War I.  Ironically, World War I intensified public pressure for 
maternity leave policies; the decimation of European populations and economies forced 
governments to encourage women to bear children and engage in paid employment (Bell & 
Offen, 1983).  This public pressure did not lead to more female-friendly maternity leave, 
however, as fears of depopulation continued to drive maternity protection legislation well into 
the 1940s.  This caused a wave of explicitly pronatalist and nationalist maternity protection 
schemes (Frank & Lipner, 1988).  Although many European countries adopted some form of 
maternity leave in these schemes, the policies provided little or no compensation and no job 
protection for pregnant workers (Frank & Lipner, 1988).  In both structure and compensation, 
these policies did little to promote economic equity for women; thus early maternity leave 
policies should not be deemed ―female-friendly,‖ and my definition effectively excludes them 
from consideration.   
Turning to modern adaptations of maternity leave policy, a more positive picture of 
female-friendliness emerges.  First, every advanced industrial democracy now provides for at 
least some form of unpaid leave
22
 and many provide paid leave.  The policies vary tremendously 
in terms of length; the duration of paid maternity leave ranges from fourteen weeks in Germany 
to nearly sixty-nine in Sweden (Gauthier, 2003).  Second, pregnancy and maternity leave are 
commonly protected categories in anti-discrimination law. Sweden first enacted legislation that 
prohibited discrimination in hiring and employment on the basis of pregnancy in 1945, followed 
by Germany in 1952, and Italy in 1966 (EU, 2007d; ILO, 2008; Neal, 1984).  As you can see in 
                                                 
22
 Australia, New Zealand, and the United States do not offer maternity leave, however they all offer unpaid family 
care leaves that may be used as maternity leave.   
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Table 3.1,
23
 few other countries adopted comparable legislation until the 1970s (e.g. Denmark, 
Belgium, and the US). Some countries did not enact pregnancy/maternity anti-discrimination 
laws until the 1980s (e.g. Finland, Australia, and France), the 1990s (e.g. Switzerland and 
Ireland) or even the 2000s (e.g. Greece
24
) (EU, 2007d).   The prohibition against discrimination 
in employment and hiring based on pregnancy and/or maternity has been an important step in 
increasing the over-all female-friendliness of maternity leave policies in the advanced industrial 
democracies (Zippel, 2009).  
[Table 3.1, here] 
Analysis based on the second gender equity guideline, compensation, gives a more 
ambiguous picture of the relative female-friendliness of maternity leave policies.  This is 
partially because of the complexities of maternity leave compensation.  First, not all countries 
(e.g. the US, Australia, and New Zealand) have provisions for paid maternity leave.  Second, 
where a country does mandate paid maternity leave, the leave can either be publically-funded or 
employer-funded.  Finally, there are multiple ways in which compensation can be determined; 
these include compensation as a percentage of actual earnings, unemployment insurance, or 
sickness benefit, and compensation as a flat rate benefit (Gauthier, 2003).  Thus, there is no 
common pattern regarding maternity leave compensation policies in advanced industrial 
democracies; however, it is possible to construct an ideal female-friendly compensation 
structure. First, higher levels of compensation make it more likely that women can afford to 
                                                 
23
 All tables and figures are found in Appendix B 
24
 Greece first implemented maternity protections in 1997;  however the legislation did not cover women in the 
police, army, or women employed in private households.  The legislation was amended to cover these groups in 
2003 (Karamessini, 2003). 
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actually take maternity leave (Weldon, 2010). Second, as the ILO noted in the revised Maternity 
Protection Convention (1952),  when the burden of maternity leave compensation falls on the 
employer it creates an incentive for employers to discriminate against women in hiring.  Thus, 
the most female-friendly maternity compensation package would be one in which full wage 
replacement is provided by public funding.  However, Table 3.1 shows that the provision of 
maternity leave and benefits varies widely across the advanced industrial democracies. 
Although the variety and complexity of compensation packages partially explains the 
lack of clarity about the female-friendliness of maternity leave policies, there is an additional 
complication.  Research shows that leave policies do increase women‘s economic independence 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  However, there is also evidence that long 
maternity leaves reinforce occupational segregation; women are more likely to be employed in 
the public or service sectors (Hansen, 1995).  Sociologists argue that this is because women tend 
to go into care occupations in which promotions are not dependent on continuous employment 
(Polachek, 1979, 1981; Stier, 1996).  In addition, the length of time a woman might be out of 
work due to family leave is likely a deterrent to women‘s employment in fields that require long 
and/or expensive training (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005).  Regardless of field of specialization, 
long leaves are likely to decrease a woman‘s long-term earnings potential either as a result of 
employer discrimination or decreased time in the workforce (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Mandel 
& Semyonov, 2005, 2006).  While maternity leave may allow for greater economic 
independence, it is also likely to negatively affect gender equality by increasing occupational 
segregation and decreasing long-term earnings potential (Stier, Lewis-Epstein, & Braun, 2001).  
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Thus, from a compensation perspective, maternity leave is at best a draw in achieving greater 
gender equity in the labor market (Weldon, 2010; Zippel, 2009). 
Family Leave Policies for Fathers 
Gender segregation is not simply an issue in paid employment; it is also an issue in 
unpaid care and household work (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).  Although female labor force 
participation rates have increased throughout the advanced industrial democracies over the past 
four decades, very little has changed in the patterns of unpaid child care and household work as a 
result (Seward, Yeatts, & Fletcher, 2009).  Women still do the bulk of unpaid care and household 
labor;  in addition, women are more likely to adjust their work schedules to accommodate family 
pressures than are men (Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008).  In an effort to change this gendered 
division of labor, many wealthy countries have adopted paternity leave policies and incentives 
for fathers to take family leave; policy provision by country can be seen in Table 3.2.   
[Table 3.2, here] 
Both types of policies are considered female-friendly because they encourage fathers to 
contribute to family care work (O'Brien, Brandth, & Kvande, 2007).  Theoretically, fathers‘ 
involvement in care increases gender equity in the labor market; where men and women share 
household duties more equally, women are less likely to suffer economic harm as a result of 
excessive absences from the labor force (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006).  Of the two policies, 
however, paternity leave is less likely to promote gender equity.  In general, paternity leave is 
very short in duration, poorly compensated at best, and not necessarily protected by law (EU, 
2007d).  Essentially, paternity leave is too short for it to truly affect the gender division of 
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household labor and use of paternity leave can have negative economic and/or employment 
consequences for fathers. Thus, although paternity leave policies should promote gender equity, 
in practice, their efficacy is questionable.  
Incentives for fathers to take family leave are more likely to help increase gender equity.  
As noted earlier, mothers are much more likely to take family leaves than are fathers (Lappegard, 
2008; OECD, 2007b; Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008).  Several countries, most notably the 
Nordic countries, have attempted to increase take-up rates among fathers by reserving a portion 
of the family leave for the father‘s use.  In these schemes, families are entitled to additional 
weeks of leave, provided those weeks are taken by the father—the leave cannot be transferred.  
This significantly increases the female-friendliness of family leave policies.  Research shows that 
when fathers take leave and care for the infant by themselves, they are more likely to participate 
in care work after the leave ends, thus the full burden of care no longer rests on the mother 
(O'Brien, et al., 2007).  However, the reserved ‗daddy days‘ have had only marginal success in 
increasing fathers‘ use of family leave; as the OECD (2007b, p. 120) notes ―this does not reflect 
a fundamental behavioral change, as mothers almost exclusively take long periods of leave.‖   It 
must be noted that leave policies, particularly those that include reserved leave, are 
comparatively new; it is unlikely that these policies are commonly accepted practice, yet 
evidence does suggest that take-up rates among men are increasing (EU, 2007a).  Thus, where 
the scheme at least protects a parent‘s right to take time off to care for a newborn, a degree of 
female-friendliness has been achieved, and  leave schemes that are structured to encourage take-
up by fathers are truly female-friendly.   
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Childcare Leave 
 Analysis of childcare leave in comparative perspective is a challenging proposition; many 
countries use the terms parental leave and childcare leave interchangeably and take-up rates are 
often catalogued accordingly.  In this study, I focus on childcare leave, as it is the more widely-
used term.  As you can see in Table 3.3, few countries adopted childcare leave until the 1980s.  
Austria
25
 was the lone provider of childcare leave until 1973, when Italy began providing 26 
weeks of leave.  France, Norway and Sweden implemented childcare leave policies between 
1977 and 1978.  An additional six countries
26
 began providing childcare leave in the 1980s, 
while the remainder
27
 did not adopt childcare leave policies until the 1990s. 
[Table 3.3, here] 
Childcare leave policies, like parental leave policies, are designed to increase gender 
equity by allowing either parent to take time off from work in order to care for small children.   
Like parental leave, the specifics of childcare leave policy in advanced industrial democracies 
have been only marginally female-friendly.  First, no country has adopted a childcare leave 
policy that includes incentives for fathers to take leave (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  Second, most 
countries have either adopted low-paid or unpaid leave (Gauthier, 2003). As you can see in Table 
3.3, as of 2005, twelve of the countries in this study offered only unpaid leave, six offered 
childcare leave compensated at only a flat rate (typically low), and only three offered 
compensation at a percent of earnings.  Given the evidence that relates low compensation to 
                                                 
25
 Austria introduced this leave in 1961, for mothers only, and only for the child‘s first year (Badelt, 1991). 
26
 Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, and Portugal 
27
 With the exception of Switzerland 
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fathers‘ low take-up of parental leave (Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008), it is likely that childcare 
leave is predominantly taken by mothers rather than fathers. Third, relatively few countries allow 
parents to take childcare leave after the child‘s third birthday; thus, parents must use annual or 
unpaid leave to care for older children.  However, despite its structural and compensation 
deficits, however, the legal entitlement to time off in order to care for a child does allow women 
to better combine motherhood and paid employment. In that sense, childcare leave is a female-
friendly policy; however, its level of female-friendliness could easily be improved.  
Cross National Analysis of Family Leave 
 This discussion suggests that the design determines the female-friendliness level of the 
family leave policy.  A truly female-friendly policy must be carefully designed to protect the 
parents‘ jobs and encourage fathers to use family leave; it must also provide adequate 
compensation to both mothers and fathers.   Because policies are designed at the cabinet level, I 
expect that women in cabinet are likely to be more influential in the adoption of female-friendly 
leave policies than are women in legislature.  If this argument is supported by the analysis, it 
would suggest new avenues for research on gender and representation.  It would further suggest 
that advocates of female-friendly leave policy should pursue their agenda at the cabinet level 
rather than at the legislative level.  In the next section, I explore this argument by analyzing the 
effect of female officeholders on an index measure of family leave policies. 
The Family Leave Index 
 Because the structure of the overall package of leave policies is the key to the level of 
female-friendliness the policies achieve, it is important to include all structural components of 
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the leave package in the analysis.  To this end, I have created an index measure of family leave 
policies.  The index includes the nine variables listed in Table 3.4, below.   
[Table 3.4, here]  
The data have all been scaled so that their values fall between 0 and 1; original values were used 
for proportions, other values were divided by the observed maximum (e.g. weeks of leave) or 
theoretical maximum (e.g. maternity leave benefit).  I then used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to 
determine whether or not there is an underlying structure inherent in the nine variables.  The 
scale reliability coefficient (0.79) indicates that the scale formed from the variables measures a 
single unidimensional latent construct. Therefore, I simply sum the values of each variable to 
create the index.  The theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the theoretical 
maximum is 9.  The actual minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 7.17.  Figure 3.1 shows, 
by country, the difference between the relative female friendliness of leave policies in 1970 
versus their relative female friendliness in 2005.   
[Figure 3.1, here] 
Analyses 
 In general, I expect that higher female representation at the cabinet level will have a 
positive effect on the female-friendliness of individual family leave policies, particularly those 
that are gender role changing, as well as on the family leave index.  As explained in chapter 2, I 
test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country.  The observations are 
compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on the dependent variables.  The 
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key independent variables are once again women in cabinet, women holding social welfare 
portfolios, and women in the legislature.  The control variables are, as detailed in chapter 2: 
women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type (Christian Democratic, Social 
Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European Union membership, and GDP 
per capita.  The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
The Predictors of Family Leave Policies 
I first determined the influence of female officeholders on the individual policies that 
make up the Family Leave Index.  I estimated eight models; each assessed the influence of the 
three key explanatory variables on a single leave-related policy.  The results are shown in table 
3.5, below.  As I expected, women in cabinet are a strong predictor of maternity and child care 
leave provision.  Although I expected female ministers would have a strong effect across the 
board, they have little or no independent effect on the remaining policies.   
[Table 3.5, here] 
Although surprising, these results are similar to those found by OECD researchers in their 
2001 study of the correlation between female-friendly reconciliation policies and women‘s 
employment: the effects of individual policies were quite varied, ranging from -0.04 to 0.59.  
The researchers found that the strongest correlation (0.68) was between the index measure of 
female-friendly policies and women‘s employment (OECD, 2001, pp. 152-153).  I expect that 
the strongest results in this study will also come from the analysis of the index measure.
28
  
                                                 
28
 OECD researchers chose to remove the low and/or negatively correlated policies from their index; however, I 
include all of the policies because full inclusion provides a harder test of the hypotheses. 
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 There are a few other oddities in the analysis of individual policies.  First, women in 
social welfare ministries have no influence on the majority of the policies.  This provides direct 
contradiction to my second hypothesis.  This may indicate that women‘s presence in cabinet, 
versus women‘s specific placement in social welfare ministries, is the more important 
determinant of some family leave policies.  Most perplexing, however, is that where they do 
have an influence (father incentives), it is both negative and significant.  However, diagnostic 
analyses not reported here indicate that father incentives analyses are sensitive to the exclusion 
of individual countries or outliers.  For example, if any one of 10 countries
29
 is dropped from the 
analysis of father incentives female social welfare ministers again lose significance.  Thus, the 
independent effect of female social welfare ministers in these models is questionable.   
A second oddity is that women‘s movements seem to have a significant negative 
influence on weeks of maternity and childcare leave. While it seems counterintuitive that 
women‘s movements should have a negative influence on any of the dependent variables, many 
feminist groups have opposed lengthening maternity and child care leave periods, as these types 
of leave reinforce traditional gender divisions of care and child rearing (Gelb & Palley, 1996; 
Weldon, 2010).  More interesting is that left cabinets seem to have a negative effect on the 
adoption of maternity leave and pay.  A closer examination of the data reveals that there are 56
30
 
observations in which the proportion of left government is less than or equal to the mean 
proportion of left government in the sample (0.37).  In these observations, the mean number of 
weeks of maternity leave (14.4) is higher than the mean in the sample (12.5). Additionally, in 22 
                                                 
29
 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK 
30
 Out of the full sample of 104 observations 
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of the 56, the maternity leave pay level is 3; this is not only the highest score possible, it is also 
about one standard deviation above the mean pay level in the full sample. Conversely, there are 
only 40 observations in which both left government and maternity leave pay exceed their sample 
means.    
More puzzling is that, in comparison with the liberal regime, SD regimes seem to have a 
significant negative influence on maternity and pregnancy related job protections (job 
protections).  The SD and liberal regimes
31
 adopted job protections in the 1970s (Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, UK, US) and 1980s (Australia, Finland, New Zealand), thus there seem to be 
no indicators in the data that explain this result. The final oddity in these results is the positive 
influence of federalism on child care pay levels/the provision of child care leave after the child‘s 
third birthday. The federalism results are strongly driven by Canada and Belgium; when the 
former is dropped federalism is no longer a significant influence on the level of child care pay.  
When the latter is dropped, federalism ceases to have a significant effect on leave after the age of 
three.   
Turning to the remaining results, it is unsurprising that both welfare regime types are 
positive in most models; the reference category is the Liberal welfare regime, which is the 
regime least likely to provide paid family leave and incentives for fathers to take it.  That EU 
membership is positive and significant in the majority of the models is expected, given that the 
EU has been very vocal in its recommendations that members adopt female-friendly policies 
(EU, 2006, 2007b; Weldon, 2010).  Interestingly, it seems that GDP per capita is only a 
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significant influence on the adoption of pregnancy/maternity-related job protections and 
incentives for fathers to take family leave; I would have expected it to have more of an influence 
on the more benefits-intensive policies, given that higher levels of wealth are typically associated 
with welfare spending.  However, that GDP per capita is not a significant predictor of family 
leave is consistent with other research on predictors of family leave, including Atchison and 
Down (2009) and Kittilson (2008).  Also intriguing is that strikes are significant only in the 
adoption of higher levels of remuneration during child care leave and union density is significant 
only in the adoption of paid paternity leave.  Given Weldon‘s (2010) and Lambert‘s (2008) 
findings, I expected labor activity to have a wider effect.  However, these two results are very 
consistent with Weldon‘s (2010) finding that union strength is the strongest predictor of paid 
leave.  Overall, these analyses provide strong support for the argument that the influence of 
female officeholders varies by policy.   
The Predictors of the Family Leave Index 
To test the effects of female officeholders on the overall female-friendliness of family 
leave policies, I estimated five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable 
independently and in combination.  These results are shown in Table 3.6, below.  Model 1 
presents the effects of female cabinet ministers; as expected, female ministers have a strong 
positive effect on family leave in general.  Model 2 presents the relationship between women in 
social welfare portfolios and family leave.  This analysis indicates that female social welfare 
ministers do not have a statistically significant independent influence on the overall adoption of 
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family leave and related policies.   Model 3 presents the effect of female legislators; like female 
social welfare ministers, they seem to have little influence on family leave policies.  
[Table 3.6, here] 
In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the 
adoption of female-friendly family leave policy.  As hypothesized, when both variables are 
included in the model, women in cabinet is the stronger predictor.  Model 5 presents the effects 
of all three key explanatory variables on the adoption of leave policy.  Again, female cabinet 
ministers have a statistically significant positive effect on female-friendly leave policy, while 
female legislators and women in social welfare ministries do not.  Because extant research 
strongly indicates that female legislators have a significant influence on leave policies, while 
these analyses indicate that they do not, I tested the significance of female ministers and female 
legislators in Models 4 and 5.  In both, the test statistic was significant, indicating that legislators 
are not without influence in the adoption of family leave policies.
32
 Model 5 indicates that it is 
the presence of women in cabinet, not their placement in particular ministries, which is important 
for the passage of female-friendly family leave policies.  This directly contradicts my second 
hypothesis, and provides support for the argument that descriptive representation in the 
cabinet—more women in office—is important in the adoption gender equity policies.   
Turning to the other explanatory variables, given Weldon‘s (2010) findings it is 
surprising that women‘s movements have a negative (albeit insignificant) influence on the family 
leave index.  This latter finding may stem from the fact that several policies that make up the 
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 Model 4 test statistic=2.81; probability=0.09 
Model 5 test statistic=2.94; probability=0.08 
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index are gender-reinforcing, rather than gender-challenging, thus women‘s movements may not 
have actively supported them.  This may also be a function of the timing of policy adoptions, as 
discussed above.  It is also interesting that strikes and union density are not significant predictors 
of female-friendly family leave policy.  However, unions have long been bastions of male 
workers; challenging gender roles has not likely been their priority. That EU membership is 
positive and significant in every model is expected.  The EU has long promoted female equity 
policies, and has strongly recommended that member countries adopt female-friendly policies 
such as family leave in order to address the aging population issue (EU, 2006, 2007b). 
33
 As in 
the analyses of individual leave policies federalism is a positive, although insignificant, predictor 
of female-friendly leave policy; of the seven federal states in the study, four provide a year or 
more of family leave.  This may account for these unexpected positive results.  Finally, it is 
unsurprising that the CD and SD welfare regimes are positive across all models, as the reference 
category is the Liberal welfare regime.   
Because the number of observations is relatively small, 104 per model, I also examined 
the effect of outliers on the results.
34
   For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each 
gender indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below 
2/√N (a commonly used standard) and re-estimated each model, once for each indicator‗s 
outliers. Thus, for example, model five was re-estimated three times, once removing women in 
legislature outliers to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing 
women in cabinet outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on. 
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 The only non-EU country with a family leave index score over 4 is Norway; the other non-EU countries fall 
between 1.2 (Switzerland) and 3.8 (Canada).   
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 See Appendix B, Table 3.7 for results 
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The removal of outliers affected a key explanatory variable only in models 4a and 5a—the 
models in which female legislative outliers were removed.  In model 4a, when the 4 female 
legislator outliers are removed female cabinet ministers lose statistical significance; the same 
thing happens when 2 legislative outliers are removed in model 5a.  This indicated the possibility 
of joint significance; thus, I estimated the joint significance of female cabinet ministers and 
legislators in models 4 and 5.  In both cases, the test statistics were statistically significant.  This 
indicates that women in cabinet may be best able to promote female friendly family leave policy 
when they have adequate female support in the legislature.
35
   It should also be noted that in 
models 4 and 5 the removal of outliers caused GDP per capita to attain statistical significance. 
Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that GDP per capita has an independent effect on a female-
friendly package of family leave policies.  Overall, however, the results appear relatively robust 
to outliers.   
Conclusion 
 Much of the gender and representation literature suggests that women in legislature are a 
key determinant in the adoption of female-friendly policies; alternate explanations indicate that 
women‘s movements or union activity are strong predictors.  However, the analyses presented 
here indicate that female cabinet ministers have a significant and positive impact on the adoption 
of a broad range of female-friendly family leave policies, as measured by the Family Leave 
Index.  The most interesting findings presented are that female ministers‘ influence on the 
individual leave policies that make up the index is quite varied. This provides strong evidence in 
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favor of the argument that women are likely to have different levels of influence on a range of 
policies.   
The results of the analyses of individual policies are somewhat puzzling, however.  I 
expected that female cabinet ministers would be highly influential in the adoption of female-
friendly policies that change traditional gender roles (e.g. paternity leave), and less influential—
if not neutral/negative—in the adoption of gender reinforcing policies (e.g. maternity leave).  
However, women in cabinet have a positive, but not significant, impact on two of the three 
gender-role changing policies included in the index:  paternity leave and paternity leave benefits.  
In addition, they do have a significant influence on the adoption of two highly gender-role 
reinforcing policies in the index: weeks of maternity and childcare leave.   
 The explanation for these puzzling results may lie in social attitudes toward the gender 
division of household and child-related labor.  Multiple researchers note that women remain the 
primary caregivers/caretakers in the home (Esping-Andersen, 2002c; Huber, Stephens, Bradley, 
Moller, & Neilsen, 2009; Lewis, Knijn, Martin, & Ostner, 2008; Maume, 2008).  Similarly, as 
mentioned above, multiple studies report that take-up rates for family leave are overwhelmingly 
higher among eligible women than eligible men.  It is typically assumed that this is a rational 
choice made within a working family; the parent that makes less money is more likely to take up 
the leave and the mother is typically the lower-earner (Dex & Joshi, 1999; Weldon, 2010).  
However, recent research indicates that social attitudes and norms may play a large role in both 
take-up of leave and support for gender-role changing leave policies (Fine-Davis, Fagnani, 
Giovannini, Højgaard, & Clarke, 2004).  
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 For example, Fine-Davis, et al (2004, p. 14) report that fully 50% of French parents 
surveyed indicated that a parent should leave the workforce when the child is young; 
furthermore, 32% feel that the non-working parent should be the mother, vs. 15% who believe it 
should be the lowest-earner.  In addition, Fine-Davis, et al (2004, p. 233) find that French 
parents, particularly fathers, strongly believe they will be resented and/or taken less seriously in 
the workplace if they use their family leave and both men and women believe it is more 
acceptable for women to take leave than men.  Both Irish and Danish parents also believe that a 
man will be taken less seriously if he takes family leave; on top of this, Fine-Davis, et al (2004) 
find that a large proportion of Danish employers also believe that leave should be taken by 
women. In Italy, despite the provision of daddy days, fathers are highly unlikely to take family 
leave; this is in spite of the fact that Italian parents agree that the father‘s use of leave would 
allow both parents to better reconcile work and family (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004; Zanatta, 1999).  
Italian fathers generally feel that women are better able to care for the children, thus their 
involvement in domestic and/or childcare work is among the lowest in Europe. In Ireland, where 
there was no provision of paid parental leave at the time of the study, Irish parents 
overwhelmingly agreed that paid parental leave was desirable; notably, however, that research 
indicates that the support is because mothers have typically been forced to use their own leave 
time to care for ill children (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004).   
 In addition to the Fine-Davis, et al (2004) study, public attitudes toward parental leave 
were captured in a 2003 Eurobarometer survey.  In the survey, 61% of fathers
36
 indicated that 
they were not considering taking parental leave.  Nearly 13% of those respondents reported that 
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they were not considering taking parental leave because leave is more for women, while about 
10% of the fathers pointed to the mother‘s use of the full leave period as their reason for not 
considering taking parental leave.   In addition, all non-retired men
37
 were asked what 
discourages men from taking parental leave, 16% indicated that parental leave is more for 
women, 10% indicated that their wives would be better at childcare, 23% indicated that they did 
not want to interrupt their careers, and 43% indicated that parental leave does not provide enough 
compensation. 
The research presented by Fine-Davis, et al (2004) and the 2003 Eurobarometer results 
both indicate that parents typically view childcare as the purview of the mother.  This indicates a 
probable lack of public demand for gender-role changing policies such as higher benefits and 
paternity leave.  Fine-Davis, et al‘s (2004) research also indicates that there is likely public 
demand for longer leave periods so that mothers do not have to use vacation or sick time (or 
unpaid leave) to care for their children.  Although female officeholders may be inclined to pursue 
gender-role challenging policies (Tremblay, 1998; Wangnerud, 2000), there is likely no political 
benefit to pursuing policies that women are not demanding.   
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Chapter 4: Gender & Working Time in Comparative Perspective 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the analysis of female cabinet ministers‘ effects on female-
friendly family leave supported my first hypothesis: female cabinet ministers have a statistically 
significant influence on the adoption of a wide range of female-friendly policies.  I have used 
these findings to support the argument that female cabinet ministers, more so than female 
legislators or unions, are lynchpins for the adoption of policies that help women reconcile work 
and family.  The working time policies analyzed in this chapter present a harder test, however.  
Regulation of working hours is necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and 
parenthood.  However, working hours and vacation time are typically viewed as labor or class 
issues—not gender issues.  Thus, it can be expected that pressure for shorter working hours, 
longer vacation time and regulation of night and/or part-time work is more likely to come from 
labor unions than from female officeholders (Figart & Mutari, 2000).  However, because each of 
these policies has significant influence on women‘s labor force participation and on gender 
equity in the labor market, I do expect that women in cabinet will be influential in increasing the 
female-friendliness of working-time regulations.   
 In particular, where time for paid and unpaid work is balanced between women and men, 
gender equity is strengthened (Rubery, et al., 1998).  For example, a short standard work week 
(under 40 hours) provides more time for domestic and care work by both women and men; this 
helps to remove men‘s paid working time as a barrier to more equitable distribution of unpaid 
labor in the home (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  Longer vacation times provide a similar benefit in 
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that they provide long blocks of time for both parents to spend with children; long vacations also 
lessen the need for parents to find adequate child care during summers (Gornick & Meyers, 
2003).  In addition, regulations that prevent employers from discriminating against part-time 
workers help to ensure the availability of quality part-time work.  Although these protections 
also make it easier for men to engage in part-time work, the primary benefit is to women, as the 
bulk of part-time workers are female (O'Reilly & Fagan, 1998).  Quality part-time work makes it 
easier for women to remain engaged in the labor market after having children; as a result, it can 
contribute to women‘s economic independence (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Warme, et al., 1992).  
Finally, many countries have historically limited women‘s access to night/nonstandard working 
hours; even today Austria, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland prohibit night work for pregnant 
women (ILO, 2010a).  While this is positioned as maternity protection, in reality it prevents these 
women from working hours that are often more lucrative than standard working hours (Gornick 
& Meyers, 2003).    
There are a number of variations in working time regulations across the advanced 
industrial democracies, thus the female-friendliness of working time regulations must be 
examined individually.  To be female-friendly, working time regulations should help balance 
paid and unpaid work for both men and women (Figart & Mutari, 2000; Rubery, et al., 1998).  In 
addition, female-friendly working time regulations should be gender-neutral to prevent 
discrimination against women.  In this chapter, I examine standard work weeks, vacation time, 
part-time work, and non-standard working time regulations as they apply to women in the work 
force.  I then use regression analysis to analyze the determinants of female-friendly working time 
policies. 
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Female Friendly Working Time Policies 
Work Weeks and Annual Leave 
 Traditional theories of full employment have typically assumed a male-breadwinner 
system in which standard working time is an 8 hour day or 40 hour work week (Bruegel, Figart, 
& Mutari, 1998; Schmid, 1995; Wheelock & Vail, 1998).  Newer theories have begun to 
challenge this assumption, arguing that redistribution of employment is necessary to create the 
number of jobs needed to reduce both persistent unemployment in marginalized groups and over-
work in others, particularly women (Wheelock & Vail, 1998).    Within this literature, feminist 
political economists argue that the gender division of paid and unpaid labor must be redistributed 
in order to achieve gender equity (Bruegel, et al., 1998; Figart & Mutari, 2000).  The current 
division of paid employment and unpaid domestic work creates what many people call women‘s 
―double burden‖ (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Woodward, 1998, p. 143); women engage in paid 
labor while at the same time shouldering the bulk of the household and child-minding work 
(Huber, et al., 2009).  The double burden is illustrated in figures 4.1 and 4.2, below.  Figure 4.1 
indicates that only 24% of male respondents spend 16 hours or more on housework (including 
cooking, cleaning, child-minding, etc.) each week, versus 49% of female respondents. In 
contrast, Figure 4.2 shows that about 72% of men and 70% of women work more than 36 hours 
per week.  
[Figures 4.1 & 4.2, here] 
 The double burden can be reduced by shortening standard working hours for all workers 
(Figart & Mutari, 2000; Gornick & Heron, 2006; Mutari & Figart, 2001).  It is preferable this is 
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done via national legislation, as there are employees not covered by collective agreement.  
However, collective agreements can shorten working time considerably.  Reduction of standard 
working hours helps both men and women to balance paid employment and unpaid domestic 
work (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  Achieving this balance is, as Rubery, et al. (1998, p. 71) argue, 
a ―prerequisite for greater equality at home and for achieving greater equality in the labor market 
and the broader society.‖  Long work-weeks (40 hours or greater) tend to be associated with low 
levels of FLP, as the lack of flexibility in working time makes harmonization of employment and 
family difficult (Figart & Mutari, 2000); low levels of FLP are, in turn, indicators of low levels 
of economic equity (Huber, et al., 2009).  In contrast, where work weeks are shorter, both FLP 
and economic equity tend to be higher (Woodward, 1998); thus, policies such as regulation of 
maximum working hours reduce working hours and increase the female-friendliness of the labor 
market. Table 4.1
38
 notes the year in which each country adopted regulations on maximum 
working time, as well as the average hours worked by employees in the year of adoption, versus 
hours worked in 2005.   
[Table 4.1, here] 
The argument in favor of longer vacation time is an extension of the argument for shorter 
working weeks: less time at work leaves more time for both sexes to participate in family life, 
thus helping to balance the gender division of labor.  However, there are additional female-
friendly benefits that accompany longer vacation time.  First, longer vacations allow parents to 
harmonize their vacations and their children‘s summer breaks (Hertz, 1999).  This means that 
parents, typically mothers, will have less difficulty arranging childcare during school breaks 
                                                 
38
 All tables and figures are found in Appendix B 
 61 
 
(Gornick & Heron, 2006; Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  In addition, where generous childcare 
leaves are not provided (e.g. the US), or where childcare leave ends after the child‘s 3rd birthday, 
vacation time is often used to care for a sick child (Milkie & Peltola, 1999). Parents with short 
vacation time can then be left without leave either for vacation or for additional care-work (Fine-
Davis, et al., 2004).  Table 4.2 demonstrates that this is likely a problem for parents in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and the US. 
[Table 4.2, here] 
Research shows that men are more likely to have unused vacation days than women 
because women are more likely to take vacation time to care for a sick child or care for their 
children when there are issues with day care (Maume, 2006, 2008). Thus, policies that extend 
vacation time are gender-neutral, reduce the burden of care on mothers, and help to achieve 
work-life balance for both sexes.  As such, extended leave policies are female-friendly.    
Part-Time Employment  
 Of all of the policies considered in this chapter, the regulation of part-time employment 
as a female-friendly policy is the most controversial.  Patrick Bollé (2001, p. 215) summarizes 
the debate neatly, asking ―Part-time work: solution or trap?‖  At one extreme, it is argued that 
wide-spread availability of part-time work allows for employment flexibility that helps women to 
harmonize paid work and family time (Daniela Del Boca & Wetzels, 2007).  On the other, it is 
argued that because part-time employment is typically concentrated in the service sector and is 
associated with low skills, low wages, and few benefits, part-time work actually diminishes 
women‘s long-term employment prospects and lifetime earnings (Bollé, 2001).  In practice, 
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however, the issue is less clear-cut. The reality is that among the advanced industrial 
democracies, we see a relatively uniform pattern in part-time employment.  
 The expansion of part-time work leads to greater female labor force participation 
(Delsen, 1998); however, the true level (in terms of hours worked) of female participation 
in the labor market is often overstated, as headcount measures do not account for the fact 
that part-time work is heavily dominated by women (Jenson & Sineau, 2001; OECD, 
2002b; Smith, Fagan, & Rubery, 1998).  
 The bulk of part-time work has typically been concentrated in the service sector—from 
40 percent in Greece to more than 80 percent in several countries, including Finland,    
Australia, and the UK (Delsen, 1998, p. 66; Sciarra, Davies, & Freedland, 2004)  
 Part-time jobs tend to be gender segregated, poorly paid, and low-status, such as 
cleaning, personal services, and retail sales (Smith, et al., 1998), and require firms to 
make minimal investment in human capital (Delsen, 1998). 
 
In short, in most of the advanced industrial democracies women are disproportionately 
represented in low-quality employment.  This is indicated in figure 4.3, which shows the 
proportion of part-time work performed by women versus men.  This would seem to support the 
argument that part-time work is a trap for female workers.   
 [Figure 4.3, here] 
There are several points that support the argument that part-time work is a solution for 
harmonizing parenthood and paid employment.  First, Esping-Andersen (2002b, pp. 79-80) notes 
that when a woman leaves the workforce for 5 years, she loses an average of 1.5 to 2% of her 
annual lifetime earnings potential; if, however, she engages in part-time work rather than exiting, 
the labor market, the cumulative wage penalty declines to 0.5%.   In addition, where part-time 
opportunities are not available, parents are left to choose between full-time employment and 
unemployment. Neither option may be feasible given that childcare must be available in order 
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for a parent to participate in full-time employment and a working partner must be present in 
order for a parent to choose unemployment (Bollé, 2001).  Thus, part-time employment provides 
a necessary middle-ground.  Finally, where provisions to allow new parents to work part-time in 
their pre-child jobs part-time work is less precarious, less gender-segregated, and better 
compensated (Rubery, et al., 1998). 
These broad discussions of part-time employment obscure an interesting point, however:  
there is no discernable cross-national pattern regarding rates of part-time employment and female 
labor force participation.  Some countries, notably the Sweden and The Netherlands, have 
actively promoted quality part-time employment as a mechanism for increasing FLP, as mothers 
as mothers often find it easier to work part-time (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; OECD, 2008; 
Rubery, et al., 1998);
39
  in contrast, Finland has very high FLP, but comparatively few part-time 
workers (Bollé, 2001; Rubery, et al., 1998).  On the opposite end of the spectrum, because of 
strict labor regulations, Spain and Greece provide few opportunities for part-time employment 
and both have among the lowest levels of FLP in Europe (Adam, 1996; Rubery, et al., 1998).   
The lack of a cross-national pattern regarding part-time work and female labor force 
participation makes it difficult to generalize about gender equity and part-time work (Figart & 
Mutari, 2000; Garibaldi & Wasmer, 2004; Sciarra, et al., 2004; Smith, et al., 1998).   
The one point on which there is general agreement is that  in order to increase gender-
equity in part-time work, there must be legislation that prevents discrimination against part-time 
workers (Garibaldi & Wasmer, 2004).  As Bollé (2001, p. 228) notes, ―where part-time work is 
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 Quality part-time work is protected by law, meaning that it is illegal to discriminate against part-timers: they must 
have pay, benefits, and training/promotional opportunities that are proportional to those of their full-time colleagues 
(EU, 2007c).   
 64 
 
accompanied by adequate legal protection…it can be an excellent means of dividing one‘s time 
between economic activity, family responsibilities, and other pursuits.‖  The elimination of 
discrimination is the key objective of the EU‘s Council Directive on Part-Time Work (1997), 
wherein member states agreed ―to eliminate discrimination against part-time workers and to 
improve the quality of part-time work‖ (EU, 2007c; Gornick & Meyers, 2003, p. 312).  The 
Directive was passed as a specific attempt to increase gender equity in the labor market 
(Bleijenbergh, de Bruijn, & Bussemaker, 2004).
40
  Thus, for the purposes of this project, where 
countries have adopted legislation that prevents discrimination against part-time employees (who 
are largely female), I consider that their part-time employment laws have taken steps toward 
becoming female-friendly. 
Non-Standard Working Time 
 Non-standard working time includes night, evening, and weekend work.  I focus here on 
night work, as that is where regulations concerning women have historically been concentrated.  
Many countries consider night work a hardship, and special benefits/pay may be granted 
accordingly.  For example, in Austria, an employee who performs six or more hours of heavy 
night work more than 51 times per year is entitled to two additional days of annual leave (ILO, 
2010a).  In Germany, unless otherwise determined by collective agreement, night workers must 
be granted paid time off to compensate for the night work and employers must pay ―an 
appropriate supplement over and above the gross wage due to them for the hours worked‖  (ILO, 
2010a). Italian law specifies that collective agreements must provide for higher salaries for night 
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workers (ILO, 2010a), while Swiss law mandates a 10% increase in salary for regular night 
workers and a 25% increase for employees temporarily assigned to night work (ILO, 2010a).   
 These provisions for night workers are generous, however they are also discriminatory.  
In each of these countries, pregnant women are prohibited from undertaking night work, 
regardless of the nature of said work.  Germany and Italy take this one step further; Germany 
prohibits night work for breastfeeding mothers, while Italy prohibits night work until the child 
turns one (ILO, 2010a).  Belgium had similar restrictions until 1998, whereas French restrictions 
on women and night work were  not lifted until 2001 (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).    These 
regulations are prima facie discriminatory toward women.  First, they exacerbate gender 
inequality because they specifically target mothers (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  Second, they are 
predicated on the idea that women must be protected in the labor market; thus, they are highly 
paternalistic.  Third, these gendered regulations prevent women from benefitting from the 
increased compensation that accompanies night work.  Despite a 1991 European Court of Justice 
ruling that any ban on women‘s night work violates EU law, the member states mentioned above 
have made no move toward complying with the Court‘s decision (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). 
Repealing gender-biased working time regulations will significantly increase the female-
friendliness of non-standard working time policies. 
Cross National Analysis of Working Time Policies 
The Working Time Index (WTI) 
 The overall nature of a country‘s working time policies must be considered when 
attempting to determine the female-friendliness of the country‘s working time policies.  I have 
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accounted for this by constructing an index measure of working time policies.  Following 
Gornick and Meyers (2003), I identified five policies related to female-friendly working time.  
These are listed in Table 4.3, below.   
[Table 4.3, here] 
 The data have all been scaled so that their values fall between 0 and 1; original values were used 
for binary measures (e.g. regulation of non-standard working time).  Because higher values 
indicate greater female friendliness, average working time was first divided by the observed 
maximum (45.74) and then subtracted from 1.  Thus the highest number of working hours 
(45.74) has a value of 0 in the index, while the lowest (31.90)  has a value of 0.303.  Vacation 
time was simply divided by the observed maximum. 
As in the previous chapter, I used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to determine whether or not 
there is an underlying structure inherent in the five variables.  The scale reliability coefficient 
(0.72) indicates that the scale formed from the variables measures a single unidimensional latent 
construct.
41
 Therefore, I again sum the values of each variable to create the index.  The 
theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the theoretical maximum is 5.  The actual 
minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 4.2.  Figure 4.4 shows, by country, the difference 
between the relative female friendliness of leave policies in 1970 versus their relative female 
friendliness in 2005, by country.  
[Figure 4.4, here] 
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Analyses 
 Overall, I expect that working time regulations will prove a much more difficult test of 
my hypotheses than did family leave.  While family leave is universally acknowledged as a 
gendered policy area, working time regulations are much less specific to women.  Thus, it may 
be the case that union activity (strikes and union density) is the more important determinant of 
working time regulations.  However, because shorter working times and protection of part-time 
employment are very important to women‘s ability to combine parenthood and paid 
employment, I expect that female cabinet ministers will have a significant influence on female-
friendly working time regulations.  Again, I test this using OLS regression with standard errors 
clustered by country.  The observations are compressed into 5 year period averages to increase 
variation on the dependent variables.  The key independent variables, as in the previous chapter, 
are women in cabinet, women holding social welfare portfolios, and women in parliament.  The 
control variables are: women‘s movements, union density, strikes, left government, GDP per 
capita, federalism, European Union membership, and welfare regime type (Christian Democratic, 
Social Democratic, and Liberal).
42
  The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below. 
The Predictors of Working Time Regulations 
 To test the effects of female officeholders on the individual working time regulations, I 
ran five models.  Each tested the effect of the three key explanatory variables on a single 
working time regulation.  The results are shown in table 4.4, below.  On the whole, the results 
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indicate that women do not have a statistically significant influence on working time policies, 
with the exception of average working hours.  In interpreting the results of the average working 
hours analysis, it is important to remember that in this analysis lower working hours are more 
female friendly.  Thus, it is odd that a higher proportion of women in cabinet leads to higher 
working hours. However, in line with my second hypothesis, it seems that higher proportions of 
female social welfare ministers lead to reduced working hours.  Given that female ministers tend 
to be concentrated in social-welfare portfolios, the two variables are highly correlated (0.67).  
However, the VIFs do not approach 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue.  The 
average working time analysis may be a case in which higher levels of women are not necessary 
for adoption of female friendly policies; however it is necessary that a woman be in a key 
position to influence policy adoption.  This may also be that case with vacation time, as female 
social welfare ministers are a significant predictor of longer vacation time while female 
ministers, in general, are not. 
Turning to the controls, it is unsurprising that women‘s movements have a significant 
positive influence on the adoption of maximum working time regulations; however, it is—on the 
surface—quite odd that women‘s movements would have a negative (albeit insignificant) impact 
on the repeal of gendered regulation of working time.  This is likely related to timing; when I run 
the regression model using the data only for 1970-89 (the most active period in the repeal of 
gendered regulation of working time), women‘s movements have a significant and positive 
influence on gendered regulations.  It is interesting to note that several of the countries that either 
repealed these laws comparatively late or have not yet repealed them also have historically had 
strong women‘s movements: e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, and The Netherlands.  At the other end 
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of the spectrum, several countries that do not have a history of gendered regulations, or that 
repealed these policies in the 1970s/early 1980s, do not have strong and autonomous women‘s 
movements: e.g. Finland, Japan, Spain, and Sweden.  Thus, the negative result is odd, but not 
inexplicable.  
Left cabinets are significant predictors in only one model: average working hours.  As 
proportion of left cabinet increases, working hours decrease.  Moving to the labor variables, 
given Weldon‘s (2010)and Lambert‘s (2008) studies I expected both labor variables to be strong 
predictors across the board, with the possible exception of gendered regulation of non-standard 
working time.  Thus, it is surprising that union activity is significant in only 2 of the 5 models: 
average weekly working hours and part-time protections. However, reduction of working time 
has long been a focus of labor unions, thus it is unsurprising that they have the greatest influence 
on reduction of average hours worked.  Lower working hours may also be a function of 
collective agreements (as in Denmark) rather than regulation of working hours; this can also be 
attributed to union activity.  Also of interest is the negative impact of strikes on the adoption of 
protections for part-time workers.  This is expected, as unions have traditionally opposed part-
time work.    
That GPD per capita is insignificant in all models is unsurprising; these policies have 
little impact on government spending.  It is interesting, however, that federalism is a significant 
negative predictor of average working hours. However, these results are driven by the relatively 
low average working hours in Belgium, Australia, and Germany; if any of these are dropped 
from the model, federalism is no longer a significant predictor of low average working time.  
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Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that federalism has no independent influence on working 
hours.   
At first glance, it seems odd that EU membership would be associates with lower average 
working hours, longer vacation time, and regulation of maximum working hours, but a negative 
predictor of gendered regulation of working hours.  However, seven EU member states
43
 have 
historically regulated women‘s night work; three of those continue to do so today (Austria, 
Germany, Italy).  In contrast, five of the six non-EU members
44
 analyzed did not have gendered 
regulations during the period of this study. Finally, that the CD welfare regime is statistically 
significant in almost all models is unsurprising, as the reference category is the liberal regime.
45
  
Liberal regimes have traditionally had the fewest regulations on non-standard working time. This 
lack of regulation also explains why both CD and SD states are significant and negative 
predictors of gendered regulation of working time in comparison with the liberal states.  
Although three SD regimes and six CD regimes
46
 regulated women‘s working hours between 
1970 and 2005, none of the liberal states had similar regulations. 
The Predictors of the Working Time Index 
 To test the effects of female officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly working 
time policies, I ran five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable 
                                                 
43
 32 observations: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and The Netherlands 
44
 52 observations: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the US; Finland, Spain and Sweden were 
free of gendered regulations prior to joining the EU. 
45
 That both regimes are negative predictors of average working time seems odd on the surface; however it must be 
kept in mind that the variable was constructed so that higher values are considered more female-friendly.  Thus, 
these results indicate that both CD & SD welfare states are likely to have lower average working hours than liberal 
states.   
46
 SD, 15 observations: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands; CD, 35 observations: France, Germany, Greece, Italy 
Portugal, Switzerland 
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independently and in combination.  These results are shown in Table 4.5, below.  Model 1 
presents the effects of female cabinet ministers on working time regulations; as expected, female 
ministers have a significant and positive effect.  Model 2 presents the relationship between 
women in social welfare portfolios and working time policy.  In direct contradiction of my 
hypothesis, this analysis indicates that female social welfare ministers have a positive but 
insignificant impact on female-friendly working time policies.   Model 3 presents the effect of 
female legislators; they have a positive and significant effect on the adoption of policies that 
increase the female-friendliness of standard working time.  In Model 4, I test the effects of both 
women in cabinets and female legislators on working time.  When both variables are included in 
the model, both are significant predictors of female-friendly working time policies. Model 5 
presents the effects of all three key explanatory variables; both female ministers and legislators 
are again individually significant.  In addition, in both models 4 and 5 the two variables are 
jointly significant at the .05 level.
47
 
As mentioned above, working time policies are commonly thought to be class-related 
policies, thus they are thought to be the purview of labor unions.  This analysis indicates, 
however, that union density is not a significant predictor, while strikes are a significant negative 
predictor of female-friendly working time policies.   It should be noted, however, that in 11 of 
the 12 observations in which there are an average of 2000 or more strikes, the WTI score is 
below the mean by an average of nearly 0.8, and in 5 of the 12 the difference is greater than 1.3 
standard deviations.  Furthermore, when the strike outliers
48
 are dropped, strikes lose statistical 
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 Model 4: F=5.25, Probability=0.016; Model 5: F=5.22, Probability=0.017 
48
 Denmark, 1999; Ireland, 2000-05; Italy, 1995-99; Japan, 1970-74; UK, 2000-05  
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significance.  Thus, that strikes have a negative influence on female-friendly working time 
policies cannot be stated with great certainty.  
In addition, EU membership is a positive, but not significant, predictor of female-friendly 
working time policies.  This is surprising, as the EU has long promoted shorter working times, 
the regulation of working hours, and the repeal of gendered regulation of non-standard working 
time.  However, as noted above, several EU countries still regulate women‘s working hours in 
some way; this may be a factor in the EU‘s non-significant influence.  Finally, that the CD and 
SD regime types are positive predictors of female-friendly working time is as expected, given the 
liberal reference category. 
 As in the previous chapter, the small number of observations (104) made it important to 
test the effects of outliers on the results.
49
  With respect to the key explanatory variables, only 
change s come in Models 2 and 4b.  In model 2, female social welfare ministers become 
significant when 10 outliers are dropped.  More interestingly, when cabinet outliers were 
excluded from model 4b, cabinet ministers lost statistical significance.  This once again raises the 
possibility of joint significance; indeed, female ministers and legislators are jointly significant 
predictors of leave policy.
50
  Also of interest, removal of the key explanatory variable outliers in 
models 4, and 5 caused left government to attain significance.  This means that left government 
is significant in 5 of the 8 diagnostic analyses.  Therefore, it must be noted that left government 
may have an independent effect on the adoption of female-friendly working time policy.  
 
                                                 
49
 See Appendix B, Table 4.6 for Outlier Analyses. 
50
 F=4.96; probability=0.02 
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Conclusion 
 The analyses suggest that it is likely that women in cabinet are a key determinant of 
female-friendly working time policy; however, the results further suggest that female ministers 
are best able to push a female-friendly agenda when there are higher proportions of women in the 
legislature.  These findings are especially telling, as working time policies have historically been 
credited, at least in part, to labor activity.  My results indicate, however that strikes may actually 
be a negative predictor of female-friendly working time policies.  It should be mentioned that the 
overall results may be driven by the fact that unions have historically viewed part-time work 
with skepticism, arguing that expansion of part-time work would limit workers‘ education and 
training options, increase gender segregation, and cut full-time positions (Delsen, 1998; Eklund, 
2004; Fuchs, 2004).  Although trade unions in some countries now support the protection of part-
time work, this is a relatively new development and is far from universal (Delsen, 1998; Fuchs, 
2004).  In addition, the finding that women in cabinet and women in legislature are jointly 
significant not only supports the substantive representation argument in general, but also 
supports my first hypothesis and the argument that women in legislatures are key determinants of 
female-friendly social policy.   Women do, indeed, respond to demands for more female-friendly 
working time policies.  
For example, a 2004 Eurobarometer (Papacostas, 2004) survey  indicates that of the 
7,815 respondents that plan to reduce their working hours, 44% of them would like to be able to 
reduce their daily/weekly hours, while 33% would like to be able to increase their vacation time, 
and 8.5% would like to do both.  It is likely, however, that governing parties must also be 
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amenable to these policies in order for the women to successfully push for change.  Since the 
1970s, the conditions have been good: states have frequently viewed the reduction of working 
time and the extension of part-time employment as strategies to combat unemployment (Bollé, 
2001).  A prime example comes from France; in 1982 the Socialist-led government implemented 
working time reductions aimed at decreasing unemployment (Laulom, 2004).  In addition, states 
often view the encouragement of part-time work as politically expedient. As Bollé (2001, p. 216) 
notes, the expansion of part-time employment opportunities ―can lower politically-significant 
unemployment rates without requiring an increase in the total number of hours worked.‖   
The results presented here also indicate that the CD welfare regime type is a consistent 
positive predictor of the overall adoption of female-friendly working time policy, as well as 
strong predictors of the regulation of weekly working hours, lengthy vacations, protections for 
part-time workers.   This would seem to support the idea that welfare regime is a driving force 
behind working time policies. I would agree that the regime type sets the stage; however, where 
significant the coefficients for regime are smaller by 25-40% than those of women in cabinet.  
Thus, it seems that women in cabinet have a larger effect on the overall female-friendliness of 
working time regulations. 
 The analyses presented here indicate that the presence of women at both the cabinet and 
legislative levels is important for the adoption of female-friendly working time policies.  This 
finding is of primary importance where working time policies are still restrictive to women or 
where working time is comparatively long.  For example, in Austria, Germany, Italy, and 
Switzerland, where regulations still prevent some women from working non-standard shifts, anti-
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discrimination activists and European Union representatives
51
 are more likely to see success if 
they focus their efforts to repeal these policies on a coalition of women in the cabinet and women 
in legislature—a two-pronged approach is likely to be more effective than focusing only on 
women in legislature.  In addition, given the paucity of female-friendly policy options for women 
in liberal regimes, liberal states should look to the policy lessons learned from CD and SD
52
 
welfare states in order to promote the adoption of policies that balance the gender division of 
labor, decrease women‘s burden of care, and increase the overall female-friendliness of working 
time policies. 
                                                 
51
Austria, Germany, and Italy are all currently in violation of a 1991 ECJ decision that ruled gendered regulation of 
working time a violation of EU law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Chapter 5: Female-Friendly Childcare Policies in Comparative Perspective 
Introduction 
 In the preceding chapters, I examined several policies that provide important support for 
working women; among these policies are maternity and childcare leave, as well as shortened 
working hours and increased vacation time.  I have found that the presence of female cabinet 
ministers is generally a positive predictor of female-friendly policy.  Female ministers, 
particularly in conjunction with female legislators, are instrumental in the adoption of family 
leave policies and female-friendly working time policies.  In this chapter, I examine the one 
policy area that is strictly necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and motherhood: 
childcare.  Childcare, like family leave, is typically viewed as a female concern rather than a 
working class concern.  The issue is one in which women are typically more vested than men; as 
Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 143) point out, when faced with poor childcare options it is 
mothers that will disassociate from the labor market in order to care for their children. Thus, 
improving the availability of affordable and reliable childcare services is vital to improving 
gender equity in the labor market.   
Indeed, it can be argued that childcare is the most important of the female-friendly 
policies, as women are unable to reconcile paid employment and motherhood without it.  Esping-
Andersen (2002b) provides strong support for this argument, finding that childcare availability is 
the key determinant of the harmonization of motherhood and paid employment for both part-time 
and full-time female workers.  Because this is an issue of prime importance to women, I expect 
that the design and adoption of childcare policy will be heavily influenced by female 
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officeholders.  Once again, the policy design becomes a central part of determining the female-
friendliness of the final policy.  While childcare policies are usually viewed as female-friendly, 
there are several components that contribute to improving the relative levels of female-
friendliness.  In this chapter, I focus on care entitlements for infants and pre-school aged 
children, childcare subsidies (tax or transfer) to parents, school age, and continuity in the school 
day/week.   
First, universal state-provided childcare for infants and preschoolers, such as the Swedish 
child care system, is highly female-friendly.  Because the state provides benefits for all children, 
Swedish parents are able to procure quality care for their children regardless of the family‘s 
economic status.
53
  The situation is quite the opposite in the US, where parents‘ childcare options 
are constrained by income; lower-income American parents often have difficulty finding  quality 
care and many American children end up in inadequate care arrangements (Gornick & Meyers, 
2003).  Second, where childcare is not state-provided, tax or transfer benefits that offset the cost 
of childcare are an important component of increasing the affordability of childcare, thus 
improving the female-friendliness of available care. Most countries now provide some sort of 
childcare subsidy, credit or rebate—however, the level of assistance varies tremendously.  In 
Spain, for example, childcare is heavily subsidized; the maximum parents will have to pay is 
20% of the cost of care (Kamerman, 2000).  In contrast, the US provides a tax credit that 
reimburses 20% of childcare costs for middle-income parents and 30% for low-income parents—
thus American parents pay, on average, about 76% of the cost of childcare (Kamerman, 2000).  
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 Fees are assessed; however they are low and are calculated on a sliding scale based on parental income.  Parents 
end up paying about 13% of the cost of care (2007c).  
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Third, although not specifically positioned as a female-friendly policy, school age is an 
important part of a female-friendly childcare package.  Having young children is the largest 
barrier to maternal employment (d‘Addio & d‘Ercole, 2005); the earlier the age at which 
children are allowed to attend school, the better for mothers—particularly when non-maternal 
childcare options are limited and/or expensive.  Finally, irregular school hours are an additional 
impediment to mother‘s employment; when either the school day or school week is not 
continuous, the burden of care increases.  For example, Swiss schools have morning and 
afternoon sessions, but only a handful of schools provide care between the sessions (Androwski, 
2010).  In contrast, British mothers do not have to concern themselves with mid-day care or 
irregular weeks, as the school day and week are continuous throughout the UK (Gornick & 
Meyers, 2003). 
Given the wide variety of childcare arrangements both within and across the advanced 
industrial democracies, it is important to examine the full spectrum of childcare policies.  In this 
chapter, I examine the public provision of childcare, childcare benefits, school ages, and the 
continuity of school time.  I first describe each policy, emphasizing the qualities that enhance 
each policy‘s female friendliness.  I then conduct regression analysis to determine to what degree 
female officeholders influence the adoption of childcare policy. 
Female Friendly Childcare Policies 
Childcare 
 Ensuring care for the children of working mothers has been an issue in many countries 
since the industrial revolution.  For example, in Francophone Belgium, the first nurseries opened 
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their doors to the children of working class women in the 1820s; these were charitable 
institutions designed to prevent vagrancy and promote morals and hygiene (EU, 2008/09n).  In 
England, poor working mothers had access to similar day nurseries as early as the late 18
th
 
century (EU, 2008/09p).  These working-class facilities were typically overcrowded and poorly 
staffed, but working class mothers had no other options.   In countries such as The Netherlands, 
these facilities gradually shifted their focus from child-minding to pre-school education (EU, 
2008/09o).  However, in most cases, basic child-minding centers were the only available non-
familial care until the 1960s or 1970s.  These day nurseries had several drawbacks, however.  
First, the child-minders were often ill-paid and ill-trained.  Second, the services were typically 
available only to poor women, so working women of higher income were forced to rely on help 
from female relatives or nannies.  Third, day nurseries were care-centric, and children in them 
received little education.   Finally, space was limited, so these facilities became inadequate as 
rates of female employment began to increase across all segments of society in the 1960s and 
1970s.  The question became what role, if any, the government should play in the provision of 
childcare.  
 There are four basic patterns of government intervention in childcare across the advanced 
industrial democracies: public provision for all children, public provision for children aged three 
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and up, childcare allowances,
54
  and childcare benefits in the form of transfers or tax credits. 
Table
55
 5.1 shows the provision of childcare polices in each country, circa 2005.   
[Table 5.1, here] 
Sweden was an early provider of public care.  Swedish lawmakers chose to extend public 
provision of care to all children, with the express intent of facilitating women‘s entry into the 
labor market  (Bergqvist & Jungar, 2000).  In comparison, the French chose to promote stay-at-
home motherhood until age 3 by ensuring a right to childcare only after the child‘s third birthday 
(Lanquetin, Laufer, & Letablier, 2000). Similarly, the Japanese government provides subsidized 
municipal daycare; however, priority is given to low income and single-parent families and 
availability is severely limited (Allen, 2003). Thus, the policy leaves women—particularly those 
in the middle class—little choice but to stay at home with small children.  The German state 
chose to fully reinforce the male-breadwinner model in which women bear the primary 
responsibility for private care; this was done by provision of a childcare allowance that pays 
women a modest sum when they stay home with small children; this results in very low 
employment among mothers of young children (Schweiwe, 2000).  In the US and Australia, the 
state chose to neither promote nor discourage female employment; instead implementing tax 
credits to help parents offset the purchase of private care
56
 (Kamerman & Kahn, 1997).   
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 Although this is a common method of intervention, in this project I do not examine child-raising allowances, as 
these pay mothers to stay home with small children and do not help reconcile parenthood and paid employment. In 
fact, some research shows that cash-for-care schemes may have a negative effect on mother‘s employment 
(Kamerman, 2000). 
55
 All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B 
56
 It should be noted that the purchase of child care effectively acts as a tax on the secondary earner‘s (typically the 
mother‘s) wages; thus, the tax credit may be more beneficial to the mother (depending on whether or not the state 
uses joint taxation)(Gornick & Meyers, 2003). 
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Public Provision of Childcare 
 The cost of quality childcare can be staggering, particularly for families with more than 
one child.   Research finds that high childcare costs have a negative effect on maternal 
employment; as care costs rise, women leave the labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  
Anderson and Levine (1999) determined that in the US—where the vast majority of childcare is 
privately purchased—a 10% reduction in the cost of childcare could lead to 3 to 4% increase in 
the likelihood of maternal employment; they further note that low-income mothers are 
particularly sensitive to childcare costs.  In addition, childcare costs act as, in effect, an 
additional tax on the secondary earner‘s (the mother‘s) wages; this significantly reduces 
women‘s equity in the labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).   Duncan and Giles (1996) argue 
that public subsidies for childcare are likely to encourage more mothers to work, thus decreasing 
their dependence on a spouse‘s income.  Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998) also find that public 
provision of childcare increases women‘s earnings and significantly increases female 
participation in the labor market.   
This is best illustrated by the Scandinavian-Spanish differential: low provision of care 
results in low FLP rates in Spain, while widespread provision of childcare in Scandinavia results 
in some of the highest FLP rates in the world (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Valiente, 2000).  As you 
can see in Table 5.2, however, this differential is not absolute.  Swiss parents, for example, have 
low access to formal care, but high FLP.  In these cases, it is assumed that family and informal 
care arrangements substitute for formal care centers.  This is sub-optimal, as family/informal 
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care arrangements are often irregular and non-regulated, and can thus pose both availability and 
quality issues for parents (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).   
[Table 5.2, here] 
Public provision of care services can also alleviate some of the wage penalty issues 
associated with women‘s exit from the labor market in order to care for small children.  Where 
there is little access to childcare (e.g. Germany), mothers often have little choice but to exit the 
workforce for the first three years of their children‘s lives; this causes a loss of skills and a wage 
penalty (Duncan & Giles, 1996; Schweiwe, 2000).  However, the wage penalty is lessened when 
women are able to get back into the workforce more quickly (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).  In 
addition, research shows that the use of childcare services is linked to the probability that women 
will engage in full-time employment (Ghysels, 2004; Schøne, 2004).  However, there is also 
evidence that women are less likely to work full-time when they have to pay for childcare, 
presumably because the cost of care outweighs the benefit of employment  (Ghysels, 2004; 
OECD, 2007b).  Thus, it becomes important that governments provide care services, or—at the 
very least—offset the costs of childcare in order to increase women‘s labor force participation 
rates. 
Offsetting the Costs of Childcare 
 The expense of childcare can be a major barrier to female employment (d‘Addio & 
d‘Ercole, 2005).  If care is available but unaffordable, it does little to help women reconcile 
parenthood and employment.  Thus, subsidies that mitigate childcare expenses can be an 
important tool for increasing FLP.  The two most common methods of subsidizing the cost to 
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parents are tax credits/deductions and transfers (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). As shown in Table 
5.1,   countries as diverse as Australia, Japan, Finland and the US are among the countries that 
provide some form of subsidy.  In Australia, this takes the form of the Child Care Benefit, a 
rebate paid on a sliding scale (by income), which can be paid directly to the service provider or 
taken as a lump sum by the parents at the end of the year (Australian Bureau of Statistics., 2002).  
The Finns and Danes provide subsidies, typically paid to private care providers, if parents choose 
private care centers rather than public (Cleveland, 2010; Waldfogel, 2001). In contrast, Canadian 
and Dutch parents receive a tax deduction to moderate the cost of childcare, while parents in the 
US and the UK receive a tax credit (Cleveland, 2010).   
 The range of subsidies creates great variety in the amount parents pay for childcare across 
the advance industrial democracies.  An OECD-sponsored study (d‘Addio & d‘Ercole, 2005, p. 
55) noted that ―as a result of different programmes, the out-of-pocket childcare costs borne by 
families vary significantly across countries: at gross income levels of 100% of the earnings of an 
APW
57
 they range from more than 40% of gross family income in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom to less than l0% in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden.‖   In some 
countries, such as Denmark, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden, parental co-payments are based on 
family income and are capped to ensure that parents pay only a small percentage of the costs 
(Child Policy International., 2008; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Kamerman, 2000).   
Because of the minimal impact of some subsidies, e.g. the US tax credit offsets less than 
an estimated 25% of costs, the expense of childcare is still an impediment to female employment 
in countries such as Ireland, Canada, and the US.  For example, Irish childcare costs are the 
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 Average production worker. 
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highest of any EU country and are not income-adjusted (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004); as a result, 
childcare acts as  a regressive burden on low income parents.  This is problematic because US 
research indicates that high childcare costs increase the likelihood that low income parents will 
need income support from the state (Connelly & Kimmel, 2003).   
This is not simply an issue of income level, however.  Researchers find that high 
childcare costs act as a significant negative influence on mothers‘ labor force participation, 
regardless of income.  For example, in a study of Canadian women‘s employment choices, 
Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996, p. 147) find that a 10% increase in childcare costs results 
in a 3.9% reduction in the likelihood a mother will engage in paid employment. Similarly, 
Michalopoilos and Robins (2000, pp. 457-460) find that increasing the cost of formal care by just 
$1 per hour is likely to decrease mothers‘ full-time employment by 3%.  In contrast, they find 
that increasing annual childcare subsidies by $100, to American and Canadian women in full-
time employment using non-parental care, will likely increase employment by about 1%.   In the 
same vein, Duncan & Giles (1996) find that increasing childcare subsidies to parents in the UK 
is likely to have a positive impact on mother‘s employment—particularly for lower-income 
mothers and mothers of children under the age of 3. 
 Policies for School-Aged Children 
 In this research, I consider two policies related to school-aged children:  (a) the age at 
which parents may first enroll children in school
58
 and (b) the continuous school day/week.
59
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 In many cases, the age at which children may be enrolled and the compulsory school age are the same, however, 
in a few cases parents have the option to enroll children early.  If, for example, the compulsory school age in the 
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These are shown in Table 5.3.  First, the age at which parents may enroll children in school is 
important, particularly when childcare access is limited.  Lower ages are more advantageous for 
working parents.  For example, while there is little access to childcare for ages 3 and under in 
Ireland, parents may enroll children in public pre-school at age 4 thus considerably lessening the 
burden of care on parents (EU, 2008/09g). Public kindergarten starting at age 5 provides a 
similar benefit for parents in the US and The Netherlands (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  In 
contrast, Sweden provides a guaranteed place for every child, ages 0-6 (EU, 2008/09l); thus, the 
fact that the school age is 7 is unlikely to cause care problems for parents.  
 Even more important to mother‘s employment, however, is a continuous school day/week 
(Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  School schedules, particularly in countries with short school weeks 
(e.g. the French 26 hour school week), are often difficult to reconcile with parent‘s work 
schedules (OECD, 2007b). Nevertheless, schools provide an important source of supervised care.  
However, whereas American and Swedish parents are able to take a child to school and not 
worry about child care for the length of the school day, German and Swiss parents are faced with 
a non-continuous school day (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  They are typically forced to arrange 
childcare for their children over the mid-day break (a break of varying lengths), as the school is 
not responsible for the children during that time (Androwski, 2010; EU, 2008/09e). This 
increases the burden of care on parents, particularly since many countries that do not have 
continuous school days also have lower access to non-parental care (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3).  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Netherlands is 5, but parents can enroll children at age 4 (Schøne, 2004).  This significantly increases the country‘s 
coverage rates for the over 3s, even though there is no legal guarantee of a place for every child.    
59
 I also considered children‘s hours in school and weeks per year, however in no country for which data could be 
found did these data change between 1970 and 2005.   
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addition to these scheduled breaks, some parents are faced with unpredictable school hours due 
to teacher absences. For example, The Netherlands does not have an effective substitute teacher 
program; thus, children are regularly sent home when a teacher is out sick and working parents 
are left scrambling to find childcare on short notice (OECD, 2007b). 
Not only may the school day be irregular but, as in France, the school week may not be 
continuous.  The French school week includes what Esping-Andersen (2002b, p. 84) calls ―the 
peculiar French practice of school-free Wednesdays.‖ He also notes that this practice is likely the 
reason for low employment of French mothers with small children, despite the wide availability 
of childcare for preschoolers; most public care facilities are also closed on Wednesdays.  
Scheiwe (Scheiwe, 2000) reports that short and irregular school hours are a similar impediment 
to mothers‘ employment in Germany, as well.  Although school-free Wednesdays are uniquely 
French, the practice of mid-week breaks is not.  Both Belgium and The Netherlands close 
schools on Wednesday afternoons, and Luxembourg‘s schools close on Tuesday and Thursday 
afternoons (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).  In these cases it is incumbent on parents, usually 
mothers, to not only find care for their children, but also to leave work mid-day to pick up the 
children and take them to the care provider; this makes it challenging for a mother of small 
children to maintain a career (Abrahamson, 2007).   Thus, non-continuous school schedules are 
generally a hindrance to the full-time employment of women. 
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Cross National Analysis of Child Care Policies 
The Child Care Index (CCI) 
 The overall nature of a country‘s child care policies must be considered when attempting 
to determine their overall female-friendliness.  I have accounted for this by constructing an index 
measure of childcare policies.  Following Gornick and Meyers (2003), I identified four policies 
related to female-friendly child care.  These are listed in Table 5.4, below.   
[Table 5.4, here] 
 To ensure that each variable is given equal weight, the data have all been scaled so that their 
values fall between 0 and 1; for example, the school day may be continuous (1), sometimes 
continuous (0.5), or not continuous (0).  Because higher values indicate greater female 
friendliness, school age was first divided by the observed maximum (7) and then subtracted from 
1.  Thus the highest school age has a value of 0 in the index, while the lowest (4) has a value of 
0.43.   
As in the previous chapter, I used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to determine whether or not 
there is an underlying structure inherent in the variables.  Given the small number of variables, 
the scale reliability coefficient (0.37) indicates that the scale formed from the variables likely
60
 
measures a single unidimensional latent construct. Therefore, I again sum the values of each 
variable to create the index.  The theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the 
theoretical maximum is 4.  The actual minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 3.14.  Figure 
                                                 
60When using Cronbach‘s Alpha, increasing the number of variables typically increases the alpha score; thus the low 
score here is likely the result of the small number of variables rather than an indicator that an additive index is 
inappropriate.  
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5.1 shows, by country, the difference between the relative female friendliness of childcare 
policies in 1970 versus their relative female friendliness in 2005, by country.  
[Figure 5.1, here] 
Analyses 
 In general, I expect that higher female representation at the cabinet level will have a 
positive effect on the female-friendliness of individual child care leave policies, particularly 
those that are gender role changing, as well as on the child care index.  As explained in chapter 2, 
I test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country.  The observations are 
compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on the dependent variables.  The 
key independent variables are once again women in cabinet, women holding social welfare 
portfolios, and women in the legislature.  The control variables are, as detailed in chapter 2: 
women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type (Christian Democratic, Social 
Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European Union membership, and GDP 
per capita.  The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 below. 
The Predictors of Child Care Policies 
I first determined the influence of female officeholders on the individual policies that 
make up the Child Care Index.  I estimated six models; each assessed the influence of the three 
key explanatory variables on a single child care-related policy.  The results are shown in table 
5.5, below.  Although I expected female ministers to have a significant influence on all policies, 
they seem to have little influence on any policy in the group.  This would be shocking, if not for 
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the fact that it echoes the results found in the previous chapters: female officeholders have had 
little influence on gender role changing policies.  Child care policies are, by definition, gender 
role changing as they explicitly change the locus of care activities to non-maternal caregivers. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the primary determinants of public care for children aged 0-6 are 
the social democratic welfare regime and GPD per capita.  Non-maternal public care is widely 
accepted in the SD countries, as shown by the high percentages of children in public care 
(Waldfogel, 2001), and all four countries are wealthy enough to shoulder the costs of public 
child care.  Similarly, it is not surprising that EU membership increases the likelihood that a 
country will provide childcare; of the 51 non-EU observations in the study, 42 (82%) do not 
include any form of child care.  Conversely, of the 53 observations in which the country is an EU 
member, 38 (72%) include at least some public care.   
[Table 5.5, here] 
One of the most intriguing results in these analyses is that union density seems to have a 
significant negative influence on the adoption of day care subsidies.  This contradicts findings 
from Lambert (2008) and Weldon (2010) that indicate labor union strength should have a 
positive effect on female-friendly policy.  Interestingly, my findings are similar to some findings 
in the labor and employment literature, although it should be noted that researchers in this field 
have found mixed effects of union activity on childcare policy.  For example, Glass & Fujimoto 
(1995) found that, the presence of unions, even in predominantly female workplaces, had a 
negative influence on the adoption of childcare policies in the US workplace.  Bardoel, Moss, 
Smyrnios & Tharenou (1999) found little evidence of a positive relationship between union 
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presence and employers‘ adoption of child care policies in Australia, while Heywood and Jirjahn 
(2009) find that the presence of a works council (an enterprise-level worker‘s representative 
council) increases the likelihood that German companies will respond to demand for child care 
policies. 
A second result that must be noted is the negative effect of women‘s movements on 
school age.  To interpret this finding, it is important to remember that lower school ages are more 
female-friendly.  In that context, it is not surprising that strong women‘s movements would work 
to lower school ages.  That federal countries have a positive influence on school age is driven by 
the Swiss school age of 7.  Similarly, both CD and SD countries typically have higher school 
ages than liberal states; the mean age for each is 5.8, 6.8 and 5.5 respectively.  Less explicable, 
however, is the negative relationship between continuous school days and left government.  A 
possible explanation is that of the 42 observations in which there is not a continuous school 
day,
61
 the proportion of left government is higher than the mean in 42 (57%).  Of those, there are 
13 in which left government has a simple majority and 7 where the proportion of left government 
is more than one standard deviation above the mean.
62
  That all of these countries are CD welfare 
states helps to explain the negative effect of the CD regime type on continuous school days.   
That there is little commonality of determinants is the most striking result from this group 
of analyses.  Welfare regime, often thought to be the primary driving force behind social 
policies, is an inconsistent predictor of individual child care policies.  EU membership, which in 
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 Five countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Switzerland 
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 Conversely, of the 103 observations in which a continuous school day is present, 74 (72%) lack a left government 
with a simple majority.  Of those, the proportion of left government is one standard deviation or more below the 
mean in 29.   
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this project has routinely been a fairly positive indicator of female-friendly policy, does not 
predict female-friendliness in four of the six estimations of the determinants of individual 
childcare policies. The most consistent pattern is that in none of the analyses do female 
officeholders seem to affect the adoption of female-friendly child care policy.
63
  However, given 
that the effects on individual policies can be different than the effects on the overall female-
friendliness of the policy area, it is important to see if this pattern holds in the analyses of child 
care policy in general (OECD, 2001). 
The Predictors of the Child Care Index 
To test the effects of female officeholders on female-friendly child care policy, I 
estimated five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable independently and in 
combination.  These results are shown in Table 5.6, below.  Model 1 presents the effects of 
female cabinet ministers on child care policies; as expected, they have a strong positive effect on 
child care policy in general.  Model 2 presents the relationship between women in social welfare 
portfolios and child care.  This analysis indicates that female social welfare ministers do not have 
a statistically significant independent influence on the overall adoption of child care- related 
policies.   Model 3 presents the effect of female legislators on child care policy; like female 
social welfare ministers, female legislators seem not to have a significant influence.    
[Table 5.6, here] 
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 Indeed, I estimated the joint significance of the female officeholders on each policy; in no model was the test 
statistic significant. 
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In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the index.  As 
hypothesized, when both variables are included in the model, women in cabinet is the stronger 
predictor of female-friendly child care policy.  However, when all three female officeholder 
variables are included in Model 5, none of the three are significant predictors of child care 
policy.  In fact, a test of joint significance shows that the key explanatory variables do not have a 
significant joint effect on the adoption of female-friendly child care policy.
64
 
 Turning to the controls, that left cabinet has a significant negative effect in all models is 
slightly puzzling.  However, closer examination of the data reveals that of the 59 observations in 
which the CCI equals or exceeds the mean (1.37), 25 also exceed the left cabinet mean (.37)—10 
exceed the left cabinet mean by one standard deviation (.31) or more. This may help explain the 
unexpected negative influence of left cabinets.  Also confusing is the strong negative influence 
of union density in all five models.  However, as noted above, the labor and employment 
literature is ambivalent, at best, on the effects of labor unions on female-friendly child care 
policy.  In addition, Morgan and Zippel (2003) note that women within trade unions championed 
child care; thus it may be the case that if I were to look at the influence of trade unions with large 
proportions of female members, we might see a more positive influence on the adoption of child 
care policies.   Finally, most observers would likely find it odd that Christian Democratic states 
are a significant negative predictor of female-friendly child care policies in comparison with the 
liberal reference category.  However, this is likely driven by the higher school ages and non-
continuous school days found in many of the CD states.  
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 Test statistic=1.28; probability=0.31  
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Because the number of observations is relatively small, 104 per model, I also examined 
the effect of outliers on the results.
65
   For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each 
gender indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below 
2/√N (a commonly used standard) and re-ran each model, once for each indicator‗s outliers. 
Thus, for example, model five was re-run three times, once removing women in legislature 
outliers to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing women in 
cabinet outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on. Only in 
model 5 did the removal of outliers affect a key explanatory variable.  In each estimation, the 
removal of outliers caused the women in cabinets variable to attain statistical significance.  
When considered in conjunction with the statistical significance of female ministers in models 1 
and 4, it seems likely that there is an independent effect of female ministers on female-friendly 
child care policy.    
Conclusion 
 In previous chapters, the relationship between women in cabinet and female-friendly 
policy has been very clear: these women have a strong independent effect on policy.  However, 
the analyses presented in this chapter are slightly less clear-cut.   Here we see that female 
ministers have a clear influence on child care policy in two of the three models in which the 
variable included, they verge on significance in the third, and when the outliers are removed 
from the analysis, women in cabinet have significant influence on the adoption of childcare 
policy.     This ambiguity may result from a lack of public demand for expansion in child care 
policy. 
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 See Appendix B, Table 5.7 for results 
 94 
 
 Child care policy tends to be gender-role changing, as it—at least for working hours—
ensures that the mother does not have to be the primary care-giver.  However, research indicates 
that mothers in many countries may not actually want their role to change.  For example, in 
Abrahamson‘s (2007, p. 201) qualitative study of work reconciliation policies, he found that 
where German mothers of small children were actually still working, they felt that the limited 
number of hours of non-maternal care was not a problem.  Abrahamson reports that according to 
the mother, the larger issue was their own working hours.  Thus, in this case there seems to be 
little demand for longer school hours or continuous school days. 
 Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, parents in many countries believe that children 
are best cared for by their parents.   Valiente (2000, p. 143), reports that in Spain ―societal views 
about childrearing emphasize the value of the care provided by mothers and family members and 
mistrust public childcare centres for very young children.‖  Indeed, if a Spanish mother must 
work when her children are small the typical preference is that children be cared for by a female 
relative, usually a grandmother.  Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri (2004, p. 7) report similar 
preferences among Italian parents, noting that parents favor care by relatives as it is the option 
that most closely approximates parental care.  They find that where a grandmother is in a 
position to care for children, Italian mothers are significantly more likely to engage in paid 
employment (Daniela Del Boca, et al., 2004, p. 19).  Similarly, as noted in Chapter 3, 50% of 
French parents in the Fine-Davis et al (2004, p. 14) study believe that parents are the best 
caretakers for young children; 32% of respondents felt the mother should be the stay-at-home 
caretaker. Finally, in studies of American attitudes toward non-parental child care, Joesch and  
Heidemann (2002) show that significant proportion of parents feel that parents should be the 
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primary caregivers, while Kuhlthau and Mason (1996) find that the majority of American 
mothers believe that parents are the best care takers for their small children.  Given these 
widespread societal preferences for parental care of small children, the fact that the relationship 
between women in cabinet and the adoption of childcare policies is ambiguous is less puzzling.  
In essence, it is not that female ministers are not representing the interests of women; it is that 
the child care policies measured here do not seem to be of interest to the majority of women.   
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Chapter 6: Gender Systems and Support for Women’s Employment 
Introduction 
In this project, I have argued that in order to better understand the influence of female 
officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly policy and the female-friendliness of the labor 
market,, we need to measure female-friendly policy holistically.  To this end, I created the 
Support for Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI); it attempts to measure the overall female-
friendliness of each country‘s package of reconciliation policies.  The SWEI includes measures 
of family leave policy, working time regulation, and child care policy.   As noted in Chapter 2, 
given the Chronbach‘s Alpha score of 0.78, I can confidently state that the SWEI does measure a 
single underlying structure.  However, there is no statistical measure that tests whether or not the 
SWEI captures the overall female-friendliness of state policy.   To determine how well the index 
measures female-friendliness, I first review existing theories of state-gender relations, including 
the relationship between gender and welfare state regimes as well as feminist theories of gender 
systems. I then compare state SWEI scores with both the welfare state and gender systems 
typologies. 
In addition to arguing for an index measure of female-friendliness, I have also argued that 
female officeholders, particularly female cabinet ministers, are likely to be strong determinants 
of female-friendly policy.  Indeed, I have found that women, both in cabinet and in legislature, 
are strong determinants of family leave and working time, and that they likely influence child 
care policy.   In this chapter, I also seek to determine whether or not female officeholders are 
also key determinants of an overall policy environment that supports women‘s employment.  To 
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do so, I use regression analysis to test the effects of female officeholders on the overall provision 
of female-friendly work-family reconciliation policy.   
The Female-Friendliness of the State 
The overall female-friendliness of the state has long been a subject of debate in the 
gender and welfare state literature (Fraser, 1994; Lewis, 1992, 2006; Lewis, et al., 2008).  Much 
of the traditional welfare state literature assumes that gender relations are associated with or 
explained by the classic welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999, 2002b).  For 
example, Arts and Gelissen (2002) define the liberal/Anglo-American
66
 social welfare states, 
such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, as those which typically have a relatively high level of 
means-tested social welfare coverage (Bambra, 2007).  Liberal states are likely to provide 
benefits only in the event of a market or familial failure; hence single mothers are the women 
most likely to receive benefits in these systems—albeit benefits which are meager and highly 
stigmatized.  The goal in these states is subsistence, not economic freedom for benefit recipients; 
this contributes to comparatively high levels of female and childhood poverty liberal welfare 
regimes.   
Conservative or Christian Democratic (CD) social welfare states, such as Germany and 
Switzerland, have a ―strong link between work position…and social entitlements,‖ and benefits 
are proportional to income (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Bambra, 2007).  Because men typically earn 
more in the family, and benefits are family-based rather than individually-based, benefits are 
typically predicated on the male income level.  The state, particularly in continental Europe, also 
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 All of the English-speaking advanced industrial democracies are classified as liberal regimes: Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, the UK, and the US 
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promotes traditional gender roles by providing to use tax benefits and cash transfers to encourage 
women to stay at home with their children.  The Southern European CD states (e.g. Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy) follow a slightly different pattern.  Trifiletti (1999, p. 50), argues that this 
group employs a the ―tacit and half-hearted‖ approach to family policy.  As with their continental 
neighbors, the Southern CD states provide little in terms of state services, but they also spend 
relatively little on cash transfers to support families (Gauthier, 2005).  Esping-Andersen (2002a, 
pp. 59-60) notes ―Spain is arguably an excellent illustrative case because it combines very low 
female employment, exceptionally undeveloped economic support to families, and fairly high 
child poverty rates: in brief, a worst-case benchmark for comparison.‖  In both types of CD 
states, however, the end result is that traditional gender roles are typically not challenged; 
women are first caregivers, then workers. 
Finally, the Social Democratic (SD) welfare states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) are those in which benefits are universal in nature, and there are strong benefits to 
offset ―various social risks,‖ including childrearing (Arts & Gelissen, 2002, p. 144; Bambra, 
2007).  Among the SD welfare states, there are several countries providing paid parental leave of 
one to two years after the birth of the first child.  The rest have paid maternal/parental leave of at 
least 14 to18 weeks where the pay is equal to between 50 and 80 percent of the parent‘s 
earnings—they also have widely available public childcare/early education programs and child-
related tax allowances are common (Gauthier, 2005; OECD, 2004).  Thus, of the three, the SD 
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states are the most likely to challenge the traditional gender division of labor resulting in women 
and men who both work and perform care activities.
67
   
To some extent, the argument that welfare regimes explain gender relations can be 
substantiated (Sainsbury, 1999).  For example, female labor force participation rates are 
generally higher in SD and liberal welfare states, while FLP is generally low in CD states 
(OECD, 2007c).  Birth rates follow a similar pattern—higher in SD and liberal states than in CD 
states (WDI, 2010).   Indeed, Figure 6.1
68
 shows that states with the same welfare regime type 
generally cluster together on the SWEI rankings—the liberal states mostly cluster at the bottom, 
while the SD states all cluster at the top.   
[Figure 6.1, here] 
However, welfare state regimes do not fully explain within-regime variations in the 
provision of female-friendly policies, thus welfare regime type does not explain the level of 
support for women‘s employment in countries like the UK, Portugal or Switzerland (Sainsbury, 
1999).  For example, although the US and UK are both typically classified as liberal states, the 
UK provides 26 weeks of moderately paid maternity leave; the US provides 12 week of unpaid 
family leave.  In addition, the US does not specifically provide paternity leave,
69
 while the UK 
provides both paternity leave and incentives for fathers to take leave.  Indeed, the UK far 
outstrips the not just the US in the provision policies that support women‘s employment, but it 
also outstrips the majority of the remaining liberal states.   
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 Women are still more likely to be caregivers, but this is not a legally institutionalized constraint. 
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 All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B. 
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 Although fathers are also allowed to take 12 weeks of family leave, it is not reserved for them.  
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In addition, Portugal performs well in comparison with its CD counterparts, while fellow CD 
regimes Switzerland and Japan cluster with most of the liberal states at the bottom of the female-
friendly barrel. Feminist scholars argue that the reason that welfare states are not perfect 
predictors of support for women‘s employment is that classic conceptions of welfare state 
regimes are predicated on male labor patterns—specifically on Esping-Andersen‘s (Esping-
Andersen, 1990) concept of the decommodification of labor (Crompton, 1999; Lewis, 1992; 
Sainsbury, 1999).  The concept presumes that labor has first been commodified in order to then 
need decommodification; the problem is that the bulk of women‘s labor has traditionally been 
non-commodified—thus the SD/CD/Liberal classifications are based on male labor and male life 
patterns.  Crompton (1999) posits that there are five gender systems that often cross-cut welfare 
state regimes: male breadwinner (MBW), dual earner/female part-time carer, dual earner/market 
carer, dual earner/state carer, and dual earner/dual carer.  These are shown in Figure 6.2.     
[Figure 6.2, here] 
 Male breadwinner (MBW) systems are those in which men are expected to be the 
primary wage earners and women are expected to be the primary caregivers, thus state 
policies reinforce traditional gender roles and the traditional gender division of labor by 
providing care allowances and tax/transfer benefits to stay-at-home mothers.     
 Dual earner/female part-time carer (PTC) systems are modified male-breadwinner 
regimes.  Although a woman is typically expected to bring in income, it is secondary to 
her male partner‘s income.  In addition ‗part time carer‘ can either result from a career 
interruption in which the woman takes a break to perform care activities, or from a 
woman‘s choice of part-time work in order to be able to also perform care work. In a 
PTC system, the state provides little in the way of benefits and/or services; thus, parents 
must rely on market solutions for care services.  This system, like the MBW system, does 
little to change the gender division of labor or promote gender equity. 
 Dual earner/market carer (MKT) systems encourage women to engage in full-time 
employment; however public policy does not support work-family reconciliation.  
Working hours are minimally regulated, the state provides few tax or transfer benefits, 
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and care services are organized by the market. This can have a bifurcating effect on 
equity; women with better educations and resources will be able to better assimilate into 
the working world, while women with lower income/education will be more 
marginalized.  Many in the latter group may well provide the poorly-remunerated 
services that allow the former to work.   
 Dual earner/state carer (SC) regimes encourage the full time employment of women by 
state-organized care services. Although the specific goal is to increase equity, the unpaid 
gender division of labor may be reproduced in the paid labor force in the dual earner/state 
care system.  The heavily gender segregated Swedish labor force provides evidence of 
this; women tend to be concentrated in public care work, while men are concentrated in 
private industry (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).   
 Dual earner/dual carer (DC) regimes are theoretically the most gender egalitarian, 
promoting policies that encourage both parents to engage in equal levels of paid 
employment and unpaid domestic/care work.  
  
These gender systems help explain the within-welfare regime variations noted above.   I have 
categorized each of the countries in the study according to Crompton‘s gender systems 
parameters.  The systems are ideal types, thus few countries match one system perfectly.  
Therefore, I have assigned both primary and secondary gender systems.  As shown in Table 6.1, 
the states in which market provision of care predominates also have tend to have the lowest 
levels of support for women‘s employment; here you can clearly see that Switzerland‘s gender 
system more clearly explains its low level of female-friendliness than does its welfare regime.  
The MBW systems with secondary PTC systems fall in the lower-middle range of support for 
women‘s employment; these countries tend to be CD regimes.   
In contrast, countries which combine PTC system with increased state care tend to score 
towards the higher end of the scale.  In this upper-middle range, particularly, we see countries 
whose level of support for women‘s employment is better explained by their gender systems; 
these include the UK, Portugal, and The Netherlands. Finally, the SC countries that have 
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incorporated elements of the DC model rank highest in terms of support for women‘s 
employment; this also corresponds to the SD welfare regime type.   The general fit between the 
countries‘ SWEI scores, welfare regimes, and gender systems suggests that the SWEI is a good 
measure of the overall female-friendliness of state reconciliation policy.   This further indicates 
that the SWEI provides an appropriate measure with which to test the influence of female 
officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly policy.    
Analyses 
 Analysis of family leave, working time and childcare policy has shown that female 
officeholders have varying levels of influence on female-friendly policy.  However, it remains to 
be seen whether or not they help to create a more female-friendly society; I expect that they do.  
As explained in chapter 2, I test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by 
country.  The observations are compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on 
the dependent variables.  The key independent variables are once again women in cabinet, 
women holding social welfare portfolios, and women in the legislature.  The control variables 
are, as detailed in chapter 2: women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type 
(Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European 
Union membership, and GDP per capita.   
The Predictors of Support for Women’s Employment  
To determine the influence of female officeholders on policies that support female 
employment I estimated five models.  Each assessed the influence of the three key explanatory 
variables on the Support for Women‘s Employment Index.   The results are presented in Table 
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6.2.  Model 1 presents the effects of female ministers on the female-friendliness of a broad range 
of work-life reconciliation policies; as expected, their influence is significant and positive.  
Model 2 presents the relationship between female social welfare ministers and the adoption of 
policies that promote female employment.  These women seem to have little independent effect 
on such policies.  Model 3 indicates that female legislators are significant and positive predictors 
of female-friendly reconciliation policy. 
[Table 6.2, here] 
  In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the 
index.  As hypothesized, when both variables are included in the model, women in cabinet are 
the stronger predictor of female-friendly child care policy.  In fact, despite their strong positive 
impact in Model 3, women in legislature lose significance in Model 4; thus I tested the joint 
significance of women in cabinet and legislature.  The test statistic (5.83) is significant at the 
99% confidence level; this indicates that women in cabinet are better able to pursue a female-
friendly agenda when there are higher proportions of women in the legislature.  When all three 
female officeholder variables are included in Model 5, women in cabinet are again a significant 
and positive determinant of female friendly policy; however, female legislators and social 
welfare ministers seem to have little independent influence.  Given the significance of female 
ministers in Model 3, and their joint significance with women in cabinet in Model 4, I again test 
for joint significance. Female ministers and legislators again prove to be jointly significant at the 
95% confidence level.
70
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 Test statistic=5.94; Probability = 0.01  
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 Turning to the control variables, it is unsurprising that EU membership is a significant 
and positive determinant of female friendly policy in every model.  The EU has taken several 
steps to address female-friendly reconciliation policy, including EU directives on part time work, 
parental/family leave, and working time (EU, 2007c; Eurofound, 2009; Gornick & Meyers, 
2003).  What is surprising is that very few other control variables seem to have independent 
effects on the adoption of female-friendly reconciliation policy.  In Model 3, we see that GDP 
per capita and the SD welfare regime are significant; however these results are not repeated in 
the other four models.   
 Given the relatively small number of observations, 104 per model, I also examined the 
effect of outliers on the results.
71
   For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each gender 
indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below 2/√N (a 
commonly used standard) and re-estimated each model, once for each indicator‗s outliers. Thus, 
for example, model five was estimated three times, once removing women in legislature outliers 
to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing women in cabinet 
outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on. Only in Model 2 did 
the removal of outliers affect a key explanatory variable.  The removal of nine female social 
welfare minister outliers caused the female social welfare minister variable to attain statistical 
significance.  The remaining results are remarkably consistent with the original analyses; we see 
changes in only models 4b and 5b.  The removal of six outliers causes the SD and CD welfare 
                                                 
71
 See Appendix B, Table 6.3 for results 
 105 
 
regimes to attain significance in Model 4b, while the removal of eight outliers causes GDP per 
capita and the CD welfare regime to attain significance in Model 5b.
72
    
Conclusion 
 This chapter addressed two primary questions.  First, it was important to determine 
whether or not the Support for Women‘s Employment Index is an appropriate and valid measure 
of the overall female-friendliness of a state‘s package of reconciliation policies.  The comparison 
of levels of support for women‘s employment, welfare state regimes, and gender systems 
determined that the SWEI lines up well with both the classic welfare state explanations of state-
gender relations and the feminist gender systems explanations of state-gender relations.  This 
determination helped to analyze the second question: do female officeholders influence the 
overall female-friendliness of state policy?  The results presented here indicate that female 
ministers do indeed have a significant independent effect on the adoption of female-friendly 
policy.   The analyses further indicate that higher proportions of female legislators may increase 
the efficacy of female representation at the cabinet level. 
Analysis of other factors indicates that the influence of a supra-national body with a 
female-friendly agenda may also be helpful to the adoption of female-friendly policy, while 
many of the common explanations for the adoption of social policy (e.g. women‘s movement, 
union activity, and left government) do not seem to have strong independent effects on female-
friendly reconciliation policy.  These results are important for helping to understand the 
conditions under which female-friendly legislation is most likely to be adopted.  They are useful 
                                                 
72
 In both models, the female cabinet minister outliers were removed. 
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for evaluation of the efficacy of gendered representation, and they provide considerable support 
for the argument that higher proportions of women in office are necessary in order for women‘s 
policy demands to be met.   In short, these results support the argument that descriptive 
representation leads to substantive representation.  This is particularly important given the 
current climate, wherein low fertility and rapidly aging populations are causing many countries 
to adopt work-life reconciliation policies.  The research presented here indicates that the 
presence of female policymakers will help to increase the female-friendliness of the policies 
adopted, while the policies adopted by male dominated bodies may be less female-friendly. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Introduction 
As a result of aging populations and historically low birthrates, women‘s participation in 
the labor market has become an issue of prime importance to governments in most of the 
advanced industrial democracies.  Many governments have begun to promote policies that help 
women reconcile childrearing and paid employment; the hope is that this will encourage women 
to participate in the labor market, thus increasing the number of people contributing to welfare 
state funding, and to bear children, thus increasing birthrates.  Despite increased national and 
supranational focus on work-life reconciliation, as well as increased focus on whether or not 
these policies increase female labor force participation (FLP) and total fertility rate (TFR), 
research on the adoption of reconciliation policy has been limited (Daniela  Del Boca, Pasqua, & 
Pronzato, 2005; EU, 2006; Gauthier, 2005, 2007; Hyatt & Milne, 1991; OECD, 2002a).  The 
research on gender and policy adoption indicates that union activity, women‘s movements, 
women in legislature, or a combination of these are key determinants of the adoption of policy 
that helps women work and care for their families (Kittilson, 2008; Lambert, 2008; Schwindt-
Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Weldon, 2010). 
In this study, I argue that this research has two main flaws.  First, researchers have, by 
and large, ignored the influence of the cabinet.  The majority of advanced industrial democracies 
are parliamentary systems in which the cabinet has considerable control over the policy 
process—from origination to implementation.  I hypothesize that women in cabinet, particularly 
women who hold social welfare portfolios, are likely to have considerable influence over the 
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adoption of female-friendly reconciliation policy. Thus, when a study omits women in cabinet 
from the analysis, the results may overstate the influence of women in legislature, women‘s 
movements, or labor unions.  To address this issue, I have introduced an original dataset that 
measures the presence of women in cabinet; I measure both the number of women in cabinet and 
the number who hold social welfare related portfolios. 
The second issue is that most studies analyze a single policy (e.g. maternity leave) and 
base their conclusions about the adoption of female-friendly policy on those results.  However, 
there is evidence that women are likely to have varying levels of influence on different policy 
areas (e.g. Sanbonmatsu, 2003).  Thus, though these studies provide insight into the adoption of a 
specific policy, it is likely that they do not give generalizable insight into the determinants of 
female-friendly policy more broadly.  I address this issue by introducing the Support for 
Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI), a composite measure of female-friendly reconciliation 
policy.  This additive index includes 19 individual policies from three policy areas: family leave, 
working time, and child care.  I use multivariate statistical analysis to test the determinants of 
each policy, policy area, and the overall level of support for women‘s employment. In this 
chapter, I briefly review the findings from these analyses.  I then highlight the implications of 
this research, and conclude with a discussion of future directions for research on gender and 
public policy. 
A Review of the Findings 
There are three main groups of findings in this study: individual policies, policy areas 
(e.g. family leave), and overall support for women‘s employment.  Analysis of specific 
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reconciliation policies provides considerable support for the argument that female officeholders 
are likely to have varying levels of influence on different policies.  Indeed, female ministers are a 
significant predictor of only a handful of the individual policies included in the SWEI: weeks of 
maternity leave, weeks of childcare leave, and average working hours.
73
 Furthermore, female 
ministers and legislators are only jointly significant in the analysis of incentives for fathers to 
take family leave.  If I were generalizing based on the results of individual policy areas, then, it 
would seem that female officeholders have very little influence on the adoption of female-
friendly reconciliation policy. 
However, analysis of the determinants of a range of female-friendly reconciliation 
policies provides a very different picture.  I include of a variety of potential determinants of 
female-friendly policy in my analyses of family leave, working time, and child care policy; these 
include women‘s movements, left government, and welfare state regime.  These are commonly 
assumed to be predictors of female-friendly policy; however in these analyses, shown together in 
Table 7.1,
74
 they appear to have little independent effect.  I also include women in legislature, 
another variable strongly argued to be a determinant of female friendly policy; these women 
seem to have an effect, but only in conjunction with women in cabinet.  Thus higher proportions 
of women in legislature are likely helpful to the adoption of female-friendly policy, but have less 
effect on their own. 
[Table 7.1, here] 
                                                 
73
 In this analysis, higher proportions of women in cabinet are associated with higher average working hours, while 
female ministers holding social welfare portfolios are associated with shorter average working hours. 
74
 All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B. 
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 Higher proportions of women in cabinet clearly improve the female-friendliness of 
family leave and working time.  While their independent effect on childcare policy is less clear-
cut, women in cabinet—when working in conjunction with female legislators—do have a strong 
effect on the provision of childcare policies that benefit women.  Furthermore, higher 
proportions of women in cabinet are strong predictors of the level of support a country provides 
to working mothers. Thus, it appears that women in cabinet, more so than women‘s movements 
or legislators, are key determinants of the female-friendliness of reconciliation policies.       
At its core, the Support for Women‘s Employment Index is an attempt to measure the 
female-friendliness of the state, at least as far as work-life reconciliation policy is concerned.  
Thus it is important to compare the SWEI with common explanations for state-gender relations, 
such as welfare regime and gender systems, to determine how well the SWEI captures countries‘ 
levels of female-friendliness.  I do so, and find that countries‘ SWEI scores generally cluster 
along welfare regime lines, with many of the liberal states at the bottom of the scale and the SD 
states at the top.  While the fit between SWEI and regime type is fairly good, there are a few 
prominent examples (e.g. the UK and Portugal) in which a country‘s level of support for 
women‘s employment cannot be explained by its welfare regime type.  The parallels between the 
countries‘ SWEI scores and Crompton‘s (1999) gender systems typology75 help to bridge this 
gap.    
At the top of the rankings, we have countries in which public policy supports a dual-
earner family by providing higher levels of state care; at the low end of the rankings, we have 
                                                 
75
 Male breadwinner, dual-earner/female part-time carer; dual-earner/market carer; dual-earner/state carer; dual-
earner/dual-carer; see Chapter 5 or Crompton (1999) for more detail. 
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countries in which the dual-earner family predominates but it is left to families to find market-
based care solutions.  In the lower-middle range, countries which promote male-earners and 
female-carers predominate; while the upper-middle is mainly comprised of countries which are 
moving towards expanded levels of state care.  Given the general fit between the SWEI and both 
welfare regime and gender systems explanations of gender-state relations, I find that the SWEI is 
an appropriate measure of the overall female-friendliness of work-life reconciliation policy.  
The Implications 
 One of the most intriguing implications in this study comes from the analysis of 
individual reconciliation policies.  As Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007, p. 555) point out, 
―much [of the] research on women‘s policy issues conflates women‘s policy with feminist 
policy.‖  Given that I define female-friendly policy as policies that ―specifically address both 
discrimination and socio-economic loss by attempting to ensure that a woman‘s career is not 
harmed when she temporarily leaves the workforce for childbearing or when she must take time 
away from work for child care activities,‖ I have certainly followed suit.  The analysis of 
individual policies does reveal that female ministers and legislators have a jointly significant 
influence on the adoptions of incentives for fathers to take family leave; this is certainly a 
feminist/gender-role changing policy, as it encourages men to do more care work.   
However, the two individual policies on which female officeholders have the greatest 
independent effect are two of the least feminist policies included in the study:  maternity and 
child care leave.  Indeed, feminist groups have often opposed expansions of maternity and child 
care leave, as they reinforce the traditional role of women as primary caregivers (Gelb & Palley, 
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1996).  In spite of this, female ministers seem to have a strong influence on policies that lengthen 
maternity and child care leaves.  I have posited that this is likely a result of demand; constituents 
have expressed their desire for longer leave periods, but not for policies that do more to change 
traditional gender roles.   Thus, these analyses may imply that, in the minds of female 
officeholders and female voters, a female-friendly policy does not necessarily equate to a gender-
role changing policy.    
Indeed, the analysis of the influence of female officeholders on the overall adoption of 
child care policy reinforces this idea.  Policies that expand public provision of child care are 
gender-role changing, as they ensure that the mother is not the primary caregiver during the work 
day.  However, the analyses presented in Chapter 5 indicate that the link between female 
representation and child care policy is less clear-cut than the link between female representation 
and family leave.  I argue that this, too, is likely the result of a lack of demand for gender-role 
changing policies; there is considerable evidence that, at least as far as care for small children is 
concerned, women may not want their roles as primary caregivers to change. This further implies 
that when we are studying substantive representation—how well a representative translates her 
constituency‘s demands into policy—we must clearly define the constituents‘ demands. More 
simply put, if women are not demanding expansion of child care, then we should not expect that 
female officeholders will have much influence on child care policy. 
The final implications from this study come from analysis of countries‘ levels of support 
for women‘s employment.  Despite the lack of findings in the analyses of individual policies, the 
show a clear and positive relationship between female ministers and the overall level of support a 
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country provides for women‘s participation in the labor market.   This indicates that women are 
able to influence the general policy environment in ways that they may not be able to (or 
interested in) with individual policies.  This provides considerable support for my argument that 
women‘s influence on individual policies does not necessarily predict their influence on the 
female-friendliness of state policies in general.   This indicates that the index measure approach 
may provide more insight into substantive representation than does single-policy analysis. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 Stripped to its essence, the central question posed in this study is whether or not female 
cabinet ministers matter in the adoption of female-friendly social policy.  The analyses 
determined that they do indeed; however, this has led to new questions and possible avenues for 
future research.  First, my analyses indicate that higher proportions of women in cabinet are 
likely to improve the female-friendliness of reconciliation policy.  It is likely that this is the case 
with other policies that are of particular interest to women, such as equal pay and anti-
discrimination policy; the caveat is that female ministers are likely to be of assistance in the 
adoption of these policies only if there is demand for them.    
 Second, the analysis reveals that while female legislators seem to have little independent 
effect on the adoption of female-friendly policy, they do have an effect in conjunction with 
female ministers.  This indicates that they are not strictly necessary to the process, but are helpful 
in the adoption of female-friendly policy.  It is imperative to better understand the relationship 
between female ministers and female legislators; how do the two work together to increase the 
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female-friendliness of state policy?  This is a question that I plan to address with a qualitative 
study of the adoption of female-friendly policy. 
Third, I have not addressed women‘s policy machineries in this study.  Women‘s policy 
machineries are government institutions (e.g. bureaus, commissions, ministries) that are designed 
to address women‘s equality issues.  Weldon (2002), for example, finds that women‘s policy 
machineries have significant influence on the adoption of policies that address violence against 
women.  Do these policy machineries have similar influence on work-like reconciliation 
policies?  
Fourth, the analysis revealed that EU membership is a strong positive predictor of the 
female-friendliness of reconciliation policy.  The EU has been quite outspoken in its advocacy of 
family leave and working time policies that benefit women; it would be interesting to determine 
the origins of the EU‘s position.  Is the influence of women in the European Commission, or in 
the European Parliament?  Is it the influence of particular countries? Finland and Sweden, for 
example are commonly credited with the inclusion of stronger equality policies in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (Stratigaki, 2000).   
Finally, cabinet ministers are responsible not only for the adoption of policies, but also 
for administering the bureaucracies that implement them.  Studies of bureaucratic representation 
suggest that given discretion in implementation, female and minority bureaucrats may be able to 
exert an influence on the implementation of policies that reflect their groups‘ policy agendas 
(Dolan, 2000; Riccucci & Meyers, 2004; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006).  Does this also hold true at 
the administrative level—do female ministers increase the female-friendliness of policies by 
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influencing the implementation process or increasing street-level bureaucrats‘ level of 
discretion?   
Conclusion 
 In this study, I have shown that increased state support for women‘s employment can, in 
large part, be attributed to the increased presence of women in cabinet.   My analysis suggests 
that research which analyzes cabinet influence will provide new insight into policymaking in 
advanced industrial democracies.  It indicates that when the cabinet is not included in the 
analysis of policy adoption, the results may be of limited utility.  If sound, this analysis further 
suggests that increasing the presence of underserved groups in the executive is likely to ensure 
that those groups are better represented in the policy process.    To ensure that their issues are 
included in the policy agenda, activists should target the people and institutions that have the 
most influence: the cabinet.  Thus, this study of female-friendly policy provides many new 
directions for research, as well as evidence that practitioners may be better able to influence 
policy if they focus their efforts on cabinet ministers.   
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The Family Leave Index 
 Variable Sources 
1.  Maternity leave (Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss, 
2005) 
2.  Maternity leave benefit (Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss, 
2005) 
3.  Job Protection (Pregnancy 
& Maternity) 
(ILO, 1952, 2008, 2010a); (Neal, 1984); 
(Department of Justice, 1977; 1985); (Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA). 
2008); (ILO, 2008); (G. James, 2004); ("Federal 
Act on Gender Equality (Gender Equality Act, 
GEA)," 1995); (Socrates Program., 1999); 
(Edwards, 1992); (Human Rights Commission., 
2002); (Karamessini, 2003); (Government of 
Portugal., 1999) 
4.  Childcare leave (Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss, 
2005) 
5.  Childcare leave benefit (Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001); (Deven & Moss, 
2002, 2005);  
6.  Paid paternity leave ("Paternity Leave/International Comparisons," 
2008), (EU, 2007d), (Denmark, 1990);  
7.  Incentives for Fathers (Drew, 2005); (Deven & Moss, 2002, 2005); 
(Gauthier, 2003; Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001); 
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1991) 
8.  Some paid leave after 3rd 
birthday 
(Deven & Moss, 2002, 2005); (Drew, 2005; 
Gauthier, 2003; Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001); 
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1991); (Plantenga & Seigel, 
2004a, 2004b); (Trentini & Lombardini, 1999); 
(Department of Labour (NZ), 2007); (Hyde & 
Essex, 1991) 
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The Working Time Index 
 Variable Source 
1.  Average Working Hours, 
per Week
76
 
(ILO, 2007); (OECD, 2010) 
2.  Vacation Time (ILO, 2010a); (Lombard, 1995); (ILO, 1995); 
(Carley, 2000); (Blyton, 1985); (EU, 2008; 
Madsen, 2000a, 2000b) 
3.  Regulation of weekly 
hours 
("Federal Act on Arrangement of Hours of Work," 
1969); (Gornick & Meyers, 2003); (Madsen, 
2000a, 2000b); (Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000; 
Grubb & Wells, 1993; McCann, 2005); (Crépon & 
Kramarz, 2002); (Lee, McCann, Messenger, & 
ILO, 2007) 
4.  Protections for part time 
work 
(ILO, 2010a); (ILO, 2010b); (ILO, 1989);  
5.  Gendered regulation of 
non-standard working 
hours 
(ILO, 2010a); (McCann, 2005); (ILO, 2001); 
(Grubb & Wells, 1993) 
  
                                                 
76
 All data are ―hours worked, manufacturing‖ unless otherwise noted here:   Canada , Germany , Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands,  US – hours paid (manufacturing);  
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Child Care Index 
 Variable Sources 
1.  Guaranteed public 
daycare 
(EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b, 2008/09c, 2008/09d, 
2008/09e, 2008/09f, 2008/09g, 2008/09h, 
2008/09i, 2008/09j, 2008/09k, 2008/09l, 
2008/09m, 2008/09n, 2008/09o, 2008/09p); (Child 
Policy International., 2008) 
2.  Daycare benefit (tax or 
transfer) 
("A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 
1999," 1999); ("Mutual Information System on 
Social Protection in the EU member States and the 
EEA," 1998-2007); (Child Policy International., 
2008); (The Norwegian Ministry of Children and 
Family Affairs 1998); (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, 
& Meghir, 1999); (Averett, Peters, & Waldman, 
1997) 
3.  Continuous school day (EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b, 2008/09c, 2008/09d, 
2008/09e, 2008/09f, 2008/09g, 2008/09h, 
2008/09i, 2008/09j, 2008/09k, 2008/09l, 
2008/09m, 2008/09n, 2008/09o, 2008/09p); 
(Androwski, 2010) 
4.  School age (World Bank, 2009); (EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b, 
2008/09c, 2008/09d, 2008/09e, 2008/09f, 
2008/09g, 2008/09h, 2008/09i, 2008/09j, 
2008/09k, 2008/09l, 2008/09m, 2008/09n, 
2008/09o, 2008/09p) 
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1 Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1.1: Proportion of Female Cabinet Ministers in Advanced Industrial Democracies 
Source: Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006) 
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Figure 1.2: Proportions of Female S.W. Ministers in Advanced Industrial Democracies 
Source: Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006) 
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2 Chapter 2 
Table 2.1: The Family Leave Index 
The Family Leave Index 
 Variable Measurement 
1.  Maternity leave Number of weeks of maternity leave 
2.  Maternity leave benefit The level of wage replacement for leave 
(unpaid=0, 1-33%=1, 34-67%=2, 68-100%=3) 
3.  Job Protection (Pregnancy 
& Maternity) 
A binary measure of the existence of job 
protections for pregnancy and/or use of family 
leave (yes=1; no=0) 
4.  Childcare leave Number of weeks of childcare leave 
5.  Childcare leave benefit The level of payment for leave (unpaid=0, flat 
rate=1, percent unemployment insurance=2, 
percent of wages=3
77
) 
6.  Paid paternity leave A binary measure of the existence of paid 
paternity leave (yes=1; no=0) 
7.  Paternity leave benefit The level of payment for leave (unpaid=0, flat 
rate=1, percent unemployment insurance=2, 
percent of wages=3) 
8.  Incentives for Fathers A binary measure of the existence of incentives 
for fathers to take leave (yes=1; no=0) 
9.  Some paid leave after 3rd 
birthday 
A binary measure of the existence of at least some 
paid leave after the child reaches age 3 (yes=1; 
no=0) 
Sources: See Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77
 There is variation among countries with regard to the percentage of wages replaced.  Thus, rather than equally 
weighting a wage replacement program that pays 30% of wages with one that pays 90%, I add the proportion paid to 
the level of payment—thus, the wage replacement levels would be 3.3 and 3.9 respectively. 
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Table 2.2: Working Time Index 
The Working Time Index 
 Variable Measurement 
1.  Average Working Hours, 
per Week 
The average number of hours worked per week 
2.  Vacation Time The minimum number of weeks of vacation 
provided by law 
3.  Regulation of weekly 
hours 
A bivariate measure of whether or not maximum 
weekly hours are regulated by statute (yes=1; 
no=0) 
4.  Protections for part time 
work 
A bivariate measure of whether or not part time 
work is protected by statute (yes=1; no=0) 
5.  Gendered regulation of 
non-standard working 
hours 
A bivariate measure of whether or not women are 
denied access to non-standard working hours 
(yes=0; no=1) 
Sources: See Appendix A 
 
Table 2.3: Child Care Index 
Child Care Index 
 Variable Measurement 
1.  Guaranteed public 
daycare 
A measure of a country‘s guarantee of public care 
for children prior to pre-school (children aged 0-
6=1; children aged 3-6=0.5; no guaranteed 
placement=0) 
2.  Daycare benefit (tax or 
transfer) 
A measure of whether or not parents receive 
benefits to offset daycare costs (yes=1; no=0, 
means tested=0.5) 
3.  Continuous school day A measure of whether or not the school day 
contains a midday gap (yes=1; no=0, 
sometimes=0.5) 
4.  School age Age at which children must begin primary 
education 
Sources: See Appendix A 
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Table 2.4: Chronabach’s Alpha Scale Reliability Coefficients 
Index Measure Alpha Score Theoretical 
Min | Max 
Actual 
Min | Max
78
 
Family Leave Index 0.76 0 | 9 0 | 6.5 
Working Time Index 0.63 0 | 5 0.81 | 4.2 
Child Care Index 0.41 0 | 4 0 | 3.14 
Support for Women‘s Employment Index 0.78 0 | 17 2.29 | 12.64 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Support for Women's Employment Index Scores, 1970 & 2005 
Sources: Various (See Appendix A) 
                                                 
78
 Minimum | Maximum Countries 
FLI: Australia (1970-79), New Zealand (1970-84), US (1970-74) | Italy (2000-05)) 
WTI: Germany (1970-74) | UK (2000-05) 
CCI: Switzerland (1990-94) | Finland (1995-99) 
SWEI: US (1970-74) | Norway (2000-05) 
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3 Chapter 3 
Table 3.1: Maternity Leave Policies 
 Maternity Leave Policy - 2005 Year Maternity-Related 
Country Weeks Pay Level
79
 Job Protection Adopted 
Australia 0 No Pay 1984 
Austria 16 High 1979 
Belgium 15 High 1971 
Canada 17 Medium 1977 
Denmark 18 Medium 1978 
Finland 43.5 High 1986 
France 16 High 1982 
Germany 14 High 1952 
Greece 17 High 2003 
Ireland 22 High 1994 
Italy 21.5 High 1966 
Japan 14 No Pay 1986 
Netherlands 16 High 1980 
New Zealand 0 No Pay 1987 
Norway 42 High 1979 
Portugal 20 High 1995 
Spain 16 High 1980 
Sweden 68.5 Medium 1945 
Switzerland 16 No Pay 1995 
UK 26 Medium 1975 
US 0 No Pay 1978 
Source: See Appendix A
                                                 
79
 Maternity Leave Pay Levels – No Pay (0% wage replacement), Low (1-33% wage replacement), Medium (34-
67% wage replacement); High (68-100% wage replacement). 
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Table 3.2: Leave Policies for Fathers 
 Year of Policy Adoption 
Country Paternity Leave Father Incentives
80
 
Australia 0 0 
Austria 1990 1997 
Belgium 1978 1998 
Canada 0 0 
Denmark 1984 1998 
Finland 1978 2004 
France 2002 0 
Germany 0 0 
Greece 1992 1999 
Ireland 1994 0 
Italy 1997 2000 
Japan 0 0 
Netherlands 2001 1998 
New Zealand 0 0 
Norway 1978 1991 
Portugal 2000 1999 
Spain 1999 0 
Sweden pre-1970 1994 
Switzerland 0 0 
UK 2003 1998 
US 0 0 
Source: See Appendix A
                                                 
80
 Note that these are incentives for fathers to take parental or child care leave and are typically unrelated to paternity 
leave. 
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Table 3.3: Child Care Leave Policies 
 Original Policy 2005 Policy 
Country Adopted Weeks Type of 
Pay
81
 
Weeks Type of 
Pay 
Leave 
Post 3
82
 
Australia 1993 52 0 52 0 No 
Austria 1961 52 %UI 104 FR Yes 
Belgium 1985 52 FR 52 FR Yes 
Canada 1990 10 %E (60) 36.5 %E (70) No 
Denmark 1992 52 %UI 32 %E (50) Yes 
Finland 1985 156 FR 156 FR No 
France 1977 104 0
83
 156 FR No 
Germany 1985 43 FR 156 FR Yes 
Greece 1984 26 0 26 0 No 
Ireland 1998 28 0 28 0 No 
Italy 1973 26 %E  (30) 46 %E (30) Yes 
Japan 1992 52 0 52 0 No 
Netherlands 1990 52 0 52 0 Yes 
New Zealand 1987 52 0 56 0 No 
Norway 1978 52 0
84
 106 FR No 
Portugal 1984 104 0 104 0 No 
Spain 1980 156 0 156 0 No 
Sweden 1978 78 0 78 0 Yes 
Switzerland - 0 0 0 0 No 
UK 1999 26 0 12 0 No 
US 1993 12 0 12 0 No 
Source: See Appendix A
                                                 
81
 %UI – percent of unemployment insurance; %E –percent of earnings, actual percentage in parentheses; FR – flat 
rate; 0 – unpaid. 
82
 Year adopted: Austria, 2005; Belgium, 1985; Denmark, 2004; Germany, 2003; Italy, 2000; The Netherlands, 
2002; Norway, 1988. 
83
 France added flat rate pay in 1985. 
84
 Norway added flat rate pay in 1998. 
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Table 3.4: Family Leave Variables 
Family Leave Variables 
 Variable Measurement Gender Role Changing? 
1.  Maternity leave Number of weeks of 
maternity leave 
N 
2.  Maternity leave benefit The level of wage 
replacement for leave 
(unpaid=0, 1-33%=1, 34-
67%=2, 68-100%=3) 
N 
3.  Job Protection (Pregnancy 
& Maternity) 
A binary measure of the 
existence of job 
protections for pregnancy 
and/or use of family leave 
(yes=1; no=0) 
N 
4.  Childcare leave Number of weeks of 
childcare leave 
N 
5.  Childcare leave benefit The level of payment for 
leave (unpaid=0, flat 
rate=1, percent 
unemployment 
insurance=2, percent of 
wages=3
85
) 
N 
6.  Paid paternity leave A binary measure of the 
existence of paid paternity 
leave (yes=1; no=0) 
Y 
7.  Incentives for Fathers A binary measure of the 
existence of incentives for 
fathers to take leave 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Y 
8.  Some paid leave after 3rd 
birthday 
A binary measure of the 
existence of at least some 
paid leave after the child 
reaches age 3 (yes=1; 
no=0) 
N 
Source: See Appendix A
                                                 
85
 There is variation among countries with regard to the percentage of wages replaced.  Thus, rather than equally 
weighting a wage replacement program that pays 30% of wages with one that pays 90%, I add the proportion paid to 
the level of payment—thus, the wage replacement levels would be 3.3 and 3.9 respectively. 
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Family Leave Policy 
 ML  ML Job CC CC Leave Paternity Father 
 Weeks Pay Protection Weeks Pay Post-3 Leave Incentives 
         
Female Cabinet Ministers 61.78* 3.92 0.85 270.63** -0.85 0.65 0.44 0.80 
 (29.35) (2.30) (1.20) (120.91) (2.10) (0.90) (0.66) (0.47) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers -1.04 0.39 -0.00 35.45 0.39 -0.22 -0.05 -0.35** 
 (4.79) (0.43) (0.25) (21.25) (0.50) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) 
Female Legislators -11.51 -1.66 0.03 -19.98 1.10 -0.59 0.32 0.57 
 (19.39) (2.30) (1.12) (129.58) (2.22) (0.47) (0.97) (0.49) 
Women‘s Movements -7.39** 0.26 -0.07 -31.58** 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 
 (2.76) (0.25) (0.11) (14.35) (0.31) (0.10) (0.13) (0.06) 
Left Government -4.97* -0.72* 0.03 16.15 -0.45 0.07 -0.13 0.11 
 (2.85) (0.40) (0.15) (20.18) (0.37) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 7.59 0.63 0.25 -82.69 1.38 0.44 1.22*** -0.10 
 (8.02) (0.87) (0.36) (49.43) (0.80) (0.26) (0.30) (0.20) 
GDP per Capita  -0.00 -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -1.24 -0.19 -0.08 -8.93 0.51** 0.16** 0.07 0.08 
 (3.02) (0.33) (0.09) (8.96) (0.20) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) 
European Union Membership 6.68 0.98*** 0.27** 16.98 0.63** 0.21* 0.24* 0.12** 
 (4.15) (0.29) (0.10) (12.60) (0.29) (0.11) (0.14) (0.05) 
CD Welfare State -0.49 1.19*** -0.20 9.54 0.49 0.18 0.25 0.03 
 (3.52) (0.35) (0.13) (18.79) (0.45) (0.11) (0.15) (0.08) 
SD Welfare State 10.36 1.15** -0.46*** -12.97 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.11 
 (8.33) (0.45) (0.15) (23.47) (0.49) (0.15) (0.25) (0.12) 
Constant 9.77 0.70 0.49* 39.02 -1.49* -0.53** -0.73** -0.34* 
 (6.40) (0.59) (0.25) (36.70) (0.72) (0.25) (0.28) (0.16) 
         
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.58 0.36 0.52 0.12 0.23 0.52 0.35 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results, Family Leave Index 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Female Cabinet Ministers 6.10**   6.28** 6.46** 
 (2.61)   (2.93) (2.94) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.62   -0.17 
  (0.53)   (0.46) 
Female Legislators   4.39 -0.29 -0.22 
   (2.84) (2.76) (2.76) 
Women‘s Movements -0.15 -0.17 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 
 (0.43) (0.45) (0.48) (0.44) (0.44) 
Left Government -0.26 0.13 0.08 -0.26 -0.25 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Strikes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 1.95* 2.01* 1.72 1.97 1.96 
 (1.12) (0.96) (1.09) (1.16) (1.16) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  0.21 0.24 0.31 0.21 0.23 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) 
European Union Membership 1.54*** 1.74*** 1.63*** 1.54*** 1.55*** 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.50) (0.44) (0.43) 
CD Welfare State 0.83 0.67 0.65 0.84 0.84 
 (0.58) (0.59) (0.62) (0.56) (0.56) 
SD Welfare State 0.60 1.09 0.67 0.62 0.64 
 (0.65) (0.72) (0.73) (0.68) (0.68) 
Constant -0.89 -1.00 -1.01 -0.89 -0.89 
 (1.00) (0.90) (0.92) (1.01) (1.01) 
      
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.63 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Figure 3.1: Leave Index Scores, 1970 & 2005 
Source: See Appendix A 
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression Results, Family Leave Index Outlier Testing 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model Model  Model 
 1 2 3 4a 4b 5a 5b 5c 
         
Female Cabinet Ministers 7.52**   4.78 7.16** 4.88 6.25** 7.18** 
 (2.72)   (2.74) (2.97) (2.81) (2.60) (3.25) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.60    -0.06 -0.18 -0.46 
  (0.44)    (0.46) (0.55) (0.36) 
Female Legislators   5.29* 2.63 -0.73 1.19 0.63 -0.47 
   (2.89) (2.60) (2.78) (2.61) (2.61) (2.64) 
Women‘s Movements -0.27 -0.56 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.30 -0.39 
 (0.42) (0.38) (0.45) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.39) 
Left Government -0.24 0.33 0.46 -0.09 -0.30 -0.17 -0.13 -0.08 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.31) (0.32) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 2.92*** 2.17** 1.50 1.81* 2.69** 1.79 2.53** 2.24* 
 (0.96) (0.89) (0.90) (1.03) (1.13) (1.08) (1.05) (1.17) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  0.21 0.43* 0.31 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.38 
 (0.26) (0.21) (0.27) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.24) 
European Union Membership 1.48*** 1.69*** 1.65*** 1.39*** 1.33*** 1.50*** 1.29*** 1.43*** 
 (0.35) (0.38) (0.50) (0.45) (0.38) (0.43) (0.38) (0.35) 
CD Welfare State 0.84 0.74 0.59 0.88 1.09** 0.90 1.01** 0.93** 
 (0.51) (0.44) (0.58) (0.56) (0.48) (0.56) (0.43) (0.42) 
SD Welfare State -0.11 0.81 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.64 0.31 0.40 
 (0.64) (0.53) (0.71) (0.78) (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.61) 
Constant -1.24 -0.68 -0.94 -0.98 -1.50 -1.00 -1.33 -1.09 
 (0.89) (0.85) (0.87) (0.98) (0.94) (0.97) (0.89) (0.90) 
         
Observations 96
86
 94
87
 98
88
 100
89
 99
90
 102
91
 99
92
 97
93
 
R-squared 0.74 0.725 0.691 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.746 0.759 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
86
 Model 1, 8 outliers: Belgium (1984-89), Denmark (1974-79), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1990-94, 1995-99), Spain 
(2000-05), Sweden (1970-74), Switzerland (2000-05) 
87
 Model 2, 10 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Italy  (2000-05), Norway (1980-84, 1985-89), Sweden (2000-05), Switzerland 
(1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1995-99) 
88
 Model 3, 6 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1989-94), Italy (2000-05), Netherlands (1989-94; 1995-99), New Zealand 
(2000-05) 
89
 Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 4 outliers: Netherlands (1990-94, 1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Switzerland 
(1989-94) 
90
 Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Italy (1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1990-94; 2000-05), US 
(1995-99) 
91
 Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 2 outliers: Netherlands (1995-99), Switzerland (1990-94) 
92
 Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Italy (2000-05), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05) 
93
 Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Finland (1985-89), Italy (2000-05), Norway (1979-84), 
Switzerland (1984-89, 1995-99, 2000-05) 
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4 Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4.1: Share of Part-Time Employment by Sex, 2005 
Source: OECD.stat, Labour Force Statistics (2010) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Average Weekly Hours of Unpaid Domestic Work by Sex, 2004 
Source: Eurobarometer Survey (Papacostas, 2004) 
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Figure 4.3: Average Weekly Hours of Paid Employment by Sex, 2004 
Source: Eurobarometer Survey (Papacostas, 2004) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Working Time Index Scores, 1970 & 2005 
Source: See Appendix A
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Table 4.1: Working Time Regulation Adoption & Average Hours Worked 
 Regulation of Maximum Working Time 2005 
Country Year 
Average Working 
Time
94
 
Average Working Time 
Australia - 36.9 34.7 
Austria 1969 41.8 34.8 
Belgium 1967
95
 39.9 31.8 
Canada - 39.7 37.9 
Denmark 2000
96
 32.1 31.6 
Finland 1996 38.3 37.8 
France 1936 44.8
97
 37.8 
Germany 1994 38 37.4 
Greece 1932
 
44.6
4
 43.2 
Ireland 1993 40.4 36.2 
Italy 1923 40.6
4 
2000 
Japan - 47.54 43.5 
Netherlands 1919 44.2
4
 38.5 
New Zealand - 37.34 38 
Norway 1977 38.2 36.9 
Portugal 1971 43.6 36.6 
Spain 1995 36.7 36.2 
Sweden 1982 36 35.6 
Switzerland 1964 46
4
 42.3 
UK 1998 38.1 36.9 
US - 39.8 41.1 
Sources: See Appendix A
                                                 
94
 If there is no regulation of maximum working hours, average working hours listed are for 1970. 
95
 This is the earliest mention of regulation 
96
 Per Madsen (2000): Denmark‘s weekly hours had been constrained by collective agreements; however, in 1999 
the European Commission served notice to the Dutch government that Dutch arrangements did not properly 
implement the EU directive on working time.  The Dutch response was implemented in February of 2000. 
97
 Average working time for implementation year not available; number is for 1970. 
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Table 4.2: Vacation Time, 1970 and 2005 
 Weeks of Vacation 
Country 1970 2005 
Australia - - 
Austria 4 5 
Belgium - 5 
Canada 2 2 
Denmark 3 5 
Finland 5 5 
France 4 5 
Germany 4 4 
Greece 4
 
4 
Ireland 3 4 
Italy 4 4
 
Japan 2 2 
Netherlands 3 4 
New Zealand - 4 
Norway 4 4 
Portugal N/A 5 
Spain N/A 5 
Sweden 5 5 
Switzerland 2 4 
UK - 5.6 
US - - 
Sources: See Appendix A 
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Table 4.3: Working Time Index 
Working Time Regulations 
 Variable Measurement Gender Role Changing? 
1.  Average Working Hours, 
per Week 
The average number of 
hours worked per week 
Y 
2.  Vacation Time The minimum number of 
weeks of vacation 
provided by law 
Y 
3.  Regulation of weekly 
hours 
A bivariate measure of 
whether or not maximum 
weekly hours are 
regulated by statute 
(yes=1; no=0) 
Y 
4.  Protections for part time 
work 
A bivariate measure of 
whether or not part time 
work is protected by 
statute (yes=1; no=0) 
N 
5.  Gendered regulation of 
non-standard working 
hours 
A bivariate measure of 
whether or not women are 
denied access to non-
standard working hours 
(yes=0; no=1) 
Y 
Sources: See Appendix A
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Working Time Policy 
 Average Weekly Annual  Regulation of Part-time Gendered  
 Working Hours Vacation Weekly Hours Protections Regulations 
      
Female Cabinet Ministers 17.01** 0.25 1.59 0.41 0.89 
 (7.99) (0.47) (1.07) (0.92) (0.72) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers -2.11** 0.16* -0.29 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.90) (0.09) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) 
Female Legislators -14.66 0.40 0.49 1.39 0.05 
 (8.45) (0.53) (1.06) (0.98) (1.13) 
Women‘s Movements -0.73 -0.05 0.25* -0.10 -0.15 
 (1.13) (0.04) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
Left Government -3.85*** 0.13 0.21 0.05 -0.17 
 (1.16) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) 
Strikes -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density -6.57* 0.03 0.25 -0.35 -0.50 
 (3.58) (0.21) (0.34) (0.37) (0.31) 
GDP per Capita  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -1.76** 0.05 0.15 -0.17 -0.23 
 (0.61) (0.06) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) 
European Union Membership -2.94** 0.18*** 0.25 -0.23 -0.19 
 (1.04) (0.06) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) 
CD Welfare State 1.38 0.45*** 0.90*** 0.54*** -0.90*** 
 (1.36) (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) 
SD Welfare State -0.44 0.45*** 0.24 0.00 -0.23 
 (1.59) (0.11) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) 
Constant 45.60*** 0.03 -0.74** 0.53 1.68*** 
 (2.25) (0.12) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37) 
      
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.53 0.75 0.61 0.51 0.63 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results, Working Time Index 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Female Cabinet Ministers 3.94***   2.44*   
 (1.27)   (1.26) (1.43) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.27   -0.33 
  (0.32)   (0.30) 
Female Legislators   4.34*** 2.52* 2.66* 
   (1.42) (1.32) (1.35) 
Women‘s Movements -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) 
Left Government 0.25 0.52** 0.42** 0.29 0.30 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Strikes -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density -0.29 -0.25 -0.54 -0.44 -0.45 
 (0.58) (0.46) (0.64) (0.62) (0.63) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.22 -0.18 -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
European Union Membership 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.06 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) 
CD Welfare State 0.99*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
 (0.28) (0.25) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) 
SD Welfare State 0.61 0.96** 0.45 0.44 0.47 
 (0.42) (0.44) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) 
Constant 1.55*** 1.48*** 1.49*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 
 (0.51) (0.45) (0.48) (0.52) (0.51) 
      
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.66 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression Results, Working Time Index Outlier Testing 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model Model  Model 
 1 2 3 4a 4b 5a 5b 5c 
         
Female Cabinet Ministers 4.03***   3.04*** 1.52 3.40*** 2.00* 2.20** 
 (1.15)   (0.96) (0.92) (1.11) (1.09) (0.96) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.72***    -0.35 -0.23 -0.15 
  (0.21)    (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) 
Female Legislators   5.05*** 3.03*** 2.91** 3.15*** 2.74* 3.69*** 
   (1.10) (1.01) (1.24) (0.98) (1.35) (1.02) 
Women‘s Movements 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) 
Left Government 0.30 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.43*** 0.22 0.44*** 0.23 0.47*** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Strikes -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 0.08 -0.40 -0.67 -0.43 -0.14 -0.44 -0.14 -0.18 
 (0.53) (0.49) (0.64) (0.56) (0.55) (0.57) (0.55) (0.53) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.19 -0.03 -0.20* -0.18 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) 
European Union Membership -0.00 0.19 -0.04 -0.08 0.11 -0.07 0.12 -0.05 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) 
CD Welfare State 1.10*** 1.21*** 0.85*** 1.07*** 1.05*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.19*** 
 (0.32) (0.20) (0.18) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) 
SD Welfare State 0.57 1.19*** 0.40 0.34 0.65 0.40 0.65 0.45 
 (0.46) (0.28) (0.30) (0.39) (0.43) (0.39) (0.43) (0.33) 
Constant 1.27** 1.12** 1.55*** 1.49** 1.18** 1.47** 1.18** 1.10** 
 (0.54) (0.42) (0.43) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.49) 
         
Observations 97
98
 94
99
 97
100
 97
101
 98
102
 97
103
 97
104
 97
105
 
R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.83 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
98
 Model 1, 7 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1970-74), New Zealand (2000-05), Sweden (1970-74), Switzerland (2000-
05), UK (2000-05), US (1995-99)   
99
 Model 2, 10 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Ireland (2000-05), Italy  (1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1980-84, 
1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1995-99), UK (2000-05), US (1995-99)   
100
 Model 3, 6 outliers: Belgium (1995-99), Denmark (1975-79; 1995-99 ), Ireland (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Spain 
(1995-99; 2000-05) 
101
 Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Australia (2000-05), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), Ireland 
(2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), US (1995-99) 
102
 Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 6 outliers: Denmark (1985-89; 1995-99), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), UK 
(2000-05), US (1995-99) 
103
 Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Australia (2000-05), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), Ireland 
(2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), US (1995-99) 
104
 Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Denmark (1985-89; 1995-99), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), UK 
(2000-05), US (1995-99) 
105
 Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Denmark (1995-99), Ireland (2000-05), Italy (1995-
99), Japan (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1979-84), UK (2000-05) 
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5 Chapter 5 
Table 5.1: Childcare Policy, 2005 
 Childcare Policy 
Country 
Public Care, Age 
3+
106
 
Public Care, Ages 
0-6 
Subsidies
107
 
Child Care 
Allowances
108
 
Australia    
 
Austria    
Belgium    
Canada    
Denmark      
Finland    
France     
Germany      
Greece    
Ireland     
Italy     
Japan     
Netherlands     
New Zealand     
Norway     
Portugal     
Spain      
Sweden   109   
Switzerland     
UK     
US     
Sources: See Appendix A
                                                 
106
 Guaranteed spot for children over the age of 3; guaranteed spot from infancy to age 6 
107
 Tax credits/deductions or transfers 
   Means Tested in: A  
108
 Means Tested in: Australia, Austria, Finland, and Germany 
109
 Sweden gives 52 weeks of parental leave and then guarantees a spot starting at age 1. 
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Table 5.2: Childcare Access, 2005 
 Ages 0-3 Ages 4-6 Female 
Country 
Childcare 
Access
110
 
Primary 
Provision
111
 
Childcare 
Access 
Primary 
Provision 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Australia Low Private Moderate Private 69.6 
Austria Low Private Moderate Private 65.7 
Belgium Low Private High Public 59.5 
Canada Low Private Moderate
112
 Private 72.8 
Denmark High Public High Public 76.2 
Finland High Public High Public 73.3 
France Low Public/Private High Public 64.5 
Germany Low Private High Public 67.4 
Greece Low Private Low Public 54.1 
Ireland Low Private High Public 60.9 
Italy Low Public High Public 50.4 
Japan Low Public Low Public 65.3 
Netherlands Low
113
 Private
114
 High Public 66 
New Zealand Low Private High Public 72.3 
Norway High Public High Public 75.4 
Portugal Low Private High Public 71.7 
Spain Low Public High Public 58.4 
Sweden High Public High Public 76 
Switzerland Low Private Low Private 74.3 
UK Low Private High
115
 Public 69.6 
US
116
 Moderate Private High Public 69.2 
Sources: Child Policy International Country Reports ; OECD (2001-2004) 
                                                 
110
 Low: Under 50% coverage; Moderate: 50-75% coverage; High: Over 75%  
111
 Private: non-governmental formal care centers; Public: publically provided or subsidized care. 
112
 Child Policy International (2003) reports that coverage is fragmented (because provinces are responsible for 
regulation and reporting) and data are inadequate.  Thus, the overall picture is one of ―uneven coverage and supply 
shortages.‖   
113
 Low coverage for ages 0-4.  At age 4, pre-primary school is available universally.  Compulsory school age is 5.  
114
 Costs are shared among parents, employers, and government. 
115
 Starting from age 3 
116
 Moderate coverage aged 0-4; high coverage age 5 as free public kindergarten begins from age 5 in most states 
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Table 5.3: Public School Policies, 2005 
Country School Age
117
 Continuous Day 
Australia 5 Yes 
Austria 6 Sometimes 
Belgium 6 Sometimes 
Canada 6 Yes 
Denmark 7 Yes 
Finland 7 Yes 
France 6 No 
Germany 6 No 
Greece 4 Sometimes 
Ireland 4 Yes 
Italy 6 Yes
 
Japan 6 Yes 
Netherlands 5 Yes 
New Zealand 5 Yes 
Norway 6 Yes 
Portugal 5 Yes 
Spain 6 Yes 
Sweden 7 Yes 
Switzerland 7 No 
UK 5 Yes 
US
118
 6 Yes 
Sources: See Appendix A
                                                 
117
 Age at which parents may first enroll children in public school—either optionally  (e.g. in Ireland a parent may 
enroll a child in optional pre-primary school at age 4; however compulsory school age is 6.)  
118
 No national standard applies; data are the most typical state standards. 
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Table 5.4: Child Care Index 
Child Care Index 
 Variable Measurement Gender Role Changing? 
1.  Guaranteed public 
daycare 
A measure of a country‘s 
guarantee of public care for 
children prior to pre-school 
(children aged 0-6=1; children 
aged 3-6=0.5; no guaranteed 
placement=0) 
Yes 
2.  Daycare benefit 
(tax or transfer) 
A measure of whether or not 
parents receive benefits to offset 
daycare costs (yes=1; no=0, means 
tested=0.5) 
Yes 
3.  Continuous school 
day 
A measure of whether or not the 
school day contains a midday gap 
(yes=1; no=0, sometimes=0.5) 
Yes 
4.  School age Age at which children must begin 
primary education 
No 
Sources: Various (See Appendix A) 
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Table 5.5: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Child Care Policy 
 Public Care Public Care Public  Day Care School Continuous 
 Ages 0-6 Ages 3-6 Care119 Subsidies Age School Day 
       
Female Cabinet Ministers -0.31 -0.04 -0.33 1.84 0.52 0.23 
 (0.43) (0.64) (0.46) (1.22) (1.06) (0.85) 
Female Social Welfare 
Ministers 
-0.06 0.13 0.00 0.23 -0.21 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
Female Legislators 0.87 0.53 1.13 -2.37 -2.00 0.95 
 (0.58) (0.71) (0.67) (1.39) (1.85) (1.18) 
Women‘s Movements 0.05 0.21 0.15 -0.04 -0.38** 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.11) 
Left Government -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.13 -0.28* 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density -0.10 0.10 -0.05 -1.22** 0.21 0.23 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.31) (0.51) (0.40) (0.45) 
GDP per Capita  0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.11 0.52*** -0.19 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) 
European Union Membership 0.07 0.36*** 0.25*** -0.04 -0.18 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
CD Welfare State 0.01 0.37 0.19 -0.14 0.72*** -0.52*** 
 (0.05) (0.22) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
SD Welfare State 0.71*** -0.24 0.59*** 0.24 1.92*** -0.38 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) (0.27) (0.30) (0.24) 
Constant -0.27* -0.10 -0.32 0.72** 5.32*** 1.32*** 
 (0.13) (0.33) (0.19) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) 
       
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.54 0.54 0.35 0.70 0.40 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
119
 The general provision of care – either 3-6 or 0-6.  3-6 is coded 0.5, 0-6 is coded 1.  
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Table 5.6: OLS Regression Results, Child Care Index 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Female Cabinet Ministers 2.73*   3.10* 2.90 
 (1.53)   (1.75) (1.78) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.49   0.19 
  (0.30)   (0.20) 
Female Legislators   1.68 -0.63 -0.71 
   (1.76) (1.87) (1.88) 
Women‘s Movements -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Left Government -0.57** -0.43* -0.41* -0.58** -0.59** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 
Strikes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density -0.98** -0.96** -1.07** -0.94* -0.94* 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49) 
GDP per Capita  -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.13 -0.15 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
European Union Membership 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.21 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
CD Welfare State -0.78** -0.85** -0.86** -0.77** -0.77** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33) 
SD Welfare State -0.01 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.01 
 (0.42) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) 
Constant 2.04*** 2.00*** 1.99*** 2.05*** 2.05*** 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52) 
      
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Figure 5.1: Child Care Index, 1970 & 2005 
Source: See Appendix A 
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Table 5.7: OLS Regression Results, Child Care Index Outlier Testing 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model Model  Model 
 1 2 3 4a 4b 5a 5b 5c 
         
Female Cabinet Ministers 3.07**   4.03** 3.45* 3.80** 2.62** 3.22* 
 (1.37)   (1.45) (1.73) (1.40) (1.23) (1.63) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  0.24    0.15 0.28 0.17 
  (0.21)    (0.20) (0.23) (0.14) 
Female Legislators   2.22 -1.32 -1.77 -1.34 -1.52 -1.62 
   (1.49) (1.59) (1.72) (1.61) (1.61) (1.63) 
Women‘s Movements -0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) 
Left Government -0.74*** -0.39** -0.43* -0.67** -0.61** -0.67** -0.57** -0.71*** 
 (0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) 
Strikes 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density -0.97* -1.53** -1.25** -0.53 -0.91 -0.53 -0.90 -0.02 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.47) (0.37) (0.68) (0.39) (0.68) (0.51) 
GDP per Capita  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.09 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
European Union Membership 0.17 0.09 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.34 0.18 0.05 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.28) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) 
CD Welfare State -0.68** -0.66** -0.83** -0.65** -0.60** -0.65** -0.62** -0.57** 
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.22) 
SD Welfare State 0.03 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.16 0.30 0.05 
 (0.32) (0.28) (0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.36) 
Constant 1.95*** 2.23*** 1.78*** 1.74*** 1.79*** 1.73*** 1.78*** 1.48*** 
 (0.49) (0.45) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.45) (0.48) (0.35) 
         
Observations 96
120
 94
121 95122 95123 96 95124 97 96 
R-squared 0.504 0.403 0.497 0.518 0.490 0.520 0.517 0.542 
Two-tailed test.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
120
 Model 1 Outliers: Austria (2000-05), Denmark (1975-79), Finland (2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (2000-05), Sweden 
(1990-94), Switzerland (1970-74; (2000-05). 
121
 Model 2 Outliers: Finland (1995-99; 2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1980-84), Switzerland (1970-74; 
1975-79; 1980-84, 1985-89, 1995-99) 
122 Model 3 Outliers: Austria (2000-05), Denmark (1975-79), Finland (2000-05), Japan (1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99), The 
Netherlands (1985-89), Spain (1995-99; 2000-05) 
123 Model 4a Outliers (Female Legislators): Australia (1995-99; 2000-05), Austria (2000-05), Japan (1990-94, 1995-99), Norway 
(1970-74), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1990-94), Switzerland (1990-94); Model 4b Outliers (Female Ministers): Australia (1995-
99; 2000-05), Finland (2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (2000-05), Sweden (1990-94), Switzerland (1990-94; (2000-05). 
124 Model 5a Outliers (Female Legislators): Australia (1995-99; 2000-05), Austria (2000-05), Japan (1990-94; 1995-99); Norway 
(1970-74), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1994-99), Switzerland (1994-99); Model 5b Outliers (Female Ministers): Australia (1995-
99; 2000-05), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1994-99), Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05); Model 5c (Female Social Welfare 
minister outliers): Finland (1995-99), Spain (1990-94; 1995-99), Sweden (1980-84; 1994-99), Switzerland (1985-89, 1994-99, 
2000-05) 
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Figure 6.1: Support for Women's Employment, 2005 
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Figure 6.2: Gender Systems Continuum 
 
                                                 
125
 Reproduced from Crompton  (1999, p. 205)  with one change; I switched the positions of dual-earner/state carer 
and dual earner/market carer. The systems with state care are trending toward dual carer policies; thus, dual 
earner/state carer is more closely aligned with dual earner/dual carer on the continuum. 
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Table 6.1: Gender Systems, by Country 
 Support for Women’s Welfare Primary Secondary  
Country Employment Score Regime Type Gender System Gender System Rationale 
Switzerland 4.1 CD 
Dual Earner/Market 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
No provision of state care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 45% 
FLP: 74% 
US 4.4 Liberal 
Dual Earner/Market 
Carer 
 
Almost no provision of state care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 18% 
FLP: 69% 
New Zealand 5.1 Liberal 
Dual Earner/Market 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Low provision of state care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 35% 
FLP: 72% 
Australia 5.9 Liberal 
Dual Earner/Market 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 39% 
FLP: 70% 
Japan 6.3 CD Male Breadwinner 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Low provision of state care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 32% 
FLP: 65% 
Canada 6.9 Liberal 
Dual Earner/Market 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Low provision of state care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 27% 
FLP: 75% 
Germany 8.0 CD Male Breadwinner 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 39% 
FLP: 67% 
Greece 9.1 CD Male Breadwinner  
Social emphasis on maternal care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 11% 
FLP: 54% 
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Table 6.1, continued      
 Support for Women’s Welfare Primary Secondary  
Country Employment Score Regime Type Gender System Gender System Rationale 
Ireland 9.4 Liberal Male Breadwinner 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 35% 
FLP: 61% 
Austria 10.0 CD Male Breadwinner 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 29% 
FLP: 66% 
France
126
 10.2 CD Dual Earner/State Carer 
Dual Earner/ Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social acceptance of state care 
post-3 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 23% 
FLP: 65% 
United Kingdom 10.7 Liberal 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Dual Earner/State Carer 
-Market Carer
127
 
Expanding provision of state care 
post-3 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 39% 
FLP: 70% 
Spain 11.0 CD Male Breadwinner Dual Earner/State Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
but expanding state services 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 22% 
FLP: 58% 
Italy 11.0 CD Dual Earner/State Carer 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
but expanding state services 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 29% 
FLP: 50% 
                                                 
126
 France is challenging to categorize; the state has long promoted reconciliation policies in order to increase the birth rate; this indicates a state care model.  
However, state policy encourages stay-at-home motherhood until age 3; even after age 3, irregular care hours contribute to low-moderate  FLP.  In addition, the 
FLP rate and preference for maternal care indicate a modified male breadwinner model – female part-time carer. 
127
 The Netherlands and the UK are interesting in that they truly combine three gender regimes; the part-time carer regime predominates, but both states are 
expanding care for children 3 and up – while parents must rely on market solutions for care of younger children and infants. 
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Table 6.1, continued      
 Support for Women’s Welfare  Primary Secondary  
Country Employment Score Regime Type Gender System Gender System Rationale 
Belgium 11.2 CD 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Dual Earner/ Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Social acceptance of state care 
post-3 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 33% 
FLP: 60% 
Netherlands 11.4 CD 
Dual Earner/Female 
Part-Time Carer 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer-Market Carer 
State promotes female part-time 
work 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 61% 
FLP: 66% 
Portugal 11.7 CD Male Breadwinner
128
 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Social emphasis on maternal care 
but expanding state services 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 14% 
FLP: 72% 
Denmark 12.3 SD 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Dual 
Carer 
High public provision of services 
Sate encouragement of paternal 
care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 24% 
FLP: 76% 
Sweden 12.3 SD 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Dual 
Carer 
High public provision of services 
Sate encouragement of paternal 
care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 19% 
FLP: 76% 
                                                 
128
 In terms of policy adoption, Portugal has moved heavily toward state care; however, in terms of take-up rates (e.g. low take up of state provided care), the 
male-breadwinner system predominates.   Portugal‘s FLP is high, and in the last 10-15 years, the state has adopted policies to support this; however, culturally 
women‘s participation is secondary to men‘s. 
 170 
 
Table 6.1, continued      
 Support for Women’s Welfare  Primary Secondary  
Country Employment Score Regime Type Gender System Gender System Rationale 
Norway
129
 12.6 SD 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Dual 
Carer 
High public provision of services 
Sate encouragement of paternal 
care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 33% 
FLP: 75% 
Finland 13.5 SD 
Dual Earner/State 
Carer 
Dual Earner/Dual 
Carer 
High public provision of services 
Sate encouragement of paternal 
care 
Female part-time employment 
rate: 14% 
FLP: 73% 
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 Although Norway‘s rate of female part-time employment is high, it has fallen from 41% in 1989 to 33% in 2005; the state is actively encouraging full-time 
employment.  
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Table 6.2: OLS Regression Analyses, Support for Women's Employment 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Female Cabinet Ministers 12.77***   11.81** 12.14** 
 (3.67)   (4.28) (4.32) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  1.38   -0.31 
  (0.87)   (0.77) 
Female Legislators   10.41** 1.60 1.73 
   (4.63) (4.64) (4.64) 
Women‘s Movements -0.23 -0.28 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.75) (0.70) (0.69) 
Left Government -0.58 0.22 0.08 -0.55 -0.54 
 (0.54) (0.62) (0.63) (0.55) (0.56) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 0.69 0.81 0.12 0.59 0.58 
 (1.73) (1.36) (1.74) (1.82) (1.83) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.14 -0.08 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.52) 
European Union Membership 1.84** 2.24** 1.97** 1.82** 1.82** 
 (0.63) (0.78) (0.81) (0.66) (0.66) 
CD Welfare State 1.04 0.71 0.66 1.01 1.01 
 (0.98) (0.97) (1.04) (0.98) (0.98) 
SD Welfare State 1.20 2.20* 1.18 1.09 1.13 
 (0.89) (1.16) (1.04) (0.94) (0.95) 
Constant 2.70 2.47 2.47 2.69 2.69 
 (1.74) (1.52) (1.59) (1.75) (1.75) 
      
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.68 0.59 0.63 0.68 0.68 
Two-tailed test.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
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Table 6.3: OLS Regression Results, Support for Women's Employment Outlier Testing 
 Model Model Model  Model Model Model Model  Model 
 1 2 3 4a 4b 5a 5b 5c 
         
Female Cabinet Ministers 14.36***   12.78** 13.24** 12.11** 11.72** 12.04** 
 (3.68)   (4.71) (4.65) (4.22) (4.06) (4.96) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers  1.64*    -0.01 -0.14 -0.32 
  (0.83)    (0.75) (0.86) (0.61) 
Female Legislators   13.76** 0.69 0.01 1.06 1.09 1.50 
   (5.44) (4.85) (4.51) (4.75) (4.58) (4.48) 
Women‘s Movements -0.25 -0.80 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 -0.14 -0.36 -0.45 
 (0.63) (0.60) (0.69) (0.67) (0.63) (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) 
Left Government -0.57 0.50 0.30 -0.44 -0.72 -0.41 -0.50 -0.40 
 (0.49) (0.59) (0.68) (0.49) (0.51) (0.51) (0.47) (0.47) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 1.09 0.07 -1.06 1.26 1.02 0.41 1.54 1.33 
 (1.63) (1.67) (1.88) (1.87) (1.83) (1.74) (1.95) (1.90) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  -0.07 0.15 -0.24 -0.16 0.02 -0.17 0.16 0.17 
 (0.45) (0.42) (0.61) (0.45) (0.38) (0.54) (0.45) (0.44) 
European Union Membership 1.65*** 2.27*** 1.64** 1.41** 1.60*** 1.63** 1.49** 1.55*** 
 (0.51) (0.60) (0.76) (0.57) (0.53) (0.69) (0.54) (0.49) 
CD Welfare State 1.12 0.69 0.35 1.29 1.58** 1.03 1.66* 1.45 
 (0.85) (0.82) (1.09) (0.85) (0.75) (1.00) (0.81) (0.85) 
SD Welfare State 0.77 2.03** 0.65 0.90 1.43* 1.14 1.43 1.00 
 (0.87) (0.74) (1.11) (1.01) (0.79) (1.20) (0.87) (0.86) 
Constant 2.30 3.14* 3.32* 2.19 1.72 2.84 1.52 1.89 
 (1.60) (1.53) (1.64) (1.59) (1.48) (1.71) (1.67) (1.65) 
         
Observations 96
130
 95
131
 93
132
 98
133
 99
134
 99
135
 96
136
 97
137
 
R-squared 0.77 0.68 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.79 0.80 
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01 
                                                 
130
 Model 1, 8 outliers: Belgium (1984-89), Denmark (1974-79), France (1975-79), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1990-94, 
1995-99), Switzerland (2000-05), US ( 
131
 Model 2, 9 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Italy  (2000-05), Norway (1980-84, 1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1970-
74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1995-99) 
132
 Model 3, 11 outliers: Belgium (1990-94, 1995-99),  Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1989-94), Ireland (2000-05), Japan (1990-
94), Netherlands (1990-94; 1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Spain (1995-99;2000-05) 
133
 Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 6 outliers: Australia (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05),  Norway (1970-74), 
Switzerland (1989-94; 2000-05), US (2000-05) 
134
 Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Australia (2000-05), France (1975-79), Switzerland (1990-94; 2000-05), 
US (1995-99) 
135
 Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 5 outliers:  Australia (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05),  Norway (1970-74), 
Switzerland (1989-94), US (1995-99) 
136
 Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 8 outliers: Australia (1995-99, 2000-05), Italy (2000-05), Sweden (1990-94), 
Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05), US (2000-05) 
137
 Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Finland (1985-89), Italy (2000-05), Norway (1980-
84), Switzerland (1984-89, 1995-99, 2000-05), UK (2000-05) 
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7 Chapter 7 
Table 7.1: OLS Regression Results, All Indices 
 Family Working Child Support-Women‘s 
 Leave Time Care Employment 
     
Female Cabinet Ministers 6.46** 2.78* 2.90 12.14** 
 (2.94) (1.43) (1.78) (4.32) 
Female Social Welfare Ministers -0.17 -0.33 0.19 -0.31 
 (0.46) (0.30) (0.20) (0.77) 
Female Legislators -0.22 2.66* -0.71 1.73 
 (2.76) (1.35) (1.88) (4.64) 
Women‘s Movements -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.23 
 (0.44) (0.17) (0.23) (0.69) 
Left Government -0.25 0.30 -0.59** -0.54 
 (0.37) (0.19) (0.23) (0.56) 
Strikes 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union Density 1.96 -0.45 -0.94* 0.58 
 (1.16) (0.63) (0.49) (1.83) 
GDP per Capita  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Federal  0.23 -0.16 -0.15 -0.09 
 (0.29) (0.18) (0.20) (0.52) 
European Union Membership 1.55*** 0.06 0.21 1.82** 
 (0.43) (0.22) (0.23) (0.66) 
CD Welfare State 0.84 0.95*** -0.77** 1.01 
 (0.56) (0.28) (0.33) (0.98) 
SD Welfare State 0.64 0.47 0.01 1.13 
 (0.68) (0.44) (0.45) (0.95) 
Constant -0.89 1.53*** 2.05*** 2.69 
 (1.01) (0.51) (0.52) (1.75) 
     
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.66 0.37 0.68 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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